Sophia Perennis
Year:2021 | Volume:16 | Issue:38|Papers Count:12

Shahin Aawani * Among the famous thinkers who lived in the seventeenth century after Descartes (1596-1650), one is Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), and the other is Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715). All the three are reckoned among French rationalist thinkers. There are some similarities between Descartes and Pascal. They are both philosophers, mathematicians and of Catholic denomination, but they represent two different lines of thought. Pascal starts, strictly speaking, from experience. Pascal does not simply accept the authority of reason, and he says that if reason were the ultimate authority, rationality would certainly be sufficient in itself and there would be no need for revelation, but rationality has not yet found a universally accepted truth. Pascal's logic is neither Aristotelian nor Cartesian, rather his logic is the "logic of the heart" in which the primordial human nature, that is, inner intuition, must be distinguished from reason. In contrast to Descartes' famous dictum "Cogito ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am), Pascal stipulates "Credo ergo sum? " (I believe, therefor I exist? ), where "thought" is supplanted by "belief". Of course, in Pascal's philosophical system, "thought is the basis of human glory and grandeur"; and the foundation of ethics in his philosophy consists in thinking and acting in the right way, therefore he seeks all the human virtues in human thought. He maintains that truth cannot be found and truly believed in through reason. Descartes with his methodic doubt and his clear and distinct ideas reached only "conceptual certainty" but he never delved into the reality of faith. Philosophers have generally identified Pascal as a rationalist, but this article proves that he is a "Fideist", and on this basis, the author examines the subject of religion and faith in the heart from Pascal's point of view. In addition, the present article examines the logic and method by which Pascal arrives at "faith" and "religion. " Pascal distinguishes between faith, levels of faith, and wisdom. He believes that faith is a grace bestowed by God on a believer. At this stage, faith is for the general public and beginners, but when faith gives way to mysticism, it is at this stage that the believer becomes a mystic and achieves an understanding of the truth. Such an argument is presented in Pascal as the difference between philosophy and wisdom, where he says: "The greatness of wisdom, which is only valid when it comes from God, is invisible to carnal and spiritual people. " He goes on to write: “ The great geniuses have their triumph and their fame, and they have absolutely no need of carnal greetings to which they have no relation, for this neither adds nor deprives their own greatness” . They are seen by God and the angels, not the bodies or the inquisitive followers. God is enough for them (Pascal, 1997: 308/793). One of the key phrases of Pascal's thought is: "The heart has its reasons, which intellect does not know"; the truth of God is such that it is both apprehended by intellect and intuited by heart, because “ it is heart that knows the principles” . To show Pascal’ s opposition to reason, the word “ qalb” proves to be more logical and precise than “ dil” and feeling. According to Descartes, “ heart” is a bodily organ that all living creatures have in common, but reason, as the faculty of reasoning and arguing, is peculiar to “ human beings” , equally distributed among them. Pascal, in contrast, explicitly asserts that this is the heart that apprehends “ mysteries of faith” . God is visible by heart, not by reason. The heart naturally loves “ transcendent beings” . Pascal maintains that man does not need to be grandiose, since he is but a reed, that is the weakest creature in nature; but he is a thinking reed. The entire universe need not arm itself to crush him. A vapor, a drop of water suffices to kill him. But, if the universe were to crush him, man would still be more noble than that which killed him, because he is aware of his mortality. The universe knows nothing of this. “ All our dignity consists, then, in thought. By it we must elevate ourselves, and not by space and time which we cannot fill. ” so we should endeavor to “ think well” ; this is the principle of morality. Unlike the rationalists, Pascal holds that God is not conceivable through rational procedures. Two centuries later, the same central thesis was developed and articulated by Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), the existentialist theologian, in a more precise and modern formulation. Both consider the quest for evidences to prove the existence of God as a kind of disrespect for religion, because it inevitably consequents on a preceding doubt and lack of conviction. Both accept revelation as the basis of their faith. Pascal, however, trusted on God’ s graciousness, contrasted the religious worldview with the scientific and philosophical rationalizations. Pascal claims that he has found the ultimate foundation of the certainty on which everything depends. This foundation is the living God, i. e. the Bible, which was revealed in Jesus and is historically present in him. Is such a claim true? In that case, can he be called a "philosopher of religion"? Meanwhile, Pascal's unfinished and most important work, entitled Pensé es (Thoughts), is written about the legitimacy of the religion of Christ defending it against its adversaries. He is a devout philosopher, and a staunch supporter of the Catholic religion, yet he is a moderate believer. His famous work, Fragments: Penseé s, is on the legitimacy of the religion of Christ and its defense. According to Pascal, attaining God is the work of the heart, not the intellect, because the intellect either leads man to heresy or makes him an atheist. The issue is complicated by the fact that “ heart” — in German: “ Herz” — has been rendered into Persian by the word “ dil” , while its true equivalent is “ qalb” . As mentioned in the article, Pascal attributes the center of intuition and vision of God to the heart as “ qalb” , rather than “ dil” — which is concomitant of arbitrariness; thus, if one considers Pascalian notion of heart as “ dil” , the knowledge of God would be understood as subjective, instead of as a knowledge by heart and faith. In the present article, the author has tried to first enumerate Pascal's scientific innovations in the field of natural sciences, hydrostatics, etc. She then goes on to describe Pascal's important intellectual points, including his inclination toward religious discourse-as well as Pascal betting on the existence of God, Pascal triangle, and Pascal's theorem. Moreover, another section of the article is particularly concerned with the relation of faith to the issue of predestination and free will, and to the law. Here, the question arises as to whether or not predestination and free will are considered to be distinct from each other in Pascal’ s fideism, as it is the case with Christian theology. How is this issue addressed by his “ logic of the heart” ?

