Journal of Philosophical Investigations in Scopus
Year:2018 | Volume:12 | Issue:22 |Papers Count:13

The present paper examines the concept of the meaning of life in the Soren Kierkegaard’ s view. Kierkegaard sees the concept of "meaning" as "end" and believes in "biology" as the supreme biologist. Based on evidence from his works, he believes that the end is not to be discovered in biology, but it is creatable. There are three witnesses to this: first, the end is, in Kierkegaard''''''''s view, paradoxical, and paradox is not real, but mental. Secondly, Christianity, in his opinion, is anxious, not religious, and religion is unreasonable, and in relation to the mind not connected with the outside, and third, that he does not consider God as an active being, but rather the existence of anxiety, The mind and mind of man. Kierkegaard''''''''s predictions in this evidence include ontological non-reality, individualism, and faith. An analysis of these three presumptions suggests that Kierkegaard believed in the supposition of meaning in life.

The main headstone of Illumination wisdom is light, such as the one of the transcendent wisdom is existence. According to Mulla sadra, the founder of transcendent wisdom, the existence in his philosophy is the same as the light in Suhrawardi's illuminative school. But there is some of existence kinds such as body that is not light in Suhrawardi doctrines; and he believes that only sensible light is a light among all of material things; this point of view is very powerful impediment to know that light and existence are same. So that, Mulla sadra make efforts to criticize the doctrine of Suhrawardi in this subject. Abstract of Mulla sadra criticizes is that: or all of material things are light or the sensible light also is not. This article want to explain that even according to the some principles of transcendent wisdom such as relation between "real and delicate"[1] there is no conflict between Suhrawardi idea; so also the matter is darken and also the sensible light is light.

A problem concerning Aristotle’ s psychology asks where its right place of study is. Should it be studied in physics or in metaphysics or some part of it in physics and some other part in metaphysics? There are two views concerning the place of psychology according to Aristotle’ s philosophy of science and both find evidences in Aristotle’ s own books, but this article criticizes them and shows that in spite of the Aristotelian texts, one cannot consider psychology as a physical science. This paper tries to show that according to Aristotelian principles, psychology is a metaphysical science and Aristotle’ s texts show nothing but the close relationship between psychology and physics. Likewise, although Avicenna himself puts the discussion of soul in his Physics but we try to show that according to him the right place of psychology is in another science.

Donald Thomas Campbell is among the psychology and sociology scientists which has played a great role in developing the evolutionary approach towards philosophy of science, morals and in particular epistemology. Campbell named his epistemological ideas which are a kind of descriptive epistemology, evolutionary epistemology. In this approach, he uses the logic of natural selection process to explain the different levels of epistemology from biological levels to culture and science levels. In other words, he is trying to classify the general theories on the epistemology relating to the natural selection by the data gained from biology, psychology, and sociology sciences. Campbell considers blind variation and selective retention mechanism as universal mechanism of evolutionary processes among biological, learning, creativity and scientific changes processes. In this paper, in addition to giving a descriptiveanalytical report and criticizing the evolutionary epistemology of Campbell, we also pay attention to the psychological results of his evolutionary epistemology.

In the first moment of the analytic of the beautiful, in the first section of his book, Kant analyses judgment of taste (which he defines as judging something to be beautiful) concerning its quality. He writes: in order to call something beautiful, a human being must judge it as the object of impartial satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This "disinterestedness" or "impartiality" of the judgment of taste has attracted many scholars of Kant's aesthetics, on the one hand because of its importance for Kant's analysis and, on the other hand, because of its ambiguous character. One of the prominent figures who was attracted by this part of Kant's analysis is Theodor Adorno. In this paper, I have tried to get a closer look at the first section of Kant's third Critique, put forward the discussions which it gave rise to and finally answer some of the critiques. Also, I will investigate in more details Adorno's ideas on the "disinterestedness" of judgment of taste and the consequences of this approach to the concept of beauty and arts; I will argue that how Adorno-based on his philosophy in relation to art and the concept of beauty, and with the use of an dialectical way of thinking-gives us a new point of view to look at the subject and theorizes that. In the end, I will try to answer some of the critiques with regard to other sections of the third Critique in order to have a better understanding of Kant's position.

Hobbes political thought is based on his twofold analysis of mankind: Human being, on one hand, as a composed material body in the network of mechanical forces follows his desires and passions. He, on the other hand, studies the concepts of right and duty in order to establish community through contract. Hobbes tries to reconcile his political system with materialistic analysis of human behavior. For this reason, in Hobbes thought, to be aware of political organization depends on recognizing human nature and to recognize human passions and moods depends on the recognition of mechanical principles and physical laws. Hobbes’ s ethics and politics are compatible with his mechanical materialism as well, and they are occasionally explained on the same ground. Our leading questions in this paper are as follows: 1. what are the characteristics of human nature as one of the main elements of Hobbes psychological system? 2. How has Hobbes compiled his political philosophy on the basis of human nature characteristics? This paper mainly claims that Human nature is based on the principles of motion and mechanical principles in Hobbes view, and as a result, mankind has not been able to establish political community naturally. Mankind is civil not naturally but compulsorily and should be forced to be social, that is to say, the political society order is not natural order but artificial one which is manifested in the content of contract items. Therefore Hobbes mechanical psychology prepare the way for his civil philosophy.

