ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINES
Year:2018 | Volume:- | Issue:21 |Papers Count:7

The interest of sadr al-Muta’allihIn in the attribute of the Self-Existence of the Lord among all divine attributes is undeniable. He is the one who considers all the divine teachings and authentic issues in theology of tawhid to be resulted from it. It is along with the name of Ever-living (al-Hayy) as the great name of God Almighty expressed in some of the traditions. The present paper seeks to explain the true simplicity of the Lord based on Divine Self-Existence. Drawing the position of the attribute of Self-Existing (Qayyum) as the origin of the relative attributes, Mulla Sadra repeatedly considers it as the link for the qualification of the essence to the active attributes that is posterior of the essence, which, as a result, not harmful for the divine essence. Based on Sadra’s principles, the understanding and proving the premises of the rule of indivisible entity is also possible on the basis of self-existence in such a way that the proving of the simplicity of Divine Essence and understanding of its wholeness will be made in the light of this name.

By examining the approach of Javadi Amoli and Rafiee Qazvini about the Asfar Arbia, it is clear that there are differences and similarities between these two views. Javadi Amoli considers the first journey to be the same as the achievement of the Position of Authority (welayah) and the end of the third journey as coincided with the fulfilment of the position of vicergerency of God; but in view of Qazvini, getting the Position of authority (welayah) comes at the end of the third journey. In his view, the end of the first journey is the beginning of the position of the heart, and the second journey is the origin of the emergence of the soul in the mystic term, whereas the intuition of the invisible identity and reaching to the level of annihilation and obliteration does not have a proportional relationship with the level of the spirit; reaching to this fact is consistent with the position of the latent. The mystics like Qaisari and Kashani believe that there is difference between the beginning levels and ending levels of the authority (welayah), but such a distinction cannot be seen in the view of Rafi’i Qazvini. From his point of view, the first journey will be in the field of the general principles and substances and accidents of the third journey of sages, but from the perspective of Javadi Amoli, the scope of the first journey continues to prove the nature of God Almighty. In addition to the inclusion of substances and accidents in the third journey, which Rafi’i Qazvini believes in, the nature of the Activity of God Almighty and the quality of the issuance of one from many will be discussed in this journey. This article seeks to examine in an analytical-comparative method the views of these two metaphysicians.

sadra as the most important designer of the issue of the principality of existence or quiddity has not determined independently the place of the conflict of principality of existence or quiddity, but understanding this shortcoming in the transcendental philosophy. Agha Ali Modarres, who is Sadraian, has had an independent discussion on this issue. In contrary, Allameh Semnani, in a cross-glance and in a detailed manner, has criticized the explanation of Modarres in various respects and he himself has made a different claim to the problem. Presenting and examining the explanation of Modarres, in this paper we have expressed the Semnani’s critique on this idea and evaluated it in detail. This research is new and lack similarity and its method is analytical and critical. The results of this article show that, although the explanation of Modarres is not accepted, Semnani’s critiques on his account are acceptable in two cases and, in other cases, are unacceptable and his saying itself has serious problems.

Despite the fact that the principality of existence is one of the most important and fundamental philosophical issues that is at the center of the intellectual and philosophical attention of Sadr al-Muta’alehin and many of the important philosophical issues are based on it, unfortunately lack of a precise separation of the ontological and epistemological issues in the texts of Islamic philosophy and Sadraian philosophy has affected on this issue itself and its consequences, as it has affected on the ambiguity and complexity of many philosophical issues and on the clarity of intentions of our philosophers, as well. While presenting the history with the separating the epistemological and ontological aspects of this issue on the bases and phrases of Sadr al-Muta’allihIn in a descriptive-analytical method, in this article, we have tried to find out this issue and study his correct interpretation of the basicality of existence and fictitiousness of the quiddity from ontological and epistemological aspects and explain the epistemological use of quiddity.

Khajeh Nasir al-ddin Tusi is one of the most prominent Shiite theologians whose works and ideas have always been of interest to scholars. Khajeh has some ideas about mutability of God’s Will (Beda) that have him different positions. Some scholars have told the same thing. Others have criticized him, and some have also come up with the justification of his idea. Investigations show that the criticism is in place and it can be used from his sayings that he denies mutability of God’s Will (Bada). However, some theologians who were before and after Khajeh, have rejected Bada and he has not presented a new theory. It seems that what Khajeh and theologians such as Sheikh Tusi and Sayyed Morteza have said about Bada is not a Shiite perspective, but it is the effect of the Judge Abdul Jabbar Mu’tazilite’s thought in the viewpoint of his student, Sayyed Morteza, and it has permeated from him to the other Shiite theologians.

According to verses and narrations, the intermediate world is between the life of this world and the life of the other world and on the basis of the philosophical texts, it is a world between the incorporeal world and the pure material one, and its mediocrity requires that it is not completely equal to the material and the quantity and be alien to the incorporeal world, and not totally lack of matter and quantity and be alien to the material world, but having the quantity and immaterial form, it is something of the incorporeal world and something of material world. Referring to the consistency of the physical form with the matter and the impossibility of realizing the form and the quantity without matter, Ibn Sina says that intermediate world and physical resurrection cannot be proved. Hence, there is no place for the intermediate world in levels of existence in his view. He explains the position of the souls after death with an emphasis on the world of spheres and intelligibleness. In this article, Ibn Sina’s views on the intermediate world, life, and life after material life will be explained and examined.

The physical resurrection in view of the two wise men of the Islamic philosophy -Avicenna and Mulla Sadra has been faced with problems; while Ghazi Saeed Qomi is the mediate student of Sadr al-Muta’allihIn and Agha Ali Modarres Zenoozi who is a commentator of the school of Sadra, their view on physical resurrection are different from Sadra’s perspective and both believe in gathering of the elemental bodies; both of them believe that the Hereafter will be realized in a different world other than this world, and attachment of the soul to the body does not disappear with death, rather the soul’s attention to the body is available even after rotting the body and dividing the components, and the ingredients of the body continue to move and evolve after death, and the soul at the resurrection is connected to the body composed of the same material of the worldly body components. After explaining these two ideas, it will be clear that the explanation of Agha Ali Modarres is more scientific and arguable.