Sophia Perennis
Year:2021 | Volume:17 | Issue:39|Papers Count:12

We are aiming to show why human beings are accustomed to ask metaphysical questions. However, we will ask this question as a metametaphysical question. We show that a mature metaphysics will never be able to explain ever raising metaphysical questions nor to determine its metaphysical questions unless it extendedly discusses the questionability of metaphysics. To this aim we first set a framework for possible alternative theories about the questionability of metaphysics and then, as a case study, based on Maecus Willaschek interpretation of Kant first critique, will show how two-layer critique of Kant has cleverly set forth this framework and gives his own answer.

The Famous thinkers, explains Ī ji's view of ethics, like other Ash'arites, as one of divine command theory, But he does not consider moral good and evil to be limited to the meaning of the merit of praising the Shari'a and blame, sometimes also means perfection and imperfection or expediency and corruption. According to Ī ji's moral ontology, it can be attributed to him that he is realist based on the promise to reason good and evil and he is subjectivist based on the promise to religious good and evil. Although he does not make a logical connection between good and evil moral meanings, he accepts Argument ability for meaning of reason good and evil. his reason for not communicating logically between these meanings, which is God's compulsion, seems invalid because, if explained logically, God's legislative will is based on God's creative will, and it will not be forced by a non-god.

In confirming the theory that the fanā or Waḥ dat al-wujū d in Islamic mysticism is due to the entry of Vedanta's teachings into the Islamic world, Zaehner paid attention to some of Bayazid's statements and tried hard to reconcile some of his statements with the words of the Upanishads. In describing his ascension (miraj), Bayazid called what he saw in this journey a khudā (deception) and This prompted Zaehner to introduce "deception" as the equivalent of "Maya" in the Shvetashvatara Upanishad. In order to strengthen his theory, he also tried to find a suitable equivalent in the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgī tā among some of the other titles that Bayazid mentioned in his Ascension. In this writing, by proving the Islamic origin of the interpretation of "deception" and also by arguing the semantic difference between "deception" and "Maya", the inaccuracy of Zaehner's claim is revealed and his theory about the influence of Vedanta on Islamic mysticism is challenged.

Closed-mindedness is an intellectual vice that that degrades people intellectually and practically. Academic practice, in particular, requires an open mind which is susceptible of critical dialogue, that is, the same virtues and skills that are at the opposite end of the spectrum. Thus, if we take closed-mindedness as a vice that should be avoided by the general public, it is a devastating flaw for academics in particular that undermines the different functions of their activities. In this paper, after outlining a framework that provides an opportunity to discuss the importance and impact of moral and intellectual virtues and vices on academic activity, we turn to the main features of closed-mindedness and what makes it an intellectual vice. Then, we show how this vice misleads the three functions of academic practice and degrades them, while open-mindedness enriches these functions and helps them to be realized in the best possible way.

The present paper is initially intended to provide an introduction to the literature on the metaphysics and semantics of dispositions in analytic philosophy. To this end, I characterize five semantic approaches to disposition ascriptions (the simple conditional analysis, the modified conditional analyses, the unanalyzable approach, the generic account, and the graded models) and show what kind of metaphysic is consistent with each of them. With this survey on the table, I am inclined to say that the arguments against the simple and modified conditional analyses are sufficiently good to refute these analyses. In addition to that, I put forward several arguments against the generic account and the graded model, arguing that the unanalyzable approach is preferable to its opponents. Finally, given this analyzability and the possibility of unmanifesting dispositions, I side with the kind of dispositionalism suggested by Martin and Heil.

This paper attempts to pursue the critique of Platonic Chorismos relating to Heidegger’ s later thought and thereby to reveal what kind of necessity is involved in the difference, priority and transcendence of ‘ the clearing’ (Lichtung) or the Being as such, as the origin of the ontological difference, with regard to the Being of beings and the understanding of Being according to the problem of Phenomenology, i. e. the possibility of appearance and phenomenality. This necessity will be first considered by interpretation of the difference and priority of ‘ the clearing’ with regard to the status of phenomenological Apriori in Heidegger’ s earlier and later thought by his referring to Plato’ s Doctrine of Recollection; then, Heidegger’ s interpretation of Plato’ s Doctrine of Ideas, especially the Idea of the Good, will be pursued too in three periods in Heidegger’ s thought in order to disclose the transcendence and separation of ‘ the clearing’ from Being and appearance, and consequently, the concealment and unavailability of ‘ the clearing’ at least in a deep nexus with Plato’ s Allegories of Sun and Cave; a connection that has to be emphasized in contrast to Heidegger’ s own position against Plato’ s Doctrine of Truth.

The present paper gives an overview of Heidegger's way of thinking, but against the main stream of his studies, that divides his thinking in two steps: before the so called "the turn" and after it. Thus it has been talked about Heidegger I and II too. This paper but presents his thinking as a way with some turns, that can be summarized into four main steps. Heidegger himself talks about three formulations and three steps of his question of being: “ the question of the meaning of being” , the “ question concerning the truth of being” and finally the “ question concerning the location of being” or "topology of Being". This article recognizes the time before summer 1923 as the fourth step, in which Heidegger’ s thinking belong to Philosophy of life. So the task of this paper is the explication of these steps, their spans and their relations to each other.