In the view of Muslim logicians, the role of the middle term in syllogism is very fundamental. The middle term in each conjunctive syllogism puts the other two terms together and creates a new knowledge not specified in the introduction. One of the main pillars of the conditional conjunctive syllogism division is the division based on the common component (part) between the premises of syllogism. Premises in conditional conjunctive syllogism, including the component's syllogism of two conjunctives, are either common in the complete part or in the incomplete. And the incomplete component is either a concept or a proposition. Each of the minor and major of syllogisms, the middle term of which is part of their antecedent and consequent, has one participant and one non-participant side. The result of the composition of the participant sides that make the categorical syllogism is part of the result of the conditional syllogism. Muslim logicians have deduced this conditional conjunctive syllogism in two different ways. The first method is related to Zayn al-Din al-Kashshī , in which the result of the syllogism is a conditional conjunctive, the consequent of which is also conjunctive. But the second method is that of khonji, in which the result of the syllogism is a conditional conjunctive, which is conjunctive to both consequent and antecedent. In this article, the method of Kashshī is investigated. This method has been explained and developed by later logicians such as Abharī , Ṭ ū sī , Kā tibī , Shahrazū rī and Ḥ illī , syllogism based on the position of the participant side has four types in the premises of syllogism. The participant side in the first category is in the minor and major consequent, in the second category is in the minor and major antecedent, and in the third category is in the minor consequent and major antecedent, and in the fourth category, the participant part is in the antecedent of both premises. The condition for validity of compound syllogism (polysyllogism) is consisting of common premises in incomplete component, from the point of view of Kashshī , is that firstly the premises are affirmative, secondly it is at least one of the premises should be universal premise, and thirdly either the composition of the two participant sides should be effective, or the composition of a minor consequent with the result of the composition of the two participant sides to the, major premise or will result its implicated result. Kashshī bases the first type and returns the second and third types to the first type by using conversion rule. The following syllogism is an example for the first category: 1. If a is b then c is d 2. If s is p then d is e ∴ If a is b then [if s is p then c is e] But in the fourth category, the common boundary is in the minor and the major antecedent. As: 1. If some d are c, then a is b. 2. If no d is not e, then s is p This category cannot be returned to the first category with conversion because both premises become particular (partial) and the condition of the syllogism validity disappears. Kashshī 's initiative to infer this kind is to use a hypothetical premise. The role of the hypothetical premise is to establish the necessary connection between minor and major [terms] and the inference is possible. According to Kashshī 's initiative, the result of the syllogism is: ∴ Sometimes if a is b then [if no c is not e then s is p] According to the first premise, sometimes if we accept the proposition "if a is b", the proposition "some d are, c" will be true. Now, if we assume that the proposition "No c is not e" is true, we will conclude: "Sometimes if a is b then [if no c is not e then no d is not e]" we can deduce the syllogism by combining this proposition with the second premise. Now, as can be seen in the example, according to Kashshī 's method, the result of the syllogism is a conjunctive proposition in which the non-participant (non-common) side is the one of the conjunctives, and its consequent is the conjunctive condition, one part of which is the non-participant (non-common) side of the other preposition and the other part is the preposition whose terms are noncommon components of the participant sides. In the first three categories, the result of the combination of the participant sides involved in the consequent is the result of the consequent and in the fourth category, the antecedent of the consequent is the result of the conditional syllogism. Among these, the explanations of Abharī and Ṭ ū sī are quite distinct, critical and complementary. Abharī has made several comments in his work. In the first writing of Muntahā al-afkā r, by accepting the validity of syllogism, in addition to the conclusive moods (logical multiplication) of Kashshī , he adds another moods. But in the second writing of Muntahā al-Afkā r, Kashf alḥ aqā ʾ iq and Khulā ṣ at al-afkā r return from this point of view and reject the validity of syllogism, and finally accept the validity of syllogism with disjunctive conclusions in Khulā ṣ at al-afkā r and Kashf al-ḥ aqā ʾ iq. But Ṭ ū sī , unlike Kashshī , considers the first category as the basis of all four categories. He uses the contraposition rule to refer the fourth category to the first category. By examining the differences of opinions about types, conditions of validity, conclusive moods (logical multiplication) and the reason of this type of syllogism, it is obtained that firstly, the validity of this syllogism is based on a syllogism whose middle term is a complete component (part) and secondly the presence of categorical syllogism components in the illation (inferential, deduction) system of hypothetical syllogism have made it difficult to clearly understand the structure of hypothetical syllogisms. Thirdly, it seems that by combining (synthesis) the comments of Abharī and Ṭ ū sī , one can achieve a single system (mechanism) of conditional syllogisms with incomplete middle term. This inferential system (mechanism) has a basis discursive (argumentative) form, and that is the basic or deductive discursive (argumentative) form, which is the participant of minor consequent in both premises, or the deductive, which is the participant in the minor consequent and the major antecedent. If we show the nonparticipant (non-common) sides of minor and major with "P" and "Q" and the sides of their participation with "M1" and "M2", the inferential form of the first base is: 1. If P then M1 2. If Q then M2 3. If M1 and M2 then M ∴ If P then if Q then M And the inferential form of the second base is: 1. If P then M1 2. If M2 then Q 3. If M1 and M then M2 ∴ If P then if M then Q Using the rules of conversion and contraposition rules, all non-base syllogisms are returned to the base syllogism.

Among the Chinese religious traditions, it is particularly Daoism that pays a strong attention to and presents a detailed account of the features of heavenly paradises, called differently as Realms of Immortals (xianjing 仙 境 ), Cave-Heavens (dongtian 洞 天 ), Blessed Lands (fudi 福 地 ), or Blessed Gardens (futing 福 庭 ). The Medieval Daoist tradition, as a development of the seminal Classical teachings, clearly made a distinction between earthly forms of the paradises manifested in sacred mountains, and their true forms (zhenxing 真 形 ) which are their heavenly counterparts. This paper tries to depict those traditional accounts that give more attention to archetypal geography, and tries to illustrate general characteristics of the paradises. Nevertheless, our special concern is focused on the heavenly paradise of Kunlun (崑 崙 ), designated as the Center of the Universe (di zhi zhongdi 地 之 中 地 ), Pillar of Heaven (tianzhu 天 柱 ), the Gate of Heaven (change 閶 闔 ), Turning Axil of Heaven and Earth (tiandi genniu 天 地 根 紐 ), and Dao’ s Yinform (daoyixing 道 陰 形 ). These paradises are above all the settlements of Daoist immortals. The ancient Chinese character of xian (仙 , immortal) itself depict a man in connection with three mountains which are explicitly the Three Mountainous Islands (sandao 三 島 ) in the celestial Eastern Ocean. The three mountains of the mentioned Chinese character are also depicted in the character shan (山 ) meaning mountain, since celestial paradises are indeed regarded as archetypes of the mountains on Earth. Mountain is the most important axial symbol in connection with the heavenly paradises, making them spiritual centers of the world, at least in a relative sense, and the places where Heaven and Earth meet each other. Mountains show also hierarchy of levels of the existence. Possessing a hierarchical order is a general feature of these paradises, considered whether in their totality or a particular paradise alone, such as Kunlun having three levels of Cold-wind Garden, Hanged Garden, and the place of Great Lord (taidi 太 帝 ). In spite of all of the images borrowed from terrestrial order, the traditional Daoist texts never forget to insist upon the celestial nature of the paradises to which those images symbolically are referred. In the midst of these symbols, water always plays an important role. Both the abundance of lifegiving waters in Kunlun— Yellow Waters (huangshui 黃 水 ) or the Elixir Water (danshui 丹 水 ) coiling around the mountain in three layers— and the celestial covering ocean itself at the northwest of which the paradise is placed, in relation to the terrestrial order, have the corresponding function in the subtle state that the state of Water-veiled Immersion (hunlun 混 淪 ; as a designation of the metaphysical One or the Being) has in relation to the whole universe, that is, their being principal in relation to the successive orders of manifestation. At the same time, the Turquoise Lake (yaochi 瑤 池 ) in Kunlun, under supervision of a great deity called Golden Mother (jinmu 金 母 ) or Queen Mother of the West (xiwangmu 西 王 母 ), significantly represents a water of making immortals and not that of creation of beings. Many deities, immortals, sages and emperors in different eras like Yu the Great (dayu大 禹 ), Yellow Emperor (huangdi 黃 帝 ), Shun (舜 ), Mu of Zhou (zhoumuwang 周 穆 王 ), Wu of Han (hanwudi 漢 武 帝 ) and many others have mystically travelled to Kunlun in order to be instructed in Daoist gnosis and blessed with immortality and heavenly mandate (tianming 天 命 ) at the hand of Queen Mother of the West. This blessing is differently symbolized in, participating in conversation with Queen Mother, drinking life-giving waters or consuming the famous Peaches of Immortality (xiantao 仙 桃 ) which are the essence of Heaven and Earth absorbed and cultivated in the Trees of No-Death (busi shu 不 死 樹 ), so that, the consumer can instantly position himself in the center of the cosmos and achieve the state of being a true son of Heaven and Earth, round, soft, and flexible outside, angular, strong, and firm inside, just like the fruit. Between the numerical symbols, it is number nine (or a multiplication of it, like 36 or 72) that is always present when there is a discussion of celestial lands. This number, cognate with geometrical symbol of circle according to the Chinese cosmology, represents Heaven, the pure Yang, as in contrast, number six is a symbol of Earth, the pure Yin. This is why forms borrowed from the terrestrial order are imaged in their perfect state. The trees are extraordinarily tall; the lights are radiated not from the forms or incarnations of the sun or moon, but from the source of their subtle substance (jinggen 精 根 ); plants grow there, not the ordinary ones, but the spiritual plants (shencao 神 草 ) and jade fungi (yuzhi 玉 芝 ); and the shape of even angular things tends to be circular and curved. Getting far from terrestriality is the first concept that comes to mind represented in all these images. Along with angelology, the study of heavenly paradises is an inseparable part of the Daoist teachings, which has not yet found its major place in the current studies of the tradition. A cause of that can be division of Daoism to non-existent traditions fancifully named as philosophical, religious, martial, mystical, magical, etc. Without study of the Daoist celestial lands, one cannot gain a whole, non-subjectivist image of the tradition.

