Essays in Philosophy and Kalam
Year:2017 | Volume:48 | Issue:97 |Papers Count:7

Essential and attributive unity are considered among the most important types of unity. In this writing, the views and ideas of Qāḍī Sa‘īd Qummī and ‘Allāma Majlisī concerning this issue are studied. These two great thinkers, besides being disagreed upon the meaning of essential unity (tawḥīd-i dhātī), are totally different, and rather contradictory, on the ontological principles and substructures, on the basis of which they have proved the essential unity and have discrepancies about the attributive unity, as well. One of the discourses associated with attributive unity is the doctrine of the objectivity of essence and attributes. ‘Allāma Majlisī is among its proponents and Qāḍī Sa‘īd Qummī is among the opponents; however, he accepts objectivity at the Divinity level. Acceptance of principality of existence and its essential concomitants drives ‘Allāma Majlisī toward reconciliation between tashbīh (assimilation) and tanzīh (Divine Transcendence); but Qāḍī Sa‘īd’s opposition to these principles and his belief in detachment of ranks in the existence of God, has led him to partiality to the theory of tanzīh as essence andtashbīh as attributes.

Deleuze presents his ontology as a post-Kantian philosophy. The main concern of post-Kantian philosophy, from Solomon Maimon to Hegel, was to construct a new metaphysics after critique of Kant and elucidation of the creation of existence. Resorting to the metaphysics of Spinoza and Leibniz as well as the philosophy of Nietzsche, Deleuze founded a new ontology. This ontology, contrary to the Hegelian ontology that had based the creation of existence on a negative principle, explains this creation on an affirmative basis. According to Deleuze, there is a totally affirmative impression of existence with Spinoza and Nietzsche that can be used for founding a new ontology. Eventually, it is this same affirmative notion that founds both a new ontology and ethics.

The inner nature (fiṭra) and the innate affairs in man is among the important discourses, which has a long record in Islamic and Western thought; and many philosophers and thinkers have talked about it, in particular, on proving it, to the extent that even some authorities in Islamic philosophy have considered the acceptance of innate ethical perceptions as the best solution to ethical relativism. In this writing, first the applications of the word innate (fitrī) is stated about human perceptions, then Mullā Ṣadrā’s viewpoint about each of these applications is presented and finally it is concluded that, contrary to some Western philosophers such as Plato and Leibniz, from the viewpoint of Mullā Ṣadrā and according to his specific humanistic principles such as the corporeal contingency of the soul, man does not have innate perception as a priori acquired perceptions and cognitions that is expedient to his creation and having been accompanied to him from the beginning. Furthermore, according to such principles as “concomitance of existence and knowledge”, “simple knowledge shared among human beings”, “knowledge caused by essence itself requires knowledge about the cause”, the innate perception by presence in Mullā Ṣadrā’s viewpoint is acceptable.

Mīrza Mahdī Iṣfahānī, the founder of Tafkīk School (separatism) and one of the contemporary figures opposing philosophy in the present era, has falsified the method of the theologians, philosophers, and mystics concerning acquiring religious knowledge and believes that he has provided a new way that is compatible with religious law (sharī‘a). Separating Divine knowledge from human knowledge, he believes that the Divine knowledge that is acquired through paying attention to luminous intellect, innate knowledge, and by referring to the external meanings (ẓawāhir) of traditions is totally distinct from human knowledge, which is achieved through logical argument. In justification of this viewpoint, Mīrza Mahdī Iṣfahānī has presented new meanings for intellect, science, and reasoning and calls the knowledge acquired in this method as Divine knowledge in contrast to human knowledge. Nevertheless, in practice, Mīrza Mahdī has not abided by this viewpoint and when explaining and proving what he claims, he has employed the very logical argument that he has called it human. On the other hand, despite his recommendation as to understanding religious text with a clear mind, Mīrzā’s impressions are totally based on his separatist (tafkīkī) preconceptions and, as a result, in many instances he has drifted away from the external meanings of the traditions and has interpreted the traditions according to his own viewpoints and contrary to their external meanings. It is attempted in this writing to critically examine Mīrzā Mahdī’s viewpoint on religious knowledge method and disclose the incompatibilities existing in Mīrzā’s viewpoint in theory and in practice.

Principality of Existence and the mentally positedness of quiddity is the issue constituting the foundation of many philosophical problems. This principle, as existing today in philosophical fields, has not been nourished in illumination school. Nevertheless, with respect to the principle of “non-addition of existence over quiddity in external world” in his works, and the arguments he has provided to prove this principle under the rubric of proofs on mentally positedness of existence, Suhrawardi is accused of accepting the notion of principality of essence. However, the discourse of the principality of existence in Mullā Ṣadrā’s works is clearly stated with respect to the proofs he has provided to prove this principle, and also due to his criticizing the arguments of those believing in mentally positedness of existence. In this article, it is tried to examine Suhrawardi’s proofs on mentally positedness of existence and Mullā Ṣadrā’s critiques on it.

One of the significant discourses of theoretical mysticism in Islam is the discussion about khātam al-awliyā (seal of the Saints). Mystics believe whatever exists in the world of being is a locus of manifestation for the Exalted God’s manifestation. God has attributes and names that each needs a locus of manifestation to show itself. One of God’s significant names is Walī; that also needs a locus of manifestation, and Saints of Allah (awliya’ ilāhī) are the manifestations of this wilāya (sainthood, guardianship, friendship). Since one day the world and the Divine manifestations will come to an end, it is necessary that the manifestation of the name Walī would have a seal, with whose appearance the world would come to an end. As to whom this Seal will apply, mention has been made in Ibn ‘Arabī’s works of Jesus Christ (A.S.), Imam Mahdī (Aj.), and Ibn ‘Arabī himself. In this article, we intend to bring up and critique the viewpoint of Mu’ayyid al-Dīn Jandī, one of the commentators of Ibn ‘Arabī and his Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, who firmly insisted that Ibn ‘Arabī was the Seal of the Saints, and then to prove, with a brief reference to Qayṣarī’s viewpoint, that Ibn ‘Arabī cannot be the Seal of the Saints.

From the viewpoint of Ṣadr al-Mut’allihīn and under the influence of the principles of transcendental philosophy, the reality of education is to remove the obstacles from the way of Divine Emanation. With some methods, human soul finds theoretical or practical knowledge by way of acquisition or the knowledge that is of existential reality without acquisition. A general glance at Mullā Ṣadrā’s works, remarks, or scattered assertions, implies that education is divided into two external and internal categories. The internal education includes thinking, inspiration, and revelation, and the external education consists of immediate and mediate types. From the Mullā Ṣadrā’s point of view, education has its specific preconditions and techniques, without which it would not be deservedly and correctly acquired. Purification and reinforcement of theoretical principles, solitude, and avoidance of imitation, practice, repetition, peace of mind, observing the order of learning doctrines, their combination, and taking the right course are among these techniques. Mullā Ṣadrā’s difference in stating the types and techniques of education is reflected in the difference in the perspective of transcendental philosophy toward knowledge as well as the ultimate goal of education and its Divine nature.