We narrate humans as we see and feel them, and we do this by drawing upon terms that are understandable by others as well. A Sufi or a mystic, however, is like a dream-stricken mute who has an experience which cannot be expressed by words. In order to communicate the experience, he or she has to deploy linguistic expressions. Thus, he or she makes a recourse to words, and in order to avoid misunderstandings, he elucidates what he or she means by these words. In this article, we have critically edited the Persian treatise Sharḥ-i Muṣ ṭ alaḥ ā t-i Ṣ ū fiyya. In the preface of the article, we are concerned with the history of the origin of Sufi terms and their expositions among Sufis, as we have introduced instances of Sufi work in which these terms are elucidated. What is critical about Sufi terms is whether they are grounded in the Qur’ an and ḥ adī ths or are just coined by Sufis. Although Sufism has obviously been influenced by non-Islamic schools of thought, the theory that Sufi terms are rooted in the Qur’ an is very popular among Sufis, historians of Sufism, and contemporary scholars of Sufism. We aslo have compared this treatise with the treatise Rashf al-Alḥ ā ẓ fī Kashf al-Alfā ẓ attributed to Sharaf al-Dī n Ḥ usayn ibn Ulfatī Tabrī zī which bears strong similarity to our treatise in its content.

Based on Dasā tir’ s approach, world history is divided into some basic periods (Mehī n Charkh) andeach of these main periods is divided into some shorter periods (Kehī n Charkh). The big period in which we are has begun with “ Ā bā d” , the prophet who all of the people in the current world are of his generation. After Ā bā d’ s period, three short periods have been passed until fifth-period “ Golshā hī ā n” . Studying Dasā tirian criteria for the beginning and end of the one period, it is shown “ Kay khō srow” is the final prophet of Golshā hī ā n and Zoroaster is the first prophet of the consequent period. Concerning this fact that “ Sā sā n V” is the final prophet of the Zoroastrian period and “ Parvī z” is the last divine king in Dasā tir, it is demonstrated that Dasā tir should be considered as the enunciation of Ā zarkeyvā n who is the first prophet of the seventh short period.

The connection between Plato's Philosophy and Illuminationist Wisdom can be found, regardless of Suhrawardi's statements about Plato as one of the most prominent sages endowed with gnostic intuition, through the analysis of the agreements between these two philosophers in treatment of the key ideas rooted in what Suhrawardi calls “ the eternal substance of wisdom” . According to this method, which goes beyond the mere historical researches, the works of the two philosophers are compared in respect of possessing themes concerning spirituality and initiatic path. The goal of the true philosophy conceived and practiced by Plato and Suhrawardi is happiness, and this happiness amounts to the likeness to God. Therefore, the most fundamental theme in this philosophy is the homogeneity of human essence with divine truths which has been forgotten as a result of attachment to body. The initial principle of philosophy as a spiritual path is thus the remembrance of the deiform self as a capacity in man to achieve that goal. Suhrawardi and Plato, in addition to reasoning about this theme, have also dealt with it in a symbolic-allegorical way. The symbols concerning the theme in question can be found particularly in Suhrawardi's mystical treatises and in such Plato’ s dialogues as Republic and Phaedrus. Symbols such as hedgehog, dewdrop, bird, heart and world reflecting cup, winged chariot, eye of soul and their correlated symbols, such as captivity in trap, leather, cave and hole, burial in grave are all representative of the dual status of man, celestial as well as mundane.

There are some evidences in Suhrawardī ’ s works about the preference of the practice compared with theoretical research that it can direct us to the preference of practical theosophy towards theoretical wisdom with giving some reasons. Theoretical wisdom was prioritized compared with practical theosophy before Suhrawardī , especially in Peripatetic school, but Suhrawardī established a wisdom by using illuminative way with the discussing way and by prioritizing this way compared with the discussing way by criticizing Peripatetics in which practical wisdom is prioritized, the priority in terms of essence not time. Mystical journey and aceticism is a impartible part of Suhrawardī ’ s practical theosophy. His wisdom is an intuitive and mystical wisdom in which Hakim experience the realities objectively not subjectively. Hence we can called Suhrawardī an empiricist philosopher, an intuitive and mystical experiment. The priority of practical wisdom over theoretical wisdom is investigable in his written thought and also in his practical life.

Among the conceptual ingredients of natural kinds, concerning living creatures specially, has been the idea of essentialism. This idea however was challenged by the evolutionary theory in biological world which provided a new view of biological species. In order to analyze the relation between natural kinds and essentialism, I focus on reasons motivated philosophers to invoke the idea of natural kinds and show that this motivation was principally epistemological, i. e. to solve inductive problems. In this view, essentialism, in its strong from, is considered to be a redundant condition for natural kinds, Essentialism, in its weaker sense, , is however required, meaning that properties underlying induction must be shared by every individual of a kind, in order to warrant the inductive inference. A consequence of weakening essentialism in natural kinds is the possibility to suggest a unified concept of natural kinds for various sciences, biological and physical.