Baḥ r al-Ḥ ayā t ("the Ocean of Life") is a 16th century Persian text written by a Shaṭ ṭ ā rī Sufi, Shaykh Muḥ ammad Ghawth Gwaliyari (d 1563). It is originally a translation of a yogic text known as Amṛ takuṇ ḍ a ("Pool of Water of Life") which is now lost. Shaykh Muḥ ammad mentions only an Arabic version of the text named Ḥ awḍ al-Ḥ ayā t. It should be mentioned that Baḥ r al-Ḥ ayā t is not a literal translation of Amṛ takuṇ ḍ a or any other Hindu texts. In fact, the Hindu doctrines and practices are gathered from different Yogic, Purā nic and Tantric traditions. In Baḥ r al-Ḥ ayā t these Hindu materials are mixed with the teachings of Islamic mysticism. Shaykh Muḥ ammad had a good reason for translating the text. From his point of view, the techniques mentioned in the text, such as breath control, etc., were useful for his own pupils and other Shaṭ ṭ ā rī Sufis. For him, Yogis are the masters of 'ilm i djasad ("the Knowledge of Body") which is a useful knowledge for the Muslims to know. Shaykh Muḥ ammad frequently emphasizes the equality of the sayings of Hindu saints with those of Sufis. However, Muḥ ammad's sympathies with Yogis, met strong oppositions by the some of Muslim scholars for whom Yogis were nothing but the misguided pagans. So they accused Muḥ ammad of blasphemy. Although he had been finally absolved, he was under suspicion even fifty years after his death when a biographer, Ghawthi Shaṭ ṭ ā rī , in his book tried to justify Shaykh Muḥ ammad's deeds. Baḥ r al-Ḥ ayā t is consisted of ten chapters. In its last chapter there is a kind of cosmology similar to those of the Tantric and Purā nic. In fact, the TantricPurā nic cosmology is a syncretism of monistic view of Advaita Vedā nta school and dualistic view of Sā ṃ khya school. So, it promotes the doctrine of "Multiplicity in Unity" which is in accordance with Shaykh Muḥ ammad's thoughts. Shaykh Muḥ ammad starts his narration of creation extoling the Unconditioned Truth as the source of all things. He mentions His Sanskrit names according to Yogis' tradition. He explains creation as the manifestation of the Unconditioned Truth. The first manifestation is the Sound. The concept of cosmic Sound is an ancient concept in Hindu literature and one can trace it back to the Upaniś ads. In Baḥ r al-Ḥ ayā t the sound is consisted of two parts: the voice and the echo, which represent respectively the spirit (Ś iva) and the matter (Ś akti). However according to the philosophy of "Multiplicity in Unity" both are the same, two manifestations of the One. Moreover, love (Skt. kama) works as the agent or operator which stimulates voice to echo, or to manifest itself in the material world. Then the Shaykh Muḥ ammad speaks of the Water as the first mater. The primordial water is also a Vedic concept. According to Nasadiya Sukta: "Then even non-existence was not there, nor existence, There was no air then, nor the space beyond it. … Then there was neither death nor immortality nor was there then the torch of night and day. … All this was only unillumined cosmic water. That One which came to be, enclosed in nothing, arose at last, born of the power of knowledge. " (Ṛ gveda 10: 129). The next Vedic concept of the Baḥ r al-Ḥ ayā t's cosmology is the concept of cosmic egg or Hiraṇ yagarbha (Ṛ gveda 10: 121). This egg appears on the primordial water and the whole world come forth of it. These Vedic concepts were retold in Purā nic literature with more details and the narrator of the Baḥ r al-Ḥ ayā t combines different narrations of Hindu cosmology and Islamizes them in a way that his audiences can accept and digest them. The concept of the Ocean of Life is an important concept in the Baḥ r alḤ ayā t as far as it became the title of the treatise. It is briefly mentioned in the final chapter of Baḥ r al-Ḥ ayā t but the full-fledged story is told in Purā nas especially in the Viṣ ṇ u Purā ṇ a (I. IX. ). As the Purā na narrates the Amṛ ta, the water of life or the nectar of immortality, was produced by Viṣ ṇ u through the act of samudra manthan ("churning of the ocean"). Viṣ ṇ u firstly throws different herbs in the ocean of milk and then churns it up with a stick, so he makes Amṛ ta or the nectar of immortality for the gods. In the Tantric literature "churning of the ocean" is a symbol for the Yogi's asceticism or meditation which brings for him the deliverance from the cycle of rebirth and union with the Truth. This idea is in accordance with the Shaṭ ṭ ā rī emphasis on the invocation and meditation as the path to salvation. So Shaykh Muḥ ammad as a Shaṭ ṭ ā rī master prescribes it for his pupils. Consequently, Shaykh Muḥ ammad in Baḥ r al-Ḥ ayā t employs Islamic proofs for Hindu ideas for instance when the text speaks of the Sound as the first manifestation of the Absolut, or the love as the vital element of creation or the primeval waters as the foundation for creation Muḥ ammad brings quotations from Quran and Islamic traditions as evidences. This paper tries to trace Shaykh Muḥ ammad's narration in the Hindu literature.

