IRANIAN REVIEW OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Year:2012 | Volume:3 | Issue:1 (9)|Papers Count:9

Along with the evident trend of Iran’s rising power in the region in recent years, one of the issues that have gained less attention is the obstacles and constraints faced with by the emerging powers in the realm of international politics as they try to acquire further power and influence. In fact, the existing great powers do not show any willingness to accept the rising powers or even try to prevent their advancement by ignoring them. However, given the characteristics of Iran’s national power and political system, which is based upon its religious values, typically there are different challenges and constraints ahead of Iran, which are not experienced by the other countries. These challenges arise from Iran’s ideological confrontation with the prevailing international system. At the same time, Iran has to continue its life in this international system and even to increase its power. Is it possible to suggest a special behavioral pattern for the Islamic Republic of Iran that would enable it to counter the constraints and increasing challenges ahead of it, which would rely on the particular conditions of its political system? This article suggests that the new pattern of ‘cooperation and critique’ for the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran for engaging the arena of international politics under the new conditions in such a way that it could counter the possible challenges and threats, while continuing to acquire and manage power.

Political relations between the United States and post-Revolutionary Iran have been almost constantly in turmoil. Obama’s rise to power in the U.S. brought some hope for ‘change’ and a new drive for good in America’s relationship with Iran. This paper studies the four Persian New Year (Nowruz) messages of March 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, sent by U.S. President Barack Obama to the Iranian people. According to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the rhetoric of Obama has been different in his messages, namely, it has turned from a soft and friendly tone in the first Nowruz message to a more hostile one in his second and third messages. Writers argue that these shifts are due to the long-standing condition of mistrust and fluctuations in the U.S.-Iran relationship on the one hand, and domestic politics during these four years on the other. The fourth message (2012) is mixed with disapproval and blessings, very much due to the U.S. internal politics, as President Obama needs a calm Iran to win the 2012 election. These unprecedented rhetoric measures seemed as great changes toward rapprochement of the broken ties between Iran and the United States.However, the complex U.S. foreign policy decision-making process has paralyzed the President, preventing him from entering a totally different path versus Iran. Furthermore, domestic politics in the U.S. and Iran during the past years show that neither country were ready to set the tone of their politics in tune with a better relationship.

In the aftermath of the visit of the Iranian President to the Island of Abu Musa on 11 April 2012 and the uproar that followed, a fresh look at the issue is warranted. The concern of this paper is not to discuss the three Islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs, but to briefly review the context which gave rise to the issue of the three islands in the first place and influenced its development to date. The paper tries to place the current controversy surrounding the three islands in its historic perspective, explaining how it grew out of antagonism that marked the relationship between the prevailing global power, Great Britain, and the major regional power, Iran, for 170 years. It aims to address the general policy of Britain during its presence in the Persian Gulf, which aimed in part to control all islands of this waterway.It explains how for 170 years, Britain tried to erode Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf, both directly by asserting its colonial rule over Iranian islands and port districts, and indirectly by claiming Iranian islands for its protégés on the Arab littoral. It shows that this tactic applied to almost all other Iranian islands in one way or another and was not limited to the three islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs.

Relations between Iran and France have undergone many ups and downs during the past three decades. However, these relations have been on a downward spiral during the past several years. It seems that factors such as recent developments in the Middle East, Iran’s nuclear dossier and the two countries’ divergent approaches to foreign policy are responsible for this new situation. This article tries to answer the question of why relations between the two countries have reached their lowest point. The author uses the concepts developed in the framework of neo-realist theories emphasizing the necessity of preventing the rise of regional hegemonic powers to argue that France’s concerns about Iran’s increasing influence in the region, their conflict of interests at the regional level, and Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear technology - which contributes to the enhancement of its influence and can escalate their conflict to the international level - constitute the most important reasons for the unfriendly relations between the two countries.

The Iran-Europe relations have always been marked with ups and downs.At some points, Iran viewed Europe as an actor replacing the US and tried to tab Europe's political and economical capacities. However, in the end, a number of developments impeded the way and held up rapprochement between the two sides. This paper tries to shed light on the developments in the relationship between Iran and Europe. Moreover, it identifies and analyses obstacles and factors, which impair the relationship. Finally, it proposes ways and means for improving it.

One of the major manifestations of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Principlists is its significant changes, particularly in comparison to the eras of reconstruction and reform. This paper seeks to analyze the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this period, utilizing the explanatory capacities of the social identity theory and the analytical concept of status-seeking. The main question of the paper concerns the main reasons behind the change in the foreign policy of Ahmadinejad’s government when compared to the governments in the reconstruction and reform eras. There are also some secondary questions: Can we consider a common ground for Iranian foreign policy in all these periods? What is the main difference between the foreign policy in the Principlist period and that of Ayatollah Hashemi and former President Khatami’s governments? The first secondary hypothesis argues that Iran has always been a status-seeking state in the regional and international systems.The second secondary hypothesis states that Ahmadinejad’s government’s foreign policy differed from the two preceding governments simply in its search for status-seeking strategy. The main hypothesis is that the perception of the policy-makers of this period concerning the failure of former governments to attain status goals, political purposes, and U.S.containment policy has been the main reason accounting for the revision of status-seeking strategy in the Principlist period.

Considering the fact that less systemic sensitivity has appeared towards U.S.military actions on the global scale and that the great powers in the international system do not engage in any serious effort at preventing this state, the role of domestic interest groups has increased as has the president’s attention to their opinions. Despite the fact that no serious threat to U.S.security existed and the country’s national interests were not at stake, Barack Obama ordered the use of military force against Muammar Gaddafi. Liberal humanists in the power structure played a crucial role in order to make the necessity of attack inevitable by aggrandizing the threat. By embracing the opinion expressed by the liberal humanists and repeating this aggrandizing for election purposes as well as for preserving his own liberal base, Barack Obama found a military attack on Libya rational and necessary.