HEKMAT-E MO’ASER (CONTEMPORARY WISDOM)
Year:2018 | Volume:9 | Issue:1 |Papers Count:10

Many thinkers have designed a form of an ideal state in their thought. Plato, the Greek thinker, and Iqbal, the Islamic thinker, are among these thinkers who have designed a form of the ideal state in their thought. What these two thinkers have the fundamental differences in the ideal state are their way of looking at the relation between poetry and philosophy in ideal state. This article with hermeneutic method attempts to explain the position of poetry and its relation with philosophy in Plato and Iqbal's views and on this basis, it deals with different view of the two thinkers on the poetry and philosophy. Generally, Plato has a negative attitude toward poetry in ideal state, and considers Poetry and poets against Philosophy and philosophers while Iqbal thoroughly believes in the positive role of poetry in ideal state and with emphasizing the relation between poetry and philosophy, he considers the same the poet and philosopher based on purpose. The main reason for this difference is the method of viewpoint of these two thinkers towards poetry from the epistemic aspect. Plato does not consider poetry to be any knowledge and reality and therefore, in the ideal state that philosophers are ruling he orders the rejection of poetry and the banishment of poets from ideal state. But in Iqbal's thought, poetry has knowledge and reflects reality and even due to its profound influence, any further knowledge comes to the work of reforming the city and society. Therefore, with a deep link between the philosophic knowledge and poetry, the philosopher and poet are one in Iqbal's view and both of them have rational knowledge and their presence is essential for the ideal state.

The truth of knowledge was considered by western philosophers and epistemologists long time ago unclear sentence. They were mostly foundationalists or coherentists in the justification element. Muslim philosophers specifically paid attention to the problem of knowledge, and defined it as constant certainty corresponding reality. In consideration of ternary definition of knowledge, it can be deduced that Muslim philosophers accepted the corresponding theory in truth element, and accepted foundationalism in justification element. Though, epistemological model of Sadra is different from those of Muslim philosophers in consideration of different evaluations of statements, and emphasis on different role and place of proof and mystic intuition in reaching knowledge, and on the other hand, by accepting that knowledge is existential, and by reducing conceptual knowledge to immediate knowledge. Understanding of Mulla Sadra's theory requires examining his method of the justification element. Various aspects are indicated to distinguish between the Transcendent Philosophy and other philosophical schools. In this view, mystic intuition can play a justifying role. From viewpoint of Mulla Sadra, what should be followed are proof and mystic intuition. In the Sadra’ s system, revelation is the criterion for evaluation of mystic intuition. So, reaching knowledge demands the existence of proof or mystic intuition, and the truth of the latter should be evaluated by the revelation. Epistemic system of Sadra is formed by three elements of proof, mystic intuition, and revelation being interrelated to each other. Explaining the epistemological role of proof, mystic intuition, and revelation addresses the context of justification, uncovering the theory of the Transcendent Philosophy about the knowledge. Methods: This study describes the problems, analyzes them, and in some cases, criticizes them using a literature review. Results and discussion: After determination of the ternary epistemic elements, viz. proof, mystic intuition, and revelation, it can be concluded that real knowledge is gained through proof or mystic intuition. In an initial look, it seems that proof and mystic intuition are different, but since he believes that real knowledge is the immediate knowledge, it can be believed that proof and mystic intuition are single and the same, and that the reality of both is the existential encountering with non-material reality. Each of proof and mystic intuition is preparing a cause for encountering non-material existence and gaining knowledge. After considering the theories that set forth the justifying element in the Sadra’ s system, and examining their faults according to this system, another theory is reached herein about justifying element, which is not just foundationalism or coherentism. Conclusion: In our opinion, in consideration of epistemological foundations of the Transcendent Philosophy, one cannot believe that Mulla Sadra's theory of justification is the same as those of other Muslim epistemologists. Mulla Sadra's theory of justification is a compound one that authors named it as “ existential foundherentism” . From the viewpoint of Mulla Sadra, proof and mystic intuition (purification of the soul) are the preparing causes for the existential encountering of non-material existence, and consequently, for justifying the beliefs. Coherentism of Mulla Sadra and his reliance on proof is the realm of conceptual knowledge. This means that in the realm of conceptual knowledge, he believes in two kinds of statements, i. e. foundational and non-foundational, and justifies the latter by the former. Mulla Sadra's cohrtentism implies his belief of conceptual knowledge to be compatible with immediate knowledge, the latter being compatible to the former. In consideration of Mulla Sadra's foundation, the reality of proof and mystic intuition is unique and the same, and that reality is immediate encountering the object of knowledge. This encountering, as a result, is a product of proof or purification of the soul, that is, both promote the existence of the knower and put him/her in the presence of object of the knowledge, and just here, object of the knowledge attends for the knower and the identity of knower and known occurs. The compound theory named “ existential foundherentism” , pays attention both to the role of proof and the mystic intuition. Although in some of his works, Mulla Sadra only emphasizes the proof for justifying the statements, his final viewpoint is to follow proof or mystic intuition, and that proof proves, hence it cannot be incompatible with the mystic intuition, and real proof is not against to the mystic intuition.

