HEKMAT-E MO’ASER (CONTEMPORARY WISDOM)
Year:2012 | Volume:2 | Issue:2|Papers Count:7

The present article investigates Mutahhari's “new theology”. First, we present Mutahhari's view of theology, according to him, the divine station of God implies that He does have a direct influence upon things, in order words, His creation must be understood as the creation of a divine ordering system. In his new theology (influenced by Judaism and Christianity), God is considered a blind and deaf force, which has no influence upon thing, human destiny being predetermined and unchangeable.

The role of the intellect (or reason) and its functions in religious speculation is very important. In the Islamic context, a wide variety of functions are attributed to the intellect. Most of the philosophical and theological schools as well as the theoretical disputes have their origin in the various status attributed to the intellect and intellection. Kindi, Avicenna, Farabi, Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra are among the great Islamic philosophers who have postulated various functions for the intellect and speculated on its relationship with religion. Farabi particularly stands out on this topic. Farabi developed his philosophical position while the Islamic word was caught in doctrinal, juridical and theological quandaries and arguments, political differences and social upheavals, and wars between various groups claiming authority.In that period, having lost its religious principle, Islam was in a state of crisis and needed a scientific explanation for its existing challenges. Hence, people were drawn towards Greek philosophy, and its principles were used to solve problems in religious thinking. Hence, we see that Farabi, using Greek philosophy and logical deduction, strive for a better understanding of religion. He considers the general Islamic principles and the law of the revelation, a key guaranteeing happiness in this world and the next. Farabi argues that it is possible for the human intellect to understand these general Islamic principles and laws by comprehending them logically. According to him, the intellect has a universal nature, and accepting its rational proofs is a common and unalterable factual possibility for all human beings. Farabi believes that the teaching of philosophy and religion are the same. They both come from the source of revelation, or emanation of the agent intellect, and both ultimately leads to perfection and happiness. Farabi does not see any tension between religion and rational intellection and attributes a unique status to the intellect. Leaving aside his unconventional position that the philosopher has a higher status than the prophet, Farabi believes that the philosopher talks using the attributes of speech, and relying upon reason, while the prophet convinces and persuades people by means of the agent intellect imprint upon his imaginal faculty.

In Western and Islamic philosophy, one of the most complex and controversial ontological topics has do with the relationship between mind and phenomenal objects, that is the relationship between the form in the mind and the material and objective form. This issue has stirred great confusion for philosophers seeking to explain the relationship of knowledge and the “outside world”. In this article we present and compare Kant and Mulla Sadra's philosophical solutions to this problem.Although in Mulla Sadra's philosophy, mind and phenomenal objects do not stand on the same ontological levels, however according to the “primacy of existence” (Aṣalat al-wujud) principle, the two are alongside each other. Knowledge is not separate from ontology and relies on the outside world in its process of perception occurring through the help of the senses, the imagination, reason, and intuition. What occurs between the outside world and the mind is called by Mulla Sadra the construction of quiddity. Quiddity is neither bound to the mind or the outside world; however it is necessary on every ontological level and participates in all the levels of perception. Mulla Sadra can explain the relationship between the intuitions of the mind and the outside world first by positing a soul which creates forms and elements related to perception and secondly, by filling the gap between mind and phenomenal objects by postulating a division of ontological levels.According to Kant, knowledge requires two things: a) observation, which is given to us in space and time and b) the reception of an intelligible upon what has been observed. For the process to occur the phenomenal object and the intelligible must share a similarity. Some intelligibles have no similarity with anything from the experiential level. Kant, in trying to reconcile mind and the phenomenal objects uses the concept of Transcendental Schemata, that is forms produced in time by the imagination. By arguing for a direct reciprocity between the phenomena and the intelligible, Kant is bound to uphold the reciprocity between phenomena and transience.

The relationship between mysticism and religion is an important one. Some have argued that mysticism is not religious in nature and can’t be reconciled with religion; hence, some groups have adopted mysticism and parted from religion while other have strictly adhere to religion and got in quandaries with mysticism. Those who consider mysticism reconcilable with religion have different opinions on the relationship they entertain. Some have argued that mysticism is the essence of religion while other have considered it an element of religion. We suggest that the relationship between religion and mysticism must be assessed by the study of their nature. In the current article, we argue and demonstrate that mysticism is not against religion nor foreign to religion; it is not like religion, nor an element of religion, but rather is the esoteric dimension of religion. With this perspective, numerous questions and ambiguities related to the relationship of mysticism and religion are answered and their respective nature becomes clearer. Moreover, we also suggest a methodology for distinguishing between authentic and unauthentic forms of mysticism.

The theory of constructional perception is a new and innovative theory in the field of pragmatic perception-resembling in its requirements and implications traditional phronesis (practical wisdom)-which is finding new application and purposes. This theory provides a unique explanation of the formation of pragmatic human knowledge by mean of the individual's psycho-somatic dimensions interacting with his/her natural and social environments, which opens up new theoretical horizons in combined philosophies like ethics, law, politics, free will and epistemology. From a more general perspective, the theory offers rich possibilities for explaining and justifying political, economical and social statements and rules, culture and tradition. This theory can be postulated as the basis from which theorization in philosophies related to the humanities can be engaged.Moreover, apart from searching for the nature and quality of constructional perceptions and how it affects the individual mind as well as his/her social dimensions, we inquire upon the principles and the mechanisms of the relationship of these constructional perceptions with reality and “real perceptions” as well as the mechanisms of transformation at play. We also investigate how constructional perceptions become firmly fixed and how they affect reality or are affected by it.

In the last decades, human rights have become a very sensitive topic. Elements of human rights can be traced back to ancient sources, however, there is no doubt that the current concept is the products of fairly recent intellectual and philosophical endeavors. For many years now, Muslims have been making the case for Islamic human rights, seeking the recognition of an equal status to the western human rights. Among preeminent scholars in Islamic society who have argued for Islamic human rights, there is Allameh Ja'fari (1923-1998), who published some insightful works in 1982, as well as Javad Amuli (1933-…). In the present article, we survey and analyze the work of Allameh Ja'fari, focusing on the following points:1. A recognition of the effort and precision of Allameh Ja'fari's work.2. An assessment of his proposed definition of elements of Islamic human rights as well as his comparison with western human rights.3. His suggestions as to how one should react and interact with the issue of human rights:a) What should be the foundation of human rights and how to reflect on the rights of various religions according to it.b) An emphasis on the pragmatic aspect of Islamic human rights, that is how and by which means these rights should be applied, rather than spending a huge amount of time on marginal issues, and seeking difficult to reach ideals.