According to development of biology, particularly in the field of evolutionary biology, this science claim presented scientific explanation about human phenomena, including religion and ethics. About the origin of moral behavior in humans, a group of evolutionary biologists believe that ethical behavior in human beings has developed during evolutionary process over time while the other group of them believes that there are many differences between animals and human in ethical behaviors. In this paper we will talk about the altruistic behavior as a moral behavior and views of two groups of biologists will be reviewed. We have discussed around two subjects: biological explanations could not present meaningful difference about the nature of ethical behavior in human and animals; and, human nature necessitated a special kind of finality in human being’ s moral behaviors.

This paper is concerned with a general account of logicism as developed within Russell’ s philosophy of mathematics. At first Russell’ s approach in metaphysic was idealistic and he relied on this point of view for extending his platonic atomism. To expound this account it will be demonstrated that after developing platonic atomism, Russell attempted to present his logicism in The Principles of Mathematics as a view opposed to an idealistic account of mathematics. However, a number of paradoxes arose had their roots deep in Russell’ s metaphysical views. At this point he was forced to moderate his realistic extreme approach. Afterward it is shown that to evade these paradoxes, Russell adopts a view that allows for ontological distinctions and then introduces a full-fledged theory of types in Principia Mathematica. Nevertheless, the new framework yields problems of its own that pose a threat to Russell’ s objectcentered metaphysics but also deprives him of handling truths of unrestricted generality. Then to present a final version of his logicism, Russell’ s way out of these issues will be set forth which comes in form of axioms of reducibility and infinity. Although these axioms represent a solution to remove paradoxes, actually those are too complicated to use.

According to some theories about the nature of moral concepts, these concepts can be included into four categories: objective (external), philosophical, emotional (affective) and constructional (contractual). To solve some of the philosophical problems, Allameh Tabatabai suggests the new theory of constructional perceptions. Dividing the constructions, he considers ethics as a part of the constructional concepts. Some of the features he considers for moral conventions such as relativeness, originating from the feelings and needs, the lack of truth and falsifiability, etc., puts this theory in close similarity with the theory of moral emotionalism from Ayer, contemporary positivist philosopher. Aside from the commonalities of the two theories, there are fundamental differences between them that should not be ignored, including that by suggesting this view, Ayer seeks to reject the metaphysics, but by suggesting conventions theory (as a whole), Allameh seeks the consolidation of rationalization and philosophical principles.

Althusser is considered as a pioneer of Hegelian interpretation of Marx's theory. His theoretical framework presents the most complicated conception of social structure. He criticizes the concept of the subject, as the foundation of modern epistemology, as well as an ideological picture of human. By this means, he manifested the weakness of this concept. Through review of Marx’ s later works, he showed that contrary to what humanist Marxists claims, the importance of his work is producing a new problem; i. e. history as a material fact, independent to human conciseness and willing. In the modern theoretical field, he presents a new materialistic formation of the history of human social life. For Althusser, the most important result of this was exiting the concept of subject of the modern thought. His attempt to separat consciousness and subject leads to an essential evolution in Marxist structuralism. Althusser attempt to show that human isn’ t the actor of history and signifier of its direction. In principle, history is more the outcome of partial independence of economic, political and ideological structures, than the product of willing and consciousness and interaction of subject.

Ibn Sina’ s philosophy after Farabi's philosophy, with accurate search of opinions of the ancient Greek scholars, is the basis of Islamic philosophy and one of the basic foundations of the transcendent wisdom. The relation between the philosophy of Sina and Sadra is still susceptible numerous thematic studies. In this research, opinions of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra have been studied comparatively with regard to octet vertices. Among octet vertices, it was emphasized on the importance of four subjects: "Definition of Philosophy and its Importance", "Fundamentals and Problems of Philosophy", "The Position of Philosophy among the other Sciences", and "The Benefit and Place of Philosophy". The views of these two philosophers on the octet vertices of philosophy (as entrance to philosophy and some kind of looking from the outside into philosophy) are largely in line and compatible, although there are some disagreements. In many cases, Sadra makes assertions about Ibn Sina’ s opinions and mainly criticized and analyzed it from the Sina’ s viewpoint. And in spite of the supreme power of Sina’ s philosophy, he has sometimes forced to use transcendent wisdom because of its conceptual failure; therefore, it can be said that not only in the entrance of philosophy, but also in philosophical opinions, if the prophetic power of Sina’ s philosophy is combined with the conceptual richness of transcendent wisdom, we will have a more powerful and effective philosophical heritage for the contemporary philosophical dialogue.