The purpose of this article is to examine the dimensions of containment and deterrence policies in Russia-US relations and analyze their impact on Iran's interests and security. Considering Russia as a revisionist power that challenges its superior position in the international arena, the US is trying to contain Russia with the same nature of the Soviet era, aiming to limit influence, reduce strategic weight, constraint geopolitical power and change its behavior to serve its own interests. On the other side, Russia, which stands for the restoration of its great power status, sees the policy of containment not only as a threat and an obstacle to the realization of this ideal, but also as a challenge to good global governance. Moscow's response to US containment policy is deterrence, which is pursued proportionately to the type of threats differing from military to economic and at various domestic, regional, and international levels. This paper, with a descriptive-analytical approach, focusing on Putin's third and fourth terms, will examine containment and deterrence polices in Russia-US relations in theoretical framework of these concepts and their consequences on Iran. It is argued that although the application of containment and deterrence in new trends in international relations has been problematic due to diversification and simultaneous threats and threatenings, given the continuing competition for power and sensitivity of geopolitical and security matters in Russia-US relations, these two polices will continue with greater complexity. In summary, it is emphasized that containment and deterrence have different consequences for Iran. Russia's resistance to Washington's aggressive policy and its willingness to cooperate with Iran as an anti-hegemonic force is the positive side and being a subject to possible US-Russian reconciliation, for example under strategic stability concept, to avoid the costs of containment and deterrence is the negative effects of these two strategies on Tehran's interests and security.