Chance is one of the topics discussed under causality and has a special place in the works of Aristotle and Darwin's theory of evolution. A closer look reveals that the meaning of chance for Darwin is the same as the meaning accepted by Aristotle. According to Aristotle and Darwin, chance is the most effective factor of change and transformation that causes modification and adaptation and consequently the evolution of living beings. Natural selection is the law that decides which creatures survive and evolve in the struggle for survival. How and why change occurs and what are the natural causes of the vast diversity of organisms is something that is unknown to Darwin. In fact, our ignorance of these causes is called chance. This descriptive-analytical article seeks to examine the meaning of chance according to Aristotle and Darwin and to clarify its place in natural selection and evolution. Among the ancient philosophers, people such as Anaximander and Empedocles have studied theories of evolution. Empedocles believed that human beings first lived in fish body and only came ashore when they were able to take care of themselves. He considered a significant role for chance and said that living beings came into existence by chance and there is no necessary or ultimate cause for them. Most of the contemporary evolutionary biologists have followed Empedocles and deny any necessary or ultimate cause in the process of evolution. After him, Aristotle was another philosopher who spoke about chance and examined it in a teleological context. Darwin saw evolution as a product of chance and like Aristotle examined it in a teleological context. Aristotle gave the example of an architect who has to use stones thrown from a rock to construct a building. The architect, due to his ignorance of natural laws, considers the shape of each stone as the product of chance; but he consciously uses these stones for his own purposes. In the process of evolution, natural selection is like an architect for whom random genetic drifts and mutations are the materials from which he selects. The selection made by natural selection is purposeful and will be in the direction of survival and adaptation of the living organism to the environment. Therefore, the role of chance in the process of evolution that Aristotle believed in and that Darwin used in his theory is very important. Aristotle in his second book of Physics stated that chance is a kind of cause that gives rise to unusual events like finding a treasure while digging a hole for planting a tree and chance is an accidental cause. Darwin stated that chance has two meanings: the first one is probability and the second one is randomness and believed that the second meaning is in fact the same as the first one. But as a whole, chance is the cause of phenomena whose real cause has not been found yet and by the passage of time their real cause will be discovered. Examining the views of Aristotle and Darwin, it can be concluded that First, both Aristotle and Darwin accept the principle of causality and believe that no phenomenon in the universe occurs without a cause. Second, they are in agreement about the principle of purposefulness of the universe. Third, for both, chance is a cause that plays a key role in the evolutionary process. According to Aristotle, chance is not an essential cause rather an accidental cause and gives rise to unusual things in the natural world. However, Darwin says that wherever we do not know the real causes or we encountered unexpected results we interpret it as chance. Therefore, accidental causality seems meaningless to Darwin. Fourth, natural selection as a law of nature is accepted by Aristotle and Darwin and it can select those changes and transformations which are necessary for the evolution of a living being. These changes such as drifts and genetic mutations occur by chance. In other words, natural selection is like an architect that by selecting changes and transformations, enables the living beings to adapt to the environment, to survive, and to evolve. Fifth, both Aristotle and Darwin consider chance as an equivalent for human ignorance and believe that human understanding is incapable of knowing the laws of nature. So they use chance to point out unknown causes that act as a mystery and may be known in the future. It can be said that the discussion of chance has two ontological and epistemological dimensions. The epistemological dimension of chance means whether we, as the agent of knowledge, are able to recognize chance in the natural world or not. The fact is that there is no certain and a priori knowledge about chance events. Accidental causes also indicate human ignorance of real causes, and ignorance is a category related to the field of epistemology. Therefore, this article examines epistemological dimension of chance. It should be noted that Darwin offers another meaning of chance, which is his own innovation, and that is that the adaptation of beings to the environment is a matter of time and future conditions and it will occur by chance in the future. It means that sometimes we know the cause of an accident but we do not know why and how it causes change and transformation. Future events are uncertain and unpredictable and arise in order to adapt to the environment and survival. Darwin considered the second meaning of chance as an accident and said that the second meaning is in fact the same as the first meaning which is probability. It seems that the second meaning of chance which has been presented by Darwin is also accepted by Aristotle but he did not separate these two meanings.

Introduction S̲ h̲ ihā b al-Dī n Yaḥ yā al-Suhrawardī known as S̲ h̲ ayk̲ h̲-i Is̲ h̲ rā ḳ or “ Master of Illumination” (1154 – 1191 AD), believed that some of the kings and prominent personalities of ancient Iran, such as Kayū marth, Farī dū n, Kaykhusraw, and Prophet Zoroaster, were guided to the right, People of ecstasy, and had a divine spirit (Khuvarna; Farrah; The glory Light) And they had the "light of Ṭ ā mes" (which annihilates the seeker, leads to a small death in the face of the great death in the great resurrection, which is for all living beings. ) and calls his wisdom the “ ῌ ī kmat-i Khusrawā nī ” . In the intellectual system of (Kh w adja) Shams al-Din Muḥ ammad ῌ ā fiz Shī rā zī (1315-1390 AD), the names of some kings of ancient Iran such as DJams̲ h̲ ī d and Kay-khusraw, as well as the word "Mughā n" had a special place. It seems that ῌ ā fiz in his poems introduces this Kings as the wise men of "mad̲ h̲ hab-i Rindā n" (religion of “ one whose exterior is liable to censure, but who at heart is sound” ) and its patterns Statement of the problem Although there is no doubt about the authenticity of ῌ ā fiz's system of thought, the idea in which Khusrawā nī 's Figures play a role is one of the things that put ῌ ā fiz next to S̲ h̲ ayk̲ h̲-i Is̲ h̲ rā ḳ and because of the temporal precedence, the possibility of Enlightenment Wisdom's influence on ῌ ā fiz's thought. The subject of this article is to examine this section of the commonalities and differences between the wisdom of Khusrawā nī S̲ h̲ ayk̲ h̲ i Is̲ h̲ rā ḳ and ῌ ā fiz Shirazi. In this study, it will be determined that "each of the ancient kings of Iran; "What role do they play in ῌ ā fiz's intellectual system and Suhrawardī 's Enlightenment wisdom, and what are the sources of their thought in this regard? " Also, "What is the place of the thought and word "Mughā n" in each of ῌ ā fiz's thoughts and thoughts of S̲ h̲ ayk̲ h̲-i Is̲ h̲ rā ḳ ? " And "Is it possible for S̲ h̲ ayk̲ h̲-i Is̲ h̲ rā ḳ 's thoughts to influence ῌ ā fiz or not? " Method To identify this part of Khusrawā nī 's wisdom of ῌ ā fiz, the author first examined the names of the kings mentioned in his poems (Diwan) and identified kings such as DJams̲ h̲ ī d, Kay-khusraw and their spiritual successor, Iskandar (Alexander the Great) who play an important role in his thought. Then, search for the history and position of their dignity in Zoroastrian Sacred Scriptual and texts (including different parts of Avesta and literature called Pahlavi) and the history and literary culture of the early Islamic period of Iran, and then search for the importance and position of each of these kings. It has been studied both in the works of S̲ h̲ ayk̲ h̲-i Is̲ h̲ rā ḳ and in the poems of ῌ ā fiz. Also, the most important paradigmatic words of the names of these kings (DJā m-i DJam and DJā m-i Djahā n Bī n; A cup where the state of the universe and the unseen are visible, and Iskandar Mirror) in the mentioned texts and the works of these two thinkers have been studied. Finally, the word Mughā n and its syntagmatic words, which were among the prominent words in ῌ ā fiz's intellectual system, were examined along with the reason for ῌ ā fiz's acceptance and Suhrawardī 's reluctance to Mughā n and its religion. Research Findings Khusrawā nī 's wisdom of ῌ ā fiz is fundamentally different from Khusrawā nī 's wisdom of Suhrawardī due to the presence of personalities such as Djams̲ h̲ ī d and Iskander, as well as the position he gives to Mughā n in his system of thought. What Suhrawardī has said about the ancient kings of Iran in his works is more compatible with Zoroastrian sacred scriptures. He does not place the name of Djams̲ h̲ ī d alongside the letters of other idealistic Iranian kings and Fahlavi scholars because of the sins attributed to him by religious texts. He acquits Zoroaster of his belief in duality without quoting the hymns of the Gathā s and introduces him as a disseminator of ideas about Khuvarna and light. He also makes no effort to purify the Madjū s (Dualists and claimants of following Zoroaster) and, contrary to the opinion of his philosophical commentators, Shahrazū rī (13th century AD) and Ḳ uṭ b al-Dī n Shī rā zī (1236-1311 AD), adheres to ancient Persian texts and despite Iskandar's enjoyment of Greek wisdom, Suhrawardī does not place him among the sages who benefited from the Khamī reh-e Azalī (eternal dough). But ῌ ā fiz, unlike S̲ h̲ ayk̲ h̲-i Is ̲ h̲ rā ḳ , is adheres only to post-Islamic Iranian literature and culture and its mystical literature and in his poems, Djams̲ h̲ ī d and Iskander have an acceptable face and in his intellectual system, Mughā n are introduced as clerics of Rindā n religion. Therefore, the possibility of ῌ ā fiz being influenced by Khusrawā nī 's wisdom in his system of thought is completely ruled out.

