Political Quarterly
Year:2023 | Volume:52 | Issue:4|Papers Count:8

The most fundamental orientation in the strategic culture of the United States of America is between the continuum of isolationism and internationalism. A comparison of the grand strategy of Wilson and Carter’s Democratic administrations, on the one hand, and the Harding and Reagan's Republican administrations, on the other hand shows that in the period between the beginning of World War I and the end of the Cold War, the Republican administrations-- unlike the Democratic administrations-- have shown major shift in their foreign policy strategy. As a result, the question arises as to why and how such a dramatic change had taken place? Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to investigate how system-level changes have led to a change in the foreign policy of Republican administrations by crossing the Republican Party sphere of influence? In order to answer this research question, the authors use the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism approach to foreign policy analysis. Given the stated objective of this study and considering that neoclassical realism theories use both the strength of international relations theories in the structural view of international phenomena, and the strength of theories of foreign policy by considering the internal and ideational factors, it seems that this theoretical framework is suitable for the present paper in order to provide insights into U.S. foreign policy-making.First, an overview of the history of US grand strategy and definitions of isolationism and internationalism in some of the most prominent scholarly works are presented. The proper conceptualization of the "degree of internationalism" as a dependent variable is offered. Then, using historical analysis and interpretation, the authors continue with a detailed study of the grand strategy of Republican administrations in five vital time periods      (i.e., World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan), and examine the ups and downs of its degree of internationalism as compared to Democratic administrations. In each of these time periods, international changes affecting US vital interests, the reaction of senior Republican politicians to these changes, the resulting party controversies, and finally the impact they have had on the foreign policy of the Republican administrations have been analyzed in order to identify the main factors influencing the change in the grand strategy of these administrations. The reasons for the return of the Harding administration to the strategy of isolationism after World War I, the fracture within the Republican Party following the US entry into World War II, and its subsequent internationalist strategy, the Eisenhower administration’s policy towards the Korean War, the Nixon administration's response to the prolongation and erosion of the Vietnam War, and the differences in the foreign policy of the Carter and Reagan administrations in dealing with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan are among the most important issues examined.The study of the procedures and processes of foreign policymaking indicates the existence of a coordination and order in the changes that have taken place. This  has manifested itself in the form of two different types of dynamics: The first is a steady line of change in the grand orientation of the U.S. foreign policy, which is gradually shifting from an isolationist strategy to an internationalist one. The second is an oscillation situation affected by the security-cost duality. Whenever a major security threat emerges, it tends to be more inclined to internationalism, and when the threat diminishes and the cost of internationalism increases, it tends to be less internationalist. At any rate, it is clear that the U.S. internationalism became more militant and interventionist after the Second World War.

With the growing isolation of Iran in the international system caused in part by Trump's campaign of maximum pressure, Iranian policymakers are increasingly drawn to China, which could significantly change the structure of the Middle East regional order in the long run. Recent agreements and partnerships between the two countries— reflected in the One Belt-One Road (OBOR) Initiative as well as the draft 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership— will pave the way for the long-term strategic cooperation between the two countries. Hence, Sino-Iranian relations are constantly evolving in the fields of geopolitics, economics, and diplomacy. Despite a steady strategic relationship, Beijing has carefully controlled the degree of its growing bilateral relations with Iran in an effort to balance its other interests in the region. While Tehran calls the new 25-year cooperation agreement as a turning point in China-Iran relations, Beijing has shown a more balanced interpretation of the importance of this document. China does not seek to destabilize and escalate tensions in the Middle East, but it has undermined the effectiveness of important US policies such as imposing anti-Iran economic sanctions by increasing its cooperation with Iran which exposes the weakening of the United States’ influence in the region. However, China's determination to increase its involvement in the Middle East puts a limit on its interactions with Iran. In fact, the deepening of China's diplomatic, economic, and military ties with Iran’s regional rivals (e.g., Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) has forced Beijing to strike a balance between its relations with Iran and its ties with the other key regional powers. The rivalry between neighbors and the growing Great-power competition in the region can significantly undermine Iran-China bilateral relations. In particular, China has adopted a non-confrontational  approach to engage with Iran in a measured and controlled manner with the purpose of not jeopardizing its relations with the key regional players (i.e., the United States, Israel, and the Arab world).As a great power, China does not want to endanger its national interests for the sake of a medium power, and tries to manage its ties with Iran on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of its engagement with this Middle Eastern power in light of its grand strategy and the multiplicity of its broader foreign policy objectives. In addition, Iranian public opinion on the multidimensional cooperation with China and the sensitivities of regional actors will influence the future of Iran-China relations. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic of Iran is eager to take advantage of Chinese trade and investment, but the policymakers are also wary of their over-reliance on China. It is true that both countries are dissatisfied with some of the rules governing the international system, and thus their policies can be examined to some extent according to the approaches of the revisionist governments which are opposed to the US dominance and hegemony. Although both countries do not like the existing international power distribution, but they have different worldviews. China is looking for a new world order, a new political and financial structure, a new way of managing and controlling everything on a global scale. China's growing role in almost all international institutions is seen as an indication of the rise of China. Hence, Beijing has based its foreign policy on maintaining stability with the assumption that its rise cannot be guaranteed by the collapse of the present international system and the formation of a completely different system.In this study, the authors seek to answer the following research questions: 1. Has the strategic partnership between Iran and China been formed in a manner conforming with the structure of the existing international order? 2. What will be the future of Iran-China Relations? Using a descriptive-analytical approach and with the aim of explaining the historical trend and transformation processes in confrontation with the U.S., the influencing pattern of the relevant variables in the strategic Iran-China relations in the post-September international environment will be analyzed. The following hypothesis will be tested: Economic and political factors which have contributed to the formation of the strategic partnership between China and Iran have also a determining role in the limitation and complexity of the future strategic relations of these two revisionist countries. The most important findings of this research is that the increasing convergence between Iran and China is in response to the increasing pressure of the United States at the international level. The  25-Year Comprehensive Agreement as well as official statements by the policymakers involved indicate the desire of both parties for greater coordination.

