RESEARCH ON METAPHYSIK
Year:2011 | Volume:47 | Issue:9-10|Papers Count:9

The contemporary approaches to moral philosophy have experienced diverging directions regarding the possibility and justification of reasoning. Hare claims that in spite of the fact that intuitivists like Moore, Ross, and Prichard block the use of reasoning by accepting the intuitiveness of knowledge of good and bad, emotivism takes the same rout by focusing on emotions and emphasizing the freedom of choice. While descriptivism and also naturalism accept the possibility of reasoning through admitting the indicative nature of ethical speech, they reject or limit the freedom of choice. He tries to justify both the freedom of choice and the possibility of rational reasoning in moral. In so doing, Hare takes refuge in the non-self-contradiction and compatibility principles to insist on the universalizability of rules of moral reasoning. To make judgments of relevance is the prerequisite in morals which subsequently encompasses universalizability and the possibility of reasoning. Using the linguistic analysis, Hare tries to show that as language in which predicate-logic governs statements, imperatives and moral sentences are governed by rational relationships and principles of compatibility. From this point of view, an individual’s judgments are justifiable, provided that it is not in contradiction with his previous judgments. The aim of this study is to state, analyze, and criticize Hare’s views regarding the provision of rational reasoning and its possibility in terms of the challenges he faces with regard to competing schools of thought.

Sheikhe Eshraq is known in the Islamic civilization as the first theorist of imaginational world. His important idea in Hekmat-al-Eshraq and other works in the proof of a world between lights world and material world as an isthmus (imaginational world or mundus imaginalis) between this world and hereafter or between spiritual world and obvious material world has important and significant effect on the expression of the universe stages in the works of Islamic wisdom such as Hazarate Khams (five divine beings) of Ibne Arabi.In order to describe and explain imaginational world, the use of imagination (which was used by Farabi as a factor to justify and explain Revelation and Prophethood and was analyzed completely by Avicenna in "Shefa") was more developed in the illuminationist wisdom and, as an esoteric faculty, it became a mirror reflecting imaginative forms of the imaginal world of imagination. Thus, referring to verses such as" then We sent her Our angel to human beings only" and appearance of Gabriel as Dahiee Kalbi to the prophet of Islam, the imaginational world became a source of ideal forms which appeared in the imagination of human and especially with regard to delicate point of Sheikh Eshraq in explaining the rule of Kon which considers an active role for the Wayfarer in creating such forms.The aim of this article is, first, to explain the faculty of imagination and its function as epistemological realm (continuous imagination) and also analyze ontological aspects of imagination, known as imaginational world or plan of ideal (discrete imagination), and then describe the role of these imaginations in founding the early and most important theosophical theories in the realm of Islamic art, literature and architecture (especially mosque).

Essential primary and technical common predications have two meanings equivocally: (1) as a qualification of the subject, (2) as a qualification of the proposition. The meaning which has been proposed by Mulla sadra is the second one and the first meaning, with this title, has gained its common use only after him. To avoid confusing them, one must use each of them in its proper place in every single proposition. The first meaning must be asserted immediately after the subject, since it concerns the concept-referent distinction in the subject. However, the second one must be asserted at the end of the proposition, since both subject and predicate are important in its realization. It shows either they are conceptually the same (conceptual unity) or subject is among the referents of the predicate (extension inclusion). To avoid the contradiction, these two meanings must be mentioned in one proposition simultaneously. For instance, it can be rightly said: “the particular with primary predication is universal with common predication” which means “the concept of the particular is among the referents of universal” or it can be rightly said: “the particular with primary predication is the particular with primary predication” which means “the concept of particular is the same as the particular conceptually”. By distinction between these two kinds of predication, Mulla sadra tries to solve some contradictory (paradoxical) instances and his commentators say explicitly that he has added a unity to the eight unities concerning the conditions of occurrence of a contradiction. However, the unity that can be added to the eight conditions is not only the second meaning of these predications, but both of them. Now, according to the two predications concerning the subject and also proposition (as a whole), as well as the quality of the propositions, i.e. affirmation and negation, we come across eight forms of propositions which two by two are contradictory.

According to Ibn Sina's logic, Lozomieh is the only conditional that is suitable to be named real conditional. Also Lozomieh is among the foundations of Ibn Sina’s logic that the rules Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens would be applied only to it. Analyzing the relation between premises and conclusion in various kinds of syllogism in ancient Logic shows the importance of Lozomieh too. After providing the truth conditions of Lozomieh, the central aim of the present article is to review different views about Lozomieh and its relation to various kinds of conditionals in Modern logic. These views are as follows: Some believe that Lozomieh is different from strict implication. Some believe Lozomieh is nearer to entailment than other kinds of implications. Some believe that Lozomieh has to be interpreted as relevant. And some believe that the definition of strict implication made by Lewis is the same as the definition of Lozomieh made by Abhary. Finally, after analyzing and criticizing these views, we want to bring to light the fact that to find the relation between Lozomieh and those of conditionals in modern Logic we have to compare all aspects of the paradigms of ancient logic and Modern logic. In addition, since the author believes that the material implication is absent in ancient logic and ancient logic is similar to relevant logic in many aspects, we have to compare the ancient logic as a paradigm to a kind of relevant logic that is substitution for material implication logic as another paradigm.

The concept of ''place'' depends on the modern understanding of being. Today, we regard place simply as a mathematical and measurable space which contains things. Furthermore, we regard this concept as a self-evident concept, while this conception belongs to modern understanding of being. Since in modern ages being is understood as an object, place is only measurable space that, in the final analysis, is not separate of the things themselves. But, in the traditional pre-modern thought, for example in Aristotle, since being means actuality and substance, in accordance to this concept place is the last level of the container of things. Place, for Aristotle, is a natural thing containing natural things but he does not think about it as a mere quantitative thing (as Descartes thinks so). Everything, according to its special nature, has natural place. Soil, water, air and fire, each one has its own special place. Heidegger, who believes that old and modern Metaphysical thought are based on neglecting the Truth of Being, criticizes traditional conception of place and tries to think about it according to the human beings Dasein, nearness and distance to Being and beings.

By emphasis on cognitive aspect of moral realism, this article surveys various divisions in moral realism and anti-realism and, regarding later Wittgenstein's courses, it explores his views about this matter. Thus, after a short description of Wittgenstein’s courses in Philosophical Investigations which are related to this topic, ideas of his commentators in this area are studied. Since moral realism has a firm relation with cognitive and non-cognitive discussion in meta-moral, thus later Wittgenstein’s view about this topic is also investigated. At the end, it is shown that calling Wittgenstein a realist or anti-realist is due to the wrong usage of reality grammar and he cannot be categorized as such.

Parallel to the emergence of Postmodernism and the collapse of modernist and Enlightenment ideals, Persian thinkers also theorized about this matter. One of these thinkers is Reza Davari Ardakani who challenges Modernism by using Heidegger’s ideas and Islamic-Shiites sources. Following phenomenological tradition, he introduces the West as a whole and in this way he criticizes those who distinguish between western science, technology, literature and western imperialism and politics. His line of criticism toward Modernism is Humanism and after such criticism he subverts other pillars of Modernism, that is, rationalism and science. He emphasizes the point that Postmodernism is not a period after Modernism but its final and crucial phase. On the basis of this, he believes that the only way out of Western and Humanist thinking is renouncing western ideologies and subjectivism. This article aims to investigate ideas of Reza Davari about the West with a philosophical view.