This research deals with determination ofMulla Sadra’ s Mystical-Philosophical confrontation with death. Authors determined this confrontation in Graded Unity of Being and Individual Unity of Being. Mulla Sadra believes that death is the perfection of rational soul. Soul at the end of perfecting route, enter the intellective world and unify with active mind, also with first one; but world’ s limitations prevent from full unification. Death create necessary situations for unification and perfection. Mulla Sadra believes that soul at the end of perfecting route survives due to unification with minds. From his point of view, human life returns to its level of perception. Death makes movement to rational level possible. Basedon Mulla Sadra's mystical theory, human life is a pure connection to God’ s one. Due to God’ s name (Alzaher & Alakher) is the manifestation of the right perfection and returns to God. Death moves divine names of human into soul’ s world.

"Mohakat" (Muḥ ā kā t) is a central concept in Avicenna's thoughts on art. He uses this term as a translation for Aristotelian "mimesis". Since there have been different conceptions about Mohakat, or representation, in the history of thought, it should be questioned that what Mohakat means in painting according to Avicenna's views. In studies about the aesthetics of Avicenna, poetry and music have been much considered, but Avicenna's views on painting have not been much noticed in the literature. The present research, therefore, seeks to provide a clear account of Avicenna's views on the concept and the meaning of Mohakat in painting, and in other words, to determine the characteristic features of Mohakat in painting according to his views. It is tried to answer this question by examining Avicenna's scattered words about painting. In this study, the aesthetic views of Avicenna on Mohakat are summarized in three general themes. The nature of Mohakat in painting is examined in the first part, the sub-queries of which are as follows: is the meaning of Mohakat pure and complete imitation, or is this kind of representation compatible with innovation? What are the cases of Mohakat, and in other words, what kinds of objects are represented in a painting? Does the painter merely represent the existing things, or he/she can deal with things that are not actual existing only in his mind? Does the painter only represent the surfaces of the things, or can he/she represent the inner qualities of the subject? What is the relation of Mohakat in painting with that in such other arts as poetry and music? The second part addresses the pleasure of Mohakat. This aesthetic pleasure is considered about both the artist and the audience. It should be inquired that are there any differences between the pleasure of the Mohakat in painting and that in the other arts? Is this pleasure dedicated to humans, or other beings can also benefit from it? The third part discusses the epistemic role of the Mohakat in painting. Is the picture necessarily true, in the sense that it should correspond to an actual object, or may it offer a non-correspondent knowledge to the audience? If so, how does it influence the audience' soul? Finally, can a painting be a good medium for transferring knowledge? And in this case, what is the characteristic features of it? In this research, it has been attempted to respond to above questions using library resources, mainly Avicenna's works, specially his scattered words about painting. Avicenna believes that the work of a poet resembles that of a painter, both imitate something. He defines Mohakat as "presenting something similar to something else, but not the thing itself. " Nevertheless, he believes that Mohakat in painting does not imply mere imitation of a model. Mohakat in painting is not merely the imitation of existing objects, and it is not necessary for the painter to make use of a model that presents in the outside world, that is, Mohakat in painting is not merely an imitation of outward appearance. In other words, the painter can portray, in addition to the outward appearance of someone, his/her inward states. Considering the relation that Avicenna has made between the kind of Mohakat in poetry and painting, it can be concluded that from his point of view, imagination has an important role in the definition of painting. Avicenna describes imitated painted forms as "pleasurable" and "delightful", and regards the ability of imitating things as one of the aspects of human superiority over animals. He emphasizes that the pleasure of Mohakat is not purely sensual pleasure and dedicated to it, rather, it is a mental pleasure and depends on the rational faculty. The audience of a painting is enjoying two things: first, the picture itself in terms of its quality and status, and the like. It seems that, according to amodern interpretation, it may imply color, composition, and formal features of the image. But on the second level, the thing that completes the pleasure is to understand that the image is an imitation of something else. Avicenna believes that the pleasure of painting is so great that it is more enjoyable to see a painting of an object than the object itself. There is also a kind of pictorial Mohakat in the music. From his point of view, Mohakat in the painting is not necessarily true or false. Truth and falsehood in painting is beyond logical truth and falsehood. Avicenna believes that painting can make people charmed and fascinated, and engage the mind of human beings. Also, Mohakat in painting can be a means of expressing rational meanings in sensible language using a coded form.