Political participation of groups, parties, and minorities is a major topic of modern politics. Democracy is defined and measured by the use of a score of indicators, including the removal of all legal obstacles for the full representation of all citizens, the fair and equitable access of minorities to political decision-making mechanisms and processes, and governing elite rotation irrespective of ethnic-religious identities. Based on the indices of democracy, the more a political regime and the ruling majority observe the minorities' rights, the higher the rank of the political system would be. Participation of the Arab and Palestinian parties in the occupied territories is a major challenge for Israel. On the one hand, Israel has evaded facilitating real and practical participation of the 48 Arabs and, on the other, it has no option other than tolerating the growing significance of the population of the Arab Israelis in its political system. After the ratification of the Jewish Nationality Bill, Israel has shown very little commitment to Palestinians' minimal participation already in place. The electoral system that informally enforces Knesset membership, compliance with the ruling system, and agreement with the central government literally means the exclusion of the Palestinians from various forms of political participation. Absurdly, the Arab parties' internal coalitions with themselves and with the ruling parties have not been facilitating their reasonable inclusion in political decision-making at the national level.In the present paper, the Arab parties' Knesset participation and outcomes during the past five decades were examined, and Palestinians' political representation in Israeli Parliament were compared and contrasted to that of Israeli and Jewish parties. The main research questions are as follows:         1. What are main Arab political parties in Israel? 2. Why are they not allowed to really influence Israeli politics despite the all-round participation of Palestinians in various elections, and the presence of some Arab representatives in the Knesset? In the hypothesis, it is stated that the disproportional ceiling specified for the participation of non-Jews in the political process in Israel has affected the extent and quality of the influence of the Palestinian Arab parties even if they would gain a large percentage of the popular votes. Using an analytical-explanatory approach, we collect and analyze quantitative and qualitative data on a number of important independent variables including legal obstacles to political participation of Arab parties with different political-religious ideology (e.g., Christian, Sunni, secular, socialist and communist), the level of participation of Palestinians in the Knesset elections held during 1949-2019 time period. The findings confirm that the coalition of Arab parties with each other or with the top Jewish parties had not facilitated their entry into the cabinet or the high-level political executive positions in the government. Following the passage of the Jewish State Law, the Israeli government has demonstrated that it has virtually no commitment to guarantee even the low level of Palestinian participation. The analysis of the participation of Arab parties in the Knesset and its consequences during the last five decades shows a declining influence of these parties as a result of a greater tendency of Israeli government to keep the power of the Palestinian parties in check.

