FOREIGN RELATIONS
Year:2016 | Volume:8 | Issue:1 (29)|Papers Count:10

The U.S. strategy against ISIS was contradictory and flawed. It was formulated at the threshold of Congressional elections in 2014, therefore, partisan predilections were obvious in it. Exploring this strategy and the reasons behind its formulation as well as its flaws can provide us a sound understanding of decision-making process in the U.S. regarding the Middle East issues that is very important for Iran. Although, Iran was not explicitly named in this strategy, it was implicitly regarded as a part of a long-term solution. For this reason, it was not surprising that in the Resolution 2254 passed by the Security Council, Iran's reservations were incorporated. Important issues which explain the situation are the particular structure of policy-making within the U.S. which is affected by Obama administration's predilections and internal pressures exerted on it, flaws and contradictions of this strategy and different views in the U.S. on the prospect of cooperation with Iran in struggle against ISIS and its obstacles. Within this framework, drawing upon the theory of bureaucratic politics developed by Graham Alison along with a more micro model called "providing commitment", this article gives an appropriate explanation on the manner in which the coalition against ISIS was declared. Generally, this coalition lacks seriousness and resolution and it will get into trouble without cooperating with Iran due to the fact that U.S. abstains from sending ground combat force to Syria.

This article studies American strategy toward China in the Persian Gulf to answer the question that what policy the United States as the hegemon power has followed toward China's increasing energy-dependency in the Persian Gulf. Has the United States followed a liberal policy and cooperated with China. Or it has followed the realist policy of containment and confrontation. This study through theoretical frameworks of liberal and realist versions of hegemonic stability theory, has argued that American strategy has been "Guarded Engagement" or a combination of both realist and liberal approaches. Washington has cooperated with China with respect of economy; but strategically and in response to post-9/11 crises, the war against Iraq and especially the nuclear programs of Iran, Washington has decisively tried to control China and to make Beijing follow American policies. In long term, the intrinsic paradox in Guarded Engagement strategy has undermined American hegemony in the Persian Gulf and its grand policy toward China. As China's relations with Persian Gulf countries expand, Beijing has followed its own interests more assertively; accordingly it has growing more difficult for the United States to control and contain Beijing in the framework of American policies.

The importance of the delimitation of maritime borders in the Persian Gulf lies in exploiting common oil and gas fields. There are many oil and gas fields in the Persian Gulf, some of which have been discovered and exploited, but others have not been discovered due to existing differences among regional countries over the delineation of the maritime borders. For example, maritime borders between Iran, on the one hand and Iraq, Kuwait and the UAE, on the other hand, have not yet been delineated. The main point here is that Iran gave significant concessions to Qatar and Saudi Arabia at the time of the delimitation of maritime borders, an issue which has remained unnoticed. Here, some questions are raised. First, what are geopolitical problems which prevented the delimitation of maritime borders in the Persian Gulf? Second, which model could be presented for the delimitation of these borders? Third, what are the concessions made by Iran to Arab countries? The main hypothesis of this article is that the geopolitical problems due to the existence of islands and some territorial claims made by some countries against others are the main factors responsible for the failure of attempts made so far to delineate the maritime borders. Its secondary hypothesis is that Iran, at the time of the delimitation of its maritime borders with some regional countries, has given up a large part of common oil and gas fields, which must have been belonged to Iran, to its unfriendly neighbors, because of the adoption of some unusual techniques.

The region of Southwestern Asia has become a scene for the rivalry of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia following the fall of Saddam in 2003 and recent developments in the Arab world, so that gaining influence in strategic zones is of great importance for the two sides. In the process, adopting realist policies by Saudi Arabia in the region and its efforts for containing Iran can increase tension in their respective influence zones. Along these lines, each actor defines its power at the regional level and formulates a strategy on the basis of geopolitical elements, this could be considered in the framework of identifying the genome map of each other and decision-making to ensure national interests, because actors usually try to regulate their behavior based on geopolitical codes. Therefore, the authors seek to answer the question that what is the impact of regional geopolitical code on political behavior of Iran and Saudi Arabia and their rivalry in Southwestern Asia. This article explains geopolitical rivalry between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Southwestern Asia by using a descriptive –analytical methodology and relying upon data collected from library sources. Along these lines, the behavior of each actor is explored based on regional geopolitical codes in the field of geo-strategy (Syria, Bahrain, Iraq and Yemen) and reasons for their presence in these countries are evaluated. Also, in the field of geo-economy, energy factor is examined in the behavior of each of these actors.

Understanding the European Union policy toward Iran's nuclear issue and essential factors shaping this policy is important and it can act as a useful experience for the Islamic Republic of Iran in its relations with the Union and its members. The main question is about the EU policy toward Iran's nuclear issue and the factors influencing it directly. The purpose of this article is to see how the Islamic Republic of Iran can gain valuable understanding from these unstable relations to shape its policy toward the EU and its members. The main argument is that the EU-Iran relations from the early years of emergence of the Islamic Revolution in 1980s have been a cycle of engagement and contrast, and the EU policy towards Iran's nuclear issue could be understandable in this context. This cycle is rooted in two main issues: Iran's foreign policy toward major powers in international system in general and toward the West in particular. At the same time, the US policy toward Iran, the security and stability of Middle East, EU strategic relations with Iran's rivals and opponents have also been important factors in shaping EU policy toward Iran. Moreover, estimates made by some European intelligence services about Iran's nuclear activities have played an important in this regard.

Lebanon is a country located in the Middle East. This country, despite its small size, is of great geopolitical significance. The political and social structure of Lebanon compared to other Arab countries in the Middle East is very different. Lebanon's social structure has unique features that distinguish it from other societies. Its democratic system is considered a defining feature which makes it different from other Arab countries. It is a consociational democracy which is applicable to the societies with deep ethnic and religious divisions. In these kinds of societies, majority democracy is not considered a feasible system. The main question posed by this article is that why and how consociational democracy could provide peace and stability in this country? The answer to this question is advanced in the framework of the hypothesis that consociational democracy based on the distribution of power in Lebanon, and supported by a foreign power, paves the way for involved groups to look for their interests in compromise and cooperation and not in conflict.