One of the inputs in analytical philosophy of mind is subjective matter’ characteristics. Different criteria are presented in this regard that the most important of them is awareness, intentionality and etc. But each of these factors have problems in mental representation, like problems about awareness and aboutness which question the distinction criterion of these characteristics. Based on the transcendent wisdom, non-essential attention is suggested component for subjective matter. By studying the position of self in transcendent wisdom, common and uncommon types in all creatures can be obtained and only certain cases of it about human should be explained such that it includes all characteristics of subjective matter. Application of self about human is differentiable in two essential and non-essential parts. The condition of subjective matter is that this attention is not essential. In this factor, awareness disappear because awareness has a widespread spectrum which develops problem in the distinct feature of subjective matter. Also this component covers aboutness, subjective causality and being first person.

Analysis science of method or methodology is used in different meanings and purposes and in different sciences by the researchers. One of the meanings is recognition science of researchapproaches in different sciences. The subject which is more intended in this article is the meaning of methodology that means presentation ofGhashirie's method (way, approach, attitude), and description, classification and analysis of his methods in collection and analysis and defense of data and claims in the book "Ghashirie's Thesis".

According to psychologism, laws of logic and mathematics are not anything except generalized accounts of thought patterns which govern human's mind. Therefore, the content of laws of logic is merely subjective idea created by the human mind. If the structure of the mind was different from our actual structure, then the laws of logic would be something different from the laws existing now. For Frege, this theory is on the basis of the conceptualism and idealism of the meaning of the words. Frege believes that the meanings of propositions, which he called "Thought", are a distinct matter from "Ideas", which exist in every individual's mind. Frege's arguments endeavor to prove it via two basic reasonings, as stated in this article. The absence of common discourse, which changes language to an individual matter, as well as the presentation of "epistemological relativism" are two vicious consequences, which is the course of accepting the matter that there is no distinction between "Thought" and "Idea". In Frege’ s view, if psychologism were true, everything would be reduced to "Idea". And if everything reduces to "Idea", "Thought" will be "Idea" as well; however, "Thought" is not "Idea". Therefore, psychalogism is void. When Frege tries to explain why Thought is not the same as Idea, he starts with the Idea properties. Frege believes that Ideas are dependent on individual (Individual-dependent), and are always dependent, hence, cannot exist without their owner independently. Each Idea only belongs to one person (individual) can never be the owner of another’ s Idea. Our own Ideas naturally and essentially are so related to our consciousness realm that each Idea owned by every person is distinct from our own Idea only belonging to ours. If two persons have one Idea, it is necessary that Ideas exist independently from them, which is in contrast to the hypothesis and essence of Idea. In his first arguments, Frege