In various sources, we have been reading that socialism and Marxism began their influence in Iran after the adoption of the Constitution along with the emergence of social democratic organizations and groups. In this study, we intend to address the following questions about Iran and Marxism: 1. When did the influence of Marxism begin in Iran? 2. What were the characteristics of the initial discourse of the Left in Iran? 3. How, under what circumstances, and at what level Marxism influenced the Moslem Iranians? The familiarity of Iranians with socialist thought occurred shortly before the culmination of Iran’s Constitutional Revolution in 1911. The introduction of socialist and Marxist thought to Iran, as a result of Iranians' encounter with Western intellectual and cultural system, provided the ideological basis for the formation of one of the nascent trends in Iran's political arena. Iranians' attention to socialism and Marxism at the beginning and on a general level was influenced by the political and inspirational slogans of Marxist intellectuals and activists, particularly those in Transcaucasia, rather than the ideological or philosophical aspects of these new ideals. These slogans were attractive to Iranian politicians and activists in that region because they were interested in helping the lower strata of society, specifically the workers. Considering the poor living conditions of this class combined with their growing size of population at that time, Marxism and socialism seemed to provide a new theoretical basis for solving the problems of the working class. Therefore, at the beginning of the spread of Marxism and socialism in Iran, their tenets and slogans were used in some political parties and groups’ manifestos and programs. An example of these parties is Ferqeh-ye Ejtemāʿīyun-e ʿʿāmīyun  (Social Democratic Party) which is considered to be the first Iranian socialist organization established by Iranian emigrants in Transcaucasia. Using the documentary research method, we systematically analyzed historical official documents  as our main data  sources. We argue that initially Iranians were influenced by the ideological slogans of Marxism rather than its theoretical foundations. At the beginning,  they were attracted to this ideology’s socialist foundations in the form of organizational goals for their political parties and groups before addressing its theoretical details. Of course, efforts were made to promote socialism and Marxism, but the level of their introduction to Iranians did not go beyond the basic principles and generalities. It is evident that Marxism and its call for a classless society did not have a great influence on the Iranian peoples' political view of society. However, Marx's social theories and Marxism’s commitment to political struggle to improve material conditions of the underprivileged social groups provided an intellectual basis of the research conducted by a number of contemporary Iranian scholars and influenced their political thought.

The occurrence of the Russian Revolution of 1917 influenced the growth of political groups with leftist tendencies, and had an impact  on a small segment of Iranian women in the society. In the framework of Marxist school, the inferior position of women in the contemporary societies is attributed to the unfair historical process of the formation of exploitation and exploitative relationships. Since Marx and Engels considered politics and political power to be dependent on the economic infrastructure, they naturally considered the reason for women's lack of political participation to be her economic dependency as well as her being oppressed and exploited in the family and society at large. Although they did not pay sufficient attention to the issue of women's political participation, other Marxist leading figures such as Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin, and Lenin defended the equal rights of men and women in a way which led to the formation of the schools of Marxist and socialist feminism. These thinkers believed that the most important step for women's liberation is the abolition of private property and the elimination of exploitative classes, because the way for their liberation would be paved by these actions first and foremost. Based on this belief, Marxism presented a materialistic analysis and a scientific perspective for women's freedom, which was considered to be the responsibility of governments and Marxist parties all over the world, including the Tudeh Party of Iran and its affiliated Women's Democratic Organization (WDO).Before the formation of Tudeh Party (the so-called the Party of the Iranian Masses), it was only the Communist Party of Iran that defended the political and social rights of women within the framework of its ideology. Accordingly, this party took measures to promote socialist tendency among women's  rights  activists  and their  organizations  by  presenting  plans  and programs to transform the living conditions of Iranian women, which were temporarily interrupted as a result of the establishment of Reza Shah's dictatorship. Despite some achievements in social and legal fields aimed at extending modern western-style social rights to women in Iran, Reza Shah’s regime created obstacles for their political rights and prevented them from engaging in non-governmental political activities. The changed Post-September 1941 political environment resulted from the vacuum created by the ending of the first Pahlavi Shah’s rule followed by the coming into power of his inexperience young heir as well as the continued intervention of the great powers in Iranian internal affairs facilitated the formation of new political organizations with different political, religious, ethnic outlook. Some groups and organization had communist and socialist inclinations and programs. Among these organizations was the Women's Democratic Organization — affiliated with the communist Tudeh party of Iran— and created at the same time as other similar organizations with the objective of defending women's rights.The Two questions posed in this study are as follows: 1. What were the main objectives of the Women's Democratic Organization (WDO) affiliated with the communist Tudeh Party of Iran? and 2. How successful was this organization in achieving its objectives? In the hypothesis, it is postulated that the formation of women's democratic organization was largely influenced by Tudeh party's attempt to penetrate the social structure of Iran and using the capacities of women's society in order to achieve its political goals. Therefore, by addressing political issues instead of general women's issues and problems, and especially neglecting and confronting the religious and customary traditions of the society, women's organization were prevented from achieving a sustainable success. Focusing on a descriptive-analytical approach, the authors analyze qualitative data on  the characteristics and function of this organization collected from historical documents, memoirs, books, and articles written by the WDO’s founders, supporters, critics, and various experts. The findings of the research, while clarifying the political participation of a notable segment of the society of Iranian women in the given period of time, indicate that the ideological leftist line of the Tudeh party was adopted by the Women's Democratic Organization, and consequently provoked the opposition of the traditional and religious groups in the society. Moreover, the establishment of authoritarianism in the country lead to the failure of   this organization to achieve its ultimate objectives.

