NAQD VA NAZAR
Year:2022 | Volume:26 | Issue:4 ( 104)|Papers Count:7

For Aristotle, happiness corresponds to the highest kind of virtue. In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle treats practical virtues, and in Book X, he treats theoretical contemplation as the best practice that might guarantee happiness. Thus, Aristotle might be said to have given two answers (naturalistic and theological) to the question of the nature of happiness. This is because the self-sufficient character of happiness implies its intrinsic value, and practical activities— which are deemed intrinsically valuable in Book I are treated as having secondary value, in Book X, as a means to the higher (theoretical) happiness. Some people believe that Aristotle has finally failed to remain committed to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental good, falling into a contradiction in his definition of happiness. In this paper, in the first place, we draw on the analytic method and revisit the notion of kalon to show that the function of theoretical reason in acquisition of moral virtues goes beyond what is claimed by naturalistic readings. Indeed, happiness is fundamentally a theological property. Secondly, we outline two senses of self-sufficiency (the dominant end, and the comprehensive end) to suggest that the second sense enables us to reconcile the two notions of “ being secondary or subsidiary” and “ being done for its own sake, ” in which case a proper reply might be yielded for the problem of contradiction.

Because of the practical intention, Aristotle in the Ethica Ninomachea studies the principles of action of them some part are the virtues which practices aimed to and another are interior foundations including soul’ s parts and humankind identity as a ethical agent. The main question about the foundations of action is the connection between soul’ s parts and the virtues as they leads to ethical action. In present article firstly described every parts of the humankind’ s soul in virtue of its role in realization of action and their internal relationship so as to study their connection with virtues as the final causes of the moral practice. On the practical anthropology of Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics action is the conclusion of the rational and irrational parts’ interaction of the soul. Any practice is the consequence of Desire and understanding’ combination which intend virtues as the final goal. Action therefore is an occurrence emerge from complicated and continual interaction among the rational and irrational parts of the soul on the one hand which has mutual connection with final virtues. Because of this relationship between desire and understanding Aristotle says that the Vices destroy the foundations of virtues.

Muslim and Christian physicalists seek to provide physicalistic accounts of the doctrine of resurrection. At first, it might seem that human monism and physicalism about the resurrection went through the same or similar developments in Islam and Christianity. In this paper, we offer the similarities and differences of physicalism in Islam and Christianity. With the library method, we studied the work of Sayyid Murtadâ and John Hick as influential Muslim and Christian theologians to consider the issue. We conclude that although both have sought to prove the possibility of resurrection by drawing on reason as their epistemic source, the difference in the context of their inclination toward physicalism might be cast in this way: Sayyid Murtadâ was led from physical resurrection to human monism, while John Hick was led from human monism to physical resurrection. Hick’ s argument for the possibility of resurrection is superior to SayyidMurtadâ s because it includes all human persons. Both thinkers, despite their temporal distance, have offered similar accounts of the human nature and the criterion of identity, but they offer different accounts of physical resurrection. Sayyid Murtadâ tries to reconcile his views with religious doctrines, while Hick rejects Christian doctrines that go against his view.

Religious experience has been a significant issue in Western philosophy since Renaissance, which led to developments in the thoughts of some Muslim intellectuals. Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, influenced by such developments, offers religious experience as the core of all religions, believing that religious beliefs, practices, and rulings are functions from such experiences. For him, religious experience is rational and knowledge-conferring. Moreover, Quranic verses should be understood in terms of religious experience. Since the approach has a remarkable role to play in our interpretation of the Quran, it seems necessary to examine Mojtahed Shabestari’ s view. Drawing on the analytic-critical method, we conclude that religious experience is a product of Christian philosophy, which cannot be properly applied to Islam. Unlike religious experience, revelation is exclusive, and the two are indeed essentially different. Sense data are not authoritative and do not confer knowledge because of their fallibility. Religious experiences are themselves constrained by traditions, and hence, they cannot serve as grounds for the rationality of religious beliefs. Because of their sensory character, religious experiences cannot be accommodated within concepts. Thus, they cannot be criteria for an understanding of the Quran.

Similar to other economic and political theories which are based on philosophical foundations, communist economy which is mainly rooted in socialistic ideas of Karl Marx has no expiration date and can be considered as an important management option under every circumstance. As under current circumstances where COVID-19 pandemic has led to severe economic problems and increasing unemployment, many theorists believe that capitalism and liberalism are not efficient now and recommend a return to some narratives of socialism. In this article, we try to study communist economy from the viewpoint of moral criticisms of Friedrich Hayek and Ayn Rand. To morally criticize communist economy, these two thinkers have considered items such as violating the individuals' rights and freedom in socialism and destruction of the individuals' identity. Rand takes a deeper and more philosophical approach to criticize moral foundations of socialism and the theory of communist economy while Hayek considers moral and social consequences of this viewpoint on the society.

Existentialist therapy is a new method of psychotherapy aimed at an identification and resolution of human concerns. Two prominent scholars of the field are Irvin Yalom and Viktor Frankl who, despite their disagreements, pushes the boundaries of this new-fangled field of psychotherapy with their remarkable research. Yalom believes that, on the existentialist approach, meaning should be created in life, whereas Frankl as the founder of the method of logotherapy believes that the nature of humans is religious, and the meaning of life should be found or discovered, and not created. However, this meaning is either momentary and subjective or universal, which is the super-meaning. Drawing on the descriptiveanalytic method, we try in this paper to consider the views of these psychotherapists, identifying their weak and strong points. It turns out that while Yalom sees religion and tradition as proper sources of the meaningfulness of life, he never allows them into his own theory. In contrast, Frankl makes much of the institution of religion and God in the human life, clarifying his spiritual tendency with the theory of super-meaning and the possibility of there being a super-world. We conclude that, despite their prima facie differences, the meaning-making and meaning-finding views are not contradictory. Instead, they can be reconciled and rendered supplementary.

After the decline of positivism and the rise of values, the issue of the meaning of life found its way into philosophy as an independent problem. However, the meaning of life was a constant ordinary concern of man. Modern people often live in metropolises, and the meaning of life for them is affected by metropolitan structures. Accordingly, the pursuit of a meaning for the modern life should consider how humans are affected by such structures. In this paper, we turn to architecture as a major component of metropolitan life, which has tremendously transformed the appearance of cities. After an examination of developments and characteristics of three architectural elements-house, street, and glass-we grapple with the question: What characteristics does modern architecture have, and how do they affect the meaning of life? The method of our research is library and analytic. Our findings suggest that semantic elements of each component are extremely shared or belong to a shared ancestor. In this way, it turns out that modern architecture in metropolises tend to have similar properties, which direct challenges about the meaning of life at selfalienation, objectification, loneliness, superficiality, anxiety, and loss of safety.