declares that if Thought is the same as Idea, it would not be possible to have common perception about one Thought, therefore, identical meaning, and as a result conversation (common discourse), would not exist. So, language would change into an individual private matter. This outcome is a result of individual-dependent (relative to subjects) relative to characteristic of Idea. His second argument is in the same direction as the first one, stating that if Thought is the same as Idea, contradiction between two Thoughts would not be possible. Because there is no identical criterion by which people (person who are communicating) could evaluate their perception, verify the validity of their viewpoints, and discover the contradiction of their thoughts toward others. Also, dispute over Truth would be vain. It is like the quarrel between two persons who fight over being an original 100 Marks banknote in their pocket. Each of them believes that only the banknote in his/her own pocket is original, then all the science would not be only as superstition. Frege in his second arguments illustrate that epistemological relativism and individualism are vicious consequents of psychologism. This research investigates the criticism of some classic logicians and contemporary thinkers on Islamic philosophy. They have declared that Frege does not distinguish between conceptualism and psychologism and also between existence of Idea and its indication. Moreover, they criticize Frege's affirmative theory about grasping of thought. In this research, it becomes clear that Frege's objections to conceptualism (psychological individualism) are still valid. There is no convincing reply to these objections yet. The approach of this research concentrates on the Frege's negative reasoning in the criticism of psychologism, not on the Frege’ s affirmative views on the manner of Thought perceptions.

Using an analytical and inferential method, it was attempted in this paper to provide a design of the philosophy of action in transcendent theosophy. Such a design can open up a framework and an outlook at the what, the why, and the how of the action in Mulla Sadra’ s thought. For Mulla Sadra, the material world is an opportunity to act in order human beings to actuate themselves, and also the body serves as the instrument for the soul to use limbs and organs so that good and bad deeds can be happened. Mulla Sadra does not regard the appearance of action, that is, the movements of the limbs, as the truth. But, in his opinion, the reality of action is esoteric and inner form which provides the possibility of the unity with the soul and the actualization of the personal dispositions. The formation of the dispositions, the heartily intuition of the right, the creation of nature, and the happiness or anger are the reasons, in Mulla Sadra’ s view, for to engage in action. The conceptual identity of the soul, the soul as being material (capacity and faculty) for the forms of the actions, the statement that the soul in its uniqueness is the whole of al-Qawa, and the substantial motion of the soul are philosophical foundations for explaining the effect of the action on the soul. In general, for Mulla Sadra, just as there is no possibility for foreign objects to be present in the soul, and it is necessary some forms of them to be as intellectual existence in the realm of the soul, the good and bad deeds are found out in the realm of the soul through the esoteric and inner form of those actions; they are united with the soul, they remain in the soul, and they affect the soul.