The region of West Asia and the Middle East has witnessed scores of unrest and political protests in recent years. These turmoil and conflicts have increased in the second decade of the third millennium with the occurrence of Arab Spring, which denoted the widespread citizen revolts in the Arab World in 2011-2012. These chains of political events were also called the Islamic Awakening. Regarding the lack of meaningful integration in the Middle East, researchers have considered various factors, including regional competition, foreign intervention and the legacy of colonialism. Nevertheless, an examination of recent events reveals a key point—The rivalry between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey which advocate three different views of Islam (i.e., Shiite, Salafi-Takfiri, and the Sunni Islamist Moslem Brotherhood) have led them to vie for power and spiritual influence in the region. We argue that this competition is one of the main factors of crisis escalation in the Middle East. The efforts of the three rivals to increase the size of the advocates of their preferred attitudes towards Islam in order to form a stronger coalition to weaken their opponents have added to the complexity of the problem of seemingly constant turmoil and political crisis in this strategic region.The three main objectives of the present study are: a) to explain how these three views of Islam were formed; b) to analyze the reasons for the competition between the advocates of these points of view; and c) to describe the consequences of the continued rivalry between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey over this issue from the perspective of regional stability and prosperity. Therefore, the authors try to succinctly answer the following research questions: 1. What factors have led to the political changes in the attitudes of the proponents of these views of Islam towards the Middle East developments? 2. To what extent have the formation, growth, and increasing competition of these three views of Islam contributed to the occurrence of conflicts in the Middle East? In the research hypothesis, it is stated that the competition between the proponents of the three different conceptions of political Islam (i.e., Shia Islam, Salafi-Takfiri, and Ikhwani) has increased unrest and violence in the Middle East. Using a qualitative-analytical approach, we collected data on  the Arab Spring events and information about the official statements of the political leaders and decision-makers in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey regarding the regional uprising and crises, particularly as related to the Syrian civil war, the rise of ISIS, and the inter-Arab crisis over Qatar. The findings of the research show that the rotational changes in the attitudes of the advocates of different brands of political Islam on a continuum from cooperation to confrontation have had an impact on the crisis escalation and unrest in the region.The 2011 Arab pro-democracy movements initially encouraged the proponents of the three views of political Islam  to come closer to these movements. For example, Saudi Arabia and Turkey as the supporters of Salafi-Takfiri and Akhwani views formed a coalition against the Shiite-backed Iran. Incidentally, Qatar also supported the Brotherhood's viewpoints. The most significant policy of the Salafi-Takfiri camp’s coalition against the Shiite camp was to support the Syrian opposition in a bid to overthrow Bashar al-Assad regime. They even provided assistance to those who established and operated ISIS, and created an economic, military, and ideological challenge for the Iraqi Shiite government. However, the cooperation among the members of this coalition did not last long because of disagreement over key issues such as the future of the Egyptian regime after Muslim Brotherhood-backed Morsi came into power, the future of the Assad regime in Syria, and the crisis in Qatar-Saudi relations. The consequence of these developments was that the supporters of the Brotherhood moved away from the Salafi-Takfiri proponents in order to counter the Saudi threats against Qatar. Turkey started moving closer to Iran and Russia to secure its interests in the post-war Syria; and this resulted in a temporary reduction in Saudi influence in the region. But this does not mean the end of competition over political clout and influence in the region by smart coalition-building. Therefore, the most crucial strategy of the IRI should be to strengthen its coalition-building strategy and use the vacuum created in the Salafi-Takfiri and Brotherhood camps, along with continuing cooperation with Qatar, tension-reduction with Ankara as well as expanding economic relations with Turkey for the purpose of intensifying the isolation of the Salafi-Takfiri camp.

Identity is regarded as one of the fundamental elements of new political, regional, and international order. Identity forms have intertwined relationships with the history, culture, and past forms of action of a society. It is noteworthy that cultural signs are reproduced gradually and reflect a new form of political behavior. Identity accounts for a major part of the causes of political disputes between Iran and several states including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Israel, Yemen, and Ukraine. Accordingly, identity can be considered as