Muḥ ammad ibn Muḥ ammad Mufid al-Qumī (b. AH 1049 /AD 1640 ), known in the historiography as Qā ḍ ī Sa‘ ī d Qummī is one of the famous thinkers of the Isfahan Philosophical School (corban, 1384, 36) (zā dhoosh, 1391, 37-40) most reckoned as a theologian & gnostic, but seems that precise study on his philosophical thoughts according to his texts has been neglected as seems his biography to be rather obscured either (Rouḍ ā ti, 1386, 9-18). Philosophacal aspects of his thoughts, particularly basic philosophical terms of his texts has not been discussed yet; his thought on essentialism known as ontological primacy of essence (the doctrine of aṣ ā lat al-mā hiyya) (Rizvi, 2007, 183) & his critique & rejection to the theory of priority of existence (the doctrine of aṣ ā lat al-wujū d) & substantial motion of famous safavid philosopher, Mullā Sadrā Shī rā zī (d. AH 1045 /AD 1635 ) has not been the subject of a serious comparative study. So it is of the most significance to recognize what the terms such as existence (wujū d) & quiddity (mā hiyya) mean according to his basic texts. What I propose to do in this paper is to present the perception of quiddity (mā hiyya) in the thought of Qā ḍ ī Sa‘ ī d Qummī . Since he is ascribed to prepatetic philosophy & has been familiar to Iluimination philosophy of suhrawardi, we shall have a interpretion on Qā ḍ ī Sa‘ ī d’ s words with regard to their discussions. In islamic Philosophical tradition, at least two perceptions & definitions of quiddity (mā hiyya) can be traced; quiddity in general (al mā hiya bil ma‘ na al a‘ am) & quiddity as whatness-what is said to answer the question of whatness (al mā hiya bil ma‘ na al ‘ akhas); these two perceptions – between philosophers prior to Qā ḍ ī Sa‘ ī d– is discussed & specified by Mullā Sadrā Shī rā zī (Mullā Sadrā Shī rā zī , 1981, v2, 2-3) & his followers, pointed by Suhrawardi (Suhrawardi, 1380a, 362; 398-399) but are not so distinct in Avicenna’ s arguments; Avicenna describes quiddity (mā hiyya) as ‘ what by which it is what it is’ or essence (Zā t) or reality (haghī ghah) (Ibn sina, 1405, 28-29) also he describes quiddity as whatness-what is said to answer the question of whatness-or definition (ḥ ad) (Ibn sina, 1405, 37; 52) but ephasizes that if what we suppose it as quiddity (as what is said to answer the question of whatness) is not identical to what by which it is what it is, it would not be quiddity (mā hiyya) (Ibn sina, 1404, 245) so the relation of these two perceptions seems to be as name (definition) & essence that in both states (mind & external being) need to accidence of existence (wū jū d) to be existent, whereas in Mullā Sadrā Shī rā zī ’ s supposition, quiddity in general is identical to existence (wujū d) & in second perception, quiddities are supposed mental posited (‘ tebā ri) notions (Mullā Sadrā Shī rā zī , 1981, v2, 2-3). Qā ḍ ī Sa‘ ī d defines quiddity (mā hiyya) as ’ what by which it is what it is’ (Qummī , 1381, 126-127) & as essense (Zā t) & base (aṣ l) (Qummī , 1381, 159) that is what is called specific existence of every beings (al wū jū d al khā s) (Qummī , 1379, 280-281) that is conceived by intuition as the same way that the cause surrounds & intellects his effect (Qummī , 1377, v2, 137). According to such descriptions, quiddities seems to be all real external beings & such a proposition may accord with quiddity in general (al mā hiya bil ma‘ na al a‘ am) in Mullā Sadrā Shī rā zī ’ s words & quiddity (mā hiyya) in Suhrawardi’ s & Avicenna’ s; but he does not discuss of second perception of quiddity (al mā hiya bil ma‘ na al ‘ akhas) as a abstractional or mentally posited meanings. Detailed & precise study on Qā ḍ ī Sa‘ ī d writings represents that every existent’ s quiddity in Qā ḍ ī Sa‘ ī d’ s thought is identical to what by which it is what it is or quiddity in general (al mā hiya bil ma‘ na al a‘ am) & quiddity as whatness-what is said to answer the question of whatness-has not been his target in arguments. According to his words, Quiddity is the all reality & essence of each existent & in another word, quiddity of everything is identical to it’ s existence that is specific (al wū jū d al khā s); his such perception is close to of Avicenna’ s & Suhrawardi’ s. In explanation two problems on external realization of quiddity, that are the problem of creation & the problem of distinction, he declares that every quiddity is created by simple creation of it’ s creator not to prosody or accidence of existence as implied in some Avicenna’ s phrases that provoked Fakhr Rā zī ’ s & Suhrawardi’ s critiques. It is the quiddity that is created as the unique creation of it’ s creator & prediction of ‘ being created’ to the other predicates & accidents as existence will be secondary (Qummī , 1381, 125-126) & it is our mind that attributes the other things to be created (Qummī , 1377, v2, 244) So the creation of existence (wū jū d) or prediction of creation to existence or dependence of creation of every thing (entity) to accidence of existence is meaningless; he emphasizes that compound cration is a weak word (Qummī , 1381, 125-126). These arguments will expel all things, except quiddities, out of the expance of causality; in such a way he denied any externality or pricipiality of existence (wū jū d) & declare his critique to Mullā Sadrā Shī rā zī (Qummī , 1381, 125-126). In addition, Qā ḍ ī Sa‘ ī d denies every kind of being\existence for quiddity before creation of it’ s creator. (Qummī , 1379, 310-314); quiddity has not any kind of pre-existence or externality before being created by it’ s creator (Qummī , 1379, 310-314). In problem of distinction he names the creation of creator as the just cause of distinction of every existent & refuses any causality of accidents & properties to make existents distinct (Qummī , 1381, 128-129) so the externality & distinction of quiddities does not need to accident of existence to become existent & also does not need to attributes & properties to become distinct. Thus some ambiguities in Avecinna’ s words that motivated suhrawardi’ s critiques, will eliminate in Qā ḍ ī Sa‘ ī d’ s thought on quiddity. It would be clear that Qā ḍ ī Sa‘ ī d’ s position on principiality or primacy of quiddity-in general-(the doctrine of aṣ ā lat al-mā hiyya) is not in opposition to the theory of principiality or priority of existence to quiddity-as whatness-(the doctrine of aṣ ā lat al-wujū d) in Mullā Sadrā Shī rā zī ’ s thought; precise study on Qā ḍ ī Sa‘ ī d’ s works specificly his perception of existence will make his representation on metaphsical ralation of quiddity & existence, more concievable.

Correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm is a common discussion in the mysticism of different religions. Usually in these schools, man is a small example of the universe and man is known as the highest and most perfect example of the names and attributes of God. Swedenborg also saw the material and spiritual worlds as having an adaptable design and pattern that could be unified. In this article, we try to explain the principles of Immanuel Swedenborg's mystical thought based on his personality and religious characteristics and his scientific position and spiritual experience. How does he interpret the connection between the material and the spiritual world? In his opinion, what is the pattern of the connection between these worlds? Is the material world genuine and is the immaterial and spiritual world influenced by the material world or is it the other way around? Where do the events of this world come from? Understanding the sacred teachings is based on which level of understanding of human language? Does being content with the apparent meaning of the Bible ultimately lead to a true understanding of these teachings? What is Swedenborg's view and classification of the different periods of man's relation to the divine? Swedenborg's thought revolved around three axes: 1-Correspondence theory: The fundamental axis of Swedenborg's thought is in the form of the theory of correspondence. He sought a way to replace the method of material analysis with Platonic or Neoplatonic idealistic views in explaining the events of existence, so that he could explain the relationship between the ontological position between the realms of God, man, and world. He realizes that the originality of the events of the material world originates beyond this world, and in fact it is the events of the spiritual world that have originality, and this material world is merely as a realm where the manifestations of the events of the spiritual world are manifested. Worldly affairs are a "manifestation" of spiritual affairs and correspond to them. These two parts are also applied to every human being, that is, each person has an "inner person" or a spiritual or spiritual world, and an "External person" whose natural world is. According to Swedenborg, a happy person is one whose external aspect is in harmony with his inner human being. Everything is a correspondent that arises and endures in nature according to the divine design. What makes the divine design is the divine good that emanates from the Lord. It begins from him, emanates from him through the heavens in sequence into the world, and there comes to a close in things most remote. Things there that are in accord with the design are correspondences. People today do not know what “ correspondence” is. They have moved away from heaven because of their love for themselves and for the world. People who love themselves and the world above all focus on nothing but earthly matters because these provide gratification to their more outward senses. They do not attend to spiritual matters because these offer gratification to their deeper senses. Correspondence is presented in two stages: There is a correspondence of everything in heaven with everything in the human being, there is a correspondence of heaven with everything earthly. 2-Different interpretations of the Bible: Swedenborg believes that the sacred text has an esoteric meaning that cannot be derived from its outward form or its literal meaning, and that the divine word has no esoteric meaning like a soulless and dead man. The outer being, separated from the inner, is just a body and so is dead, but the inward being is what lives and allows the outward being to live. In the same way, Word by itself is a body without a soul. The Word’ s literal meaning alone, can never provide a view of the inner contents. According to him, The Word is in fact written in pure correspondences. At the end of the church, when there is no longer any love and therefore no longer any faith, the Lord will open the Word by disclosing its deeper meaning and will reveal the heavenly contents hidden within it. In the Secrets of Heaven, Swedenborg interprets Genesis and Exodus and inner meaning of them. For example, he considers six-day creation on the Genesis as six consecutive stages of reconstruction in man. Creation continues from the initial stage of being "lifeless" to the stage when one reaches spiritual development, and the seventh day or Sabbath also refers to a person who has reached the highest stage of personality perfection and has become a "heavenly" person; In this regard, the description of the Garden of Eden is in fact a description of the nature and essence of that person and his nature. 3-Religious interpretation of the periods of man's relationship with divinity: According to Swedenborg, in each period there was a special scripture for the people of that time. The oldest church that existed before the flood has a book, the earliest people were heavenly people and thought on the basis of actual correspondences, that era was called the Golden Age. The old church after the flood has another book, people of this era did not think from actual correspondences but from a knowledge about correspondences, their era was called the Silver Age. Judaism has a book written by Moses and the prophets, people of this era were familiar with correspondences but did not do their thinking on the basis of their knowledge of correspondences, their era was called the Bronze Age. And finally, the new church has a Bible written by the Gospel writers, the knowledge of correspondences was completely lost and this era was called Iron Age. So, in general, there were four time periods with four specific Bibles of that period that formed man's relationship with divinity. These periods begin with the clarity of thought and the deep connection of the material world, and then end with a kind of separation of human thought from spiritual truth.

Decoding the fundamental concepts of ancient Greek’ s ontology has always been of interest to philosophers. The Greek way of thinking about the universe has established a relation to nature, objects, and even self-thinking through language, and in the experience of this relationship with objects philosophical thought has formed, and from its heart new concepts emerged. Since Greek philosophy is closely linked to its ontology, it will not be possible to have knowledge of ancient Greek philosophy without a proper understanding of what these concepts are making. One of these Greek ontological concepts is the word “ ethos". The term “ ethos" is derived from the Greek word "ἦ θ ο ς , ἔ θ ο ς , plurals: (ἤ θ η ), (ἤ θ ε α )" which has a close meaning to the spirit and the morality, and words such as "custom", "habit” just refer to a part of the meaning of the word. In the eighth to fifth centuries B. C, “ ethos" was addressed as the way of life which was based on the will of the gods and it became a common attitude among artists. Accordingly they perfected their technical skills in presenting tangible personality and spiritual (ethos) moods and characters in the artworks. According to the analysis of the poems of the poets of archaic era, the commentators and scholars believe that “ ethos" in Homer's poems first implied concepts such as "the place of habit" and most of all on the animal residence; The residence in which human has tried to train animals and impose his desired order and habits, contrary to their nature. However, contrary to human thought, the animal does not easily violate its nature or at least not be completely subjected to the imposition of order on itself. Later in the poems of poets such as Hesiod, Theognis and Pindar, ethos is interpreted from animal residence to "human residence, " "habits, " "customs, " "deceptive nature" and "temperament” . In fact, according to these poets and writers, the way a human being adapts to the environment arising from his ethos depends on the habits and moods he shows from himself. Therefore, in ancient Greek literature, ethos was construed as a quality of living, like habit which creates predictable behaviors. In addition to literature, the word “ ethos” has been used in the thoughts of Greek philosophers, including Heraclitus. The purpose of this descriptiveanalytical study was to understand Heraclitus concept of ethos and for this purpose, the B119 fragment of Heraclitus along with its two key terms, "ethos" and "daimon", is analyzed. By analyzing this fragment, it became clear that Heraclitus had a deeper impression of daimon than the archaic literature, which is not the same as the Homerian goddess or the external force involved in human destiny. In Heraclitus' view, daimon is the highest level of human existence that man can be achieved it by knowing the principles of his own nature and the cosmos order. In addition to presenting a new impression of the human nature of the literature of the archaic era, Heraclitus offers both a fuller impression of the divine nature and the evolution of human nature over divine nature. Thus it becomes apparent that ethos and daimon have close links, and man, as a whole, enjoys the nature of God, and human is the focus of relevance and bond between Ethos, Daimon, Wisdom and Logos. According to Heraclitus, the difference between divine and human nature is in the absence of wisdom. From his point of view, man can never have the same ethos as divine Ethos, but only he has the ability to gain a degree of divine wisdom; because man has a spark of Deity. It is daimon who has the potential to gain wisdom, and the existence of demonic human is a prerequisite for gaining wisdom. Human nature obtains its reinforcement force only through its daimonian activity, but divine ethos is forever beyond man's reach. According to Heraclitus, the soul can be both dry and fiery but it is wiser when the spirit is at its driest or warmest; because it's more like its divine nature. In other words, when the spirit is dry, it has wisdom, a wisdom that is sovereign over everything and in this case more like logos or eternal fire; For the Fire of Eternity is sovereign over all things, and it descends upon all things, condemning and seizing them. Therefore, a relationship can be established between ethos (human nature) and Daimon (divine nature) with Logos as a more inclusive cosmos system than human intellect and wisdom. This means that in its highest form as a system, Logos has given a special intellect and wisdom to any being in accordance with his ontological rank. In this way, a degree can be assumed for the animal to be donated in part of the logos (wisdom and wisdom). That's why animals have minimal dignity of ethos and we can regulate its mood and habits through the manger. For man, as much as his acquired virtue, there are levels of Ethos and Logos from the animal stage to the divine constant Therefore, it can be said that reason and wisdom are as a partial and underlying part of the cosmos Logos system, which regulates humans relationships with each other, man with nature and man with gods, and even the gods themselves are forced to follow this system with each other and in relation to human beings. As is evident in the teachings of Christianity, man is in the ranks of humanity, but through the gift given to human nature, he can ascension to the position of Deity. Therefore, in the philosophical system of Heraclitus, his words can be interpreted as such that despite the stark differences in the rank of ethos (human nature) and Daimon (divine nature) in adherence to reason and wisdom, it is possible that man rises to the highest stage in the world, but achieving the perfect divine nature is not possible.

Sayyid Ṣ adr al-dī n Moḥ ammad Dashtakī Shī rā zī seems to be the inventor of the division of composition into unified composition and composition by join in Islamic philosophy. With this division, Dashtakī has expressed a new theory about the composition of material objects from matter and form, as well as the composition of man from soul and body, and considers these compositions as a unification, not simply the parts joining to each other. In this paper, we will present Dashtakī ’ s arguments for the theory of unified composition. We will also examine three objections to this theory and his responses. Finally, we will examine the background of this theory in Bahmanyā r's phrases. Dashtakī believes that when the components in a compound have a real plurality, i. e. each one exists separately from the other, a composition by join is created, such as the composition of a house from numerous clays. But if the components in the compound are united and none of them exists actually and seperately from the others, the resulting composition will be an alliance and union. He believes that in the unified composition, every component is identical to any other component and is identical to the whole. In order to achieve a composition, a plurality is needed and in order to form a single composition, there must be plural components related to each other. An important question is that, principally how is a composition possible, if unified composition comes to existence only when the components are made united with each other and with the whole? In other words, unified composition is not possible, because the first condition, i. e., the plurality of the constituent components, cannot be satisfied. Dashtakī , in order, strives to express a difference between the components in the union compound. He believes that the conditions of the realization and the survival of the components are different, and that is enough for them to be different. In Dashtakī 's point of view, in the unified composition the components are analytical, so are not separated in reality. In other words, the components do not have actual and "in-the-world" plurality, which means that it is our intellect that separates them and looks at them as independent objects. Therefore, unity and identity are in-the-world and plurality and discernibility are analytical and intellectual. Dashtakī 's first argument for his theory in general is as follows: the three major material objects (body, plant and animal) are undoubtedly real compounds. But in these compositions, components exist potentially, and in a unified composition, components do not exist actually. Therefore, these objects are unified compounds. His second argument is that the accuracy of predication implies unity. In the unified composition, the components are identical with the whole, and therefore, the components can be predicated to the composition. In Dashtakī 's view, if A is predicated to B, then it could be concluded that they are identical and unified. The first objection to this theory is that the unity is incompatible with causality. From the perspective of the Peripatetics, form is the cause of the matter, and this is incompatible with the union of the two. In reply, Dashtakī states that in case of causality, there is no need for cause and effect to be two different and discernible entities, but a single entity may be from one aspect the cause and, from another, the effect. In other words, the foresaid causality is analytical causality. When mind analyses something, and then finds analytical components, it can see between those analytical and intellectual components, causality, and find some of them as the cause of the others. The second objection is the incorrectness of the unity in compounds with components not being similar. Only in the compounds having similar parts such as glass, the objection goes, one can accept the unity of matter and form. For example, in compounds such as horses, it is not possible to accept the union of matter and form, because in horses, there are components with different natures, such as bones, flesh and nerves. Unity of these parts with each other and with the whole is not plausible. Dashtakī ’ s reply is to concede that the horse is also a natural unit and has no actual plurality. Components having similar or different natures does not make any difference. According to the theory of unified composition, the horse's components are united with the horse's form and have only analytical plurality. Horse’ s components are just analytical components, not actual, independent ones. The third objection is the incompatibility of the actual existence of components with their unity. But Dashtakī maintains that a unique actual personal entity cannot have actual plural components. He states that compounds such as horses exist objectively, but objective and real existing is divided into two kinds: dependent existence, and independent existence as a single real thing. Therefore, the two characteristics of "being a component" and "being independent" are incompatible and do not come together in a real being. Dashtakī has also quoted phrases from Bahmanyā r to confirm his point of view. Bahmanyā r states that the properties of an animal belong to the whole and compound, not to each component. For example, it is a horse that feels, not its bone or brain, as the eye is also a compound, but seeing is the work of the eye, not the work of any of its components. Therefore, the animal, which is something compound, has characteristics that none of its components have. So the animal is something over and above its components. Bahmanyā r thinks the components in the animal exist potentially. Then he states a general rule: any compound in which unity is real, its components do potentially exist. Therefore, Bahmanyā r considers the body parts of a living organism as a potential being and generally believes that the components of any compound that have true unity are potential. The potentiality of the components in a real compound does not mean that the components are destroyed and a new thing is produced. The components are also available, but they do not have the effects they had separately before the composition comes into existence. In other words, the components form an identity together and therefore have a new effect. It seems that Bahmanyā r has expressed the same idea that Dashtakī is looking for in the theory of unified composition. Therefore, it can be said that before Dashtakī , Bahmanyā r has come up with the thought of a unity. Nonetheless, Bahmanyā r has not explained more about this idea and its effects in the other problems of his first philosophy. Dashtakī is the first who has organized and developed this idea as a philosophical theory.

Ibn Taymiyyah, a Sunni scholar with Salafi tendencies, has criticized the scientific debates of many philosophers, theologians, and Islamic groups such as the Shiites. Many works in the critique and excommunication (Takfir) of mystics and Sufis, such as Rifa'iyyah and Shazliyah and Fatwas have been written and issued by him. One of the reasons for the expulsion of the mystics, based on his view, is their attitude about the unity of existence (vahdat-e vojod) regarding oneness of God. Ibn Taymiyyah has excommunicated the founders of this doctrine, such as Ibn Arabi and the commentators of his school. He considers "unity of existence" as atheism, polytheism and infidelity. He, generally, claims that if one believes in the doctrine of the unity of existence and considers it correct, this is enough for its corruption and invalidity. According to him, unity of existence, incarnation (Holool) and unity are different interpretations of one thing and there is not much difference between them. In defining the unity of existence, he says: Mystics believe that existence is one. Therefore, the necessary existence of the Creator (Vojood-e Vajib-e Khaliq) is the contingent being of the creature (Vojood-e Momken-e Makhlooq). For him, the unity of existence has two basic principles: the objectivity of creation (Eyniyat-e Khalq), truth and immutable essences (Ayan _e_ Sabeteh); his interpretation, understanding and critical analysis of the first principle reveals that Ibn Arabi has included two things in his words: denying the existence of truth and denying the creation of divine creatures; Ibn Arabi, by considering the existence of truth and the existence of things as one, in fact denies lordship. Ibn Taymiyyah seeks to depict the doctrine of the unity of existence as "incarnation. " In this paper, by a descriptive-analytical method, we have first explained Ibn Taymiyyah's understanding and perception of mystical ontology (Vojood Shenasi Erfani), and then we have examined and criticized his words and proofs. It seems that the issues of mystical ontology for Ibn Taymiyyah and his followers have not been "properly" explained in detail by technical explanation and analysis. His superficial understanding of mystics’ words can be easily seen, since mystics have explicitly considered incarnation as polytheism in their works and have considered the doctrine of the unity of existence as opposite and distinct. The approach of Muslim mystics indicates that existence is a single, authentic, absolute and infinite reality that has filled all reality and existence with secrets in all existence and has left no room for others; From this point of view, there is no more than one essential instance of existence (Mesdaq-e Bel-zate Vojood), then creations and multiplicities of the universe of possibility are an accidental example (Mesdaq-e Bel-araz) and manifestation of the existence of true deception. The latter does not have an existential soul, but is a manifestation of essential existence; in the sense that understanding the meaning of existence, it needs others, while the truth and mere existence do not need anything to be existed. This matter has been explicitly repeated in mystics’ words, but Ibn Taymiyyah, regardless of the "language of mysticism", in most cases considers the unity of existence as an equal to incarnation. In his works, Ibn Arabi has considered incarnation as polytheism. Disbelief in solution and unity incarnation is one of decisive and certain beliefs of theoretical mysticism, so it is necessary (in scientific discussions) to weigh any ecstatic words, for instance belief in incarnation, empathetically and without presuppositions with the principles and decisive basics of knowledge; In particular, the doctrine of the unity of existence, which is a paradoxical theory beyond reason. The unity of existence is neither a pure assimilation to God and the world, nor an incarnation. Rather, it is a progressive and evolved theory that is compatible to the religious texts of Islam. In this approach, the unity of existence can be defined as follows: "The truth of existence is a single and personal reality, in which all beings and phenomena of the universe are the place of manifestation (opportunities and manifestations) of the same existence, or in other words, based on the verse (Every day He is engaged in some work “ Chapter55/29) different and various designations of the world are all different manifestations of the single reality. " In mysticism, the essential existence of the Supreme Being (Vojood-e Vajebi Haq Taȃ la) is an essential instance of existence (Mesdaq-e Bal-zat-e Vojood) and leaves no room for the other and the independent essence due to absoluteness of division (Itlaq-e Maqsqmi). In absoluteness of division, existence is free from any determination (Taȃ yyon), it is not even bound by absoluteness; Absolute existence at the same time is present throughout the universe and presence in all places and levels beyond any determination and specification. In every rank and place, other saying, it takes over the same rank and the constraints of that place, but it is a reality beyond that place and all the levels and appointments. The essence of the Supreme Being has an unconditional identity due to the absoluteness of division. So that absoluteness cannot be a stipulation for His identity and existence. The status of Divine Essence is the status of no determination (bi Taȃ yyoni) and condition; and no determination and specification is superior to other ones. The Divine Essence has all specifications, existential perfections and divine attributes; It is a status of unity. But when determinations and realities appear and move from epitome to detail, pluralities arise. This is where the discussion of "manifestation" comes into play. In fact, it will be absolute by one of the determinations; thus, by the absolute appearance in the form of appointments and restrictions, the status of plurality appears. To clarify their intuitions, those possessed of the knowledge of God (Ahl-e Marefat), for the men of perfect visions and explain the unity of existence, otherness and objectivity of creation and truth, reveal the necessity of discussion on the requirements of the theory of unity of existence and some other concepts like surrounding distinction (Tamayoz-e Ehali), divine transcendence (Tanzih), and ascribing human attributes to God (Lehaz-e Nafsol Amri). Ibn Taymiyyah has questioned the issue of the objectivity of the creation and the truth; what is meant by Mystics’ belief that the Supreme Being (due to infinity and absoluteness of division) is the same as all things and at the same time other than them? What is the difference between creation and truth? Mystics have proposed to surrounding distinction in response. In this distinction, which is also interpreted as one-sided distinction, we come across two things in which one (God) surrounds the other (beings), and encompass it. Therefore, in this research, by the objectivity, it is no meant the literal concept and as a result, the suspicion of incarnation is never raised; Rather, the dignity of the Absolute Truth is that it is accompanied by its possibilities and constraints (intrinsic assistance (Maeiyyat-e Zati), but not in the form of incarnation. Belief in incarnation and union between two essences and multiplicity of real existence multiplicity are two sides of extremism.

In this paper, after a brief discussion of traditional metaphysics and its guiding principles, we take a look at naturalized metaphysics. There is an agreement in the practice of naturalized metaphysics that it is continuous with science. However, it turns out that this commitment is not enough to define the discipline. Having defined what naturalized metaphysics is, a concrete example drawn from the literature on the philosophy of time is examined thoroughly. The example is taken from Putnam's famous paper on the relation of science to the problem of time Finally, we conclude by saying that naturalized metaphysics is not radically different from the traditional one concerning its methods. Therefore, there is a fundamental vagueness in terms of methods in multiple instances of alleged naturalized metaphysics. Special relativity and the metaphysics of time An interesting case of a philosophical confrontation between physics and metaphysics is the debate over the ontology of time. McTaggart, at the beginning of the twentieth century, argued for the unreality of time (McTaggart, 1908). His argument has resurrected the problem of the dimensionality of the world in metaphysics. After that, three kinds of ontologies have been distinguished: Presentism ( only the present events are real, ) Pastism ( only the past and present events are real, ) and Eternalism ( All past, present, and future events are real. ) In general, the metaphysical debate over these three kinds of ontologies was pursued traditionally, i. e. by a priori argumentation. However, since the 0691 s, the debate found an interesting naturalistic twist: by arising arguments from the relativity of simultaneity in favor of eternalism, physics in general and special relativity, in particular, gained an important role in the debate. 1. Science as the ultimate solution Some philosophers had argued that the problem of the true ontology of time gets its ultimate solution by ( and only by ) physics. The idea was the, there is a well-established scientific theory of space and time, namely the special theory of relativity, which rejects the ontological distinction between past, present, and future events. So, this theory has thought us that we live in a four-dimensional world and there is no more ontological problem concerning time and the determination of future events ( for example, see Gö del, 0696 Rietdijk, 0699 Fitzgerald, 0696 Putnam, 0691 Sider , 91-21 1110 and Saunders . ) 1111 In his influential paper‘ , time and physical geometry ’ , ) Putnam argues given the relativity of simultaneity, since reality is absolute then past and future events, as well as present ones, are all real. 2. Science as a source, not as the ultimate solution In response to Putnam’ s argument, some philosophers objected that, from the relativity of simultaneity, one need not necessarily conclude eternalism. The absoluteness of reality, for example, is an assumption to which one might not be forced to commit ( Sklar1977, 112 0691 ( . ) The idea is that eternalism, presentism, and pastism, as viewed traditionally, are not the only options in the metaphysics of time. A metaphysician can reasonably, develop other metaphysical models of time, consistent with the relativity theory ( for example, see Stein 0691 , Stein and Godfrey-Smith 0660 . ) 0616 3. science as a source of confirmation of rejection As another trend in the literature, there is a tendency to considering the a priori method as a valid way of reasoning in metaphysics. Along this line, some philosophers continued to develop metaphysical models of ontology concerning time, based on the traditional a priori method. However, these philosophers are naturalistic in that they are sensitive to the outcomes of science. They try to show that their favorite metaphysics either get confirmation from science (for example Sider ) 1110 or at least is empirically adequate ( for example Tooley. ) 0661 4. Philosophy as a study in the conditions of possibility of science The fourth approach in ( one might call ) the natural philosophy of time has been exemplified in a work by a famous figure of logical positivism: Hans Reichenbach . ) 0621 ( He argued that some unempirical elements in the relativity theory can be treated as a priori. However, this differs from Kant’ s reasoning in that these a priori elements are not necessary, but conventional. This conventionality appears, especially, in the standard definition of simultaneity presented by Einstein. This definition, Reichenbach argues, rests on the unverifiable assumption that the one-way speed of light is ( in a vacuum ) a constant in all directions. Appealing to the conventionality thesis, some philosophers had tried to argue in favor of eternalism ( see for example Petkov 0616 and , ) while others 1111 attempt to exploit the in principle impossibility of determining empirically the one-way speed of light to defend their noneternalistic metaphysics against Putnam's argument ( Tooley, 0661 Cohen. ) 1109 Conclusion we conclude by saying that naturalized metaphysics is not radically different from the traditional one concerning its methods. Therefore, there is a fundamental vagueness in terms of methods in multiple instances of alleged naturalized metaphysics.