Allameh Tabataba'i (Seyed Mohammad Hossein Tabataba'i) is a classic philosopher in the tradition of the Transcendent Philosophy and a great commentator of the Holy Qur'an. His thoughts are not, however, limited to these two areas. He has new ideas in other epistemic areas as well, including ethics. The main area in ethics is undoubtedly the division of schools into moral realism and non-realism. The purpose of this research is to analyze the issue of Allameh Tabataba'i's position in these categories and to gloss the philosophical subjects which describe this issue? This paper tries to address this issue by analyzing and explaining the issue of "Iʿ tibā rī yā t" (fictions) and "sensation". Methods: This paper is written in a documentary-analytical way. Results and Discussion: In the theory of Iʿ tibā rī yā t (Fictions), we have the following propositions: Each of delusive meanings is based on the truth; each delusive limit that we present in a referent, has another real referent that has been taken from it; indeed, the consideration is not untruthful; The moral propositions are the model and representation of the Causality, which even manifests itself in mental conceptions; The obligation state of "ought" has been taken in all fictions from the obligation of “ necessity” and, therefore, the state of prohibition will be taken from the necessity of “ privation” . Rational men’ s Fictions are based on criterions and truths. They judge that justice or honesty are goodness, because they think that both of them are always helpful to the interests and purposes of society. Real effects are predicated on these Affairs. Accordingly, it can be deduced that the consideration of good and evil is the result of the general necessity that the pre-community human being considers inevitably. Goodness and badness are natural particulars. Their favorability and acceptance or unfavorability and disacceptance are perceived by the faculty of perception. Moreover, any freewill act is done with using the state of "necessity". therefore, when we do any action we believe that doing that action bases on the requirement of the active power (quwwat faʿ ʿ ā lat). Good and bad are defective and, unlike truth and falsity, are true sentences that describe the attributes of the action and the harmony between the action and the goal (telos). Whenever a person considers something to achieve his/her goal and interest of the action, and the consideration and goal are rational, it will be useful and otherwise abolished and unnecessary. Moral judgments are not pure considerations, but based on the truths of the world, mankind, noumenal interests and evil aspects, and have their own real and special effects. The difference between true knowledge and considerative (mentally-posited) one is that true knowledge is abstracted from the outside world of mind. True knowledge is called truth (ṣ idq) Corresponding to truth in the outside world of mind, and is called right (ḥ aq) because the outside world of mind corresponds to it. Consequently, the meaning of truth and right is that this mental truth is exactly the same as the external reality, and the external reality is the same as the truth that it is in the mind. But considerative knowledge is realized only in the mind and does not correspond to the outside world of the mind unless an interest of our interests impels us considering it factual. The fact of predicate of these propositions of cases is depends on the consistency and mismatch with the opinions of scholars and rational men. The creation (inshā ʾ ) of scholars are not vain, and goes back to the realm of their understanding of realities. Conclusion: Therefore, the following achievement can be guided: the considerative meanings are taken from the realities. The considerative obligation, through the scholar’ s consideration, is taken from real obligation for acquisition of goal and interest of the action. The considerative propositions of ethics are based on the realities of the universe and mankind and the noumenal interests and evil aspects, and have their own real and special effects. Corresponding to Allameh's view, although propositions of ethics and creative propositions are cognate, and thus they are not in the cycle of real propositions that are capable of being truth or falsity, but the reality of moral propositions and judgments and judgments is explained in terms of their intentions and goals according to the beliefs of scholars and their perception of reality. Thus, the view of Allameh Tabataba'i in his epistemic system stays on defining moral realism.

Being familiar with various philosophical sources and schools, Mulla Sadra sometimes provides diverse answers to some of the philosophical or theological problems. For example, in regard to equality of the Divine essence and attributes, there are three theological, philosophical, and mystical perspectives in the works of this Shirazi philosopher, which are referred to respectively as general, special, and specific approaches in the present articles. The main goal of this study is to explain Mulla Sadra’ s general approach and compare it to the other two perspectives. Naturally, in order to understand Mulla Sadra’ s philosophical answer, it is essentially important to understand its differences with the more general approach and the theological perspective. After explaining these important differences, Mulla Sadra’ s philosophical perspective shall be described. In explanation of his philosophical theory, Mulla Sadra first compares the Divine essence and attributes to the existence and nature of the physical objects, and then, relying on the accidental realization of the quiddities, he regards the Divine essence to be essentially equal to the “ existence” and accidentally equal to the transcendent attributes; therefore what is abstracted directly from the Divine essence is the concept of “ predicative existence” ; but, as the subjective attributes are related to the existence and its essential properties, they are inherently abstracted from the simple Divine reality, and this means that the attributes are equal due to the unity of the Divine essence. Accordingly, concentrating on the hidden restrictive attributes prepares the ground for understanding Mulla Sadra’ s philosophical approach accurately, and differentiating it from his mystical approach to the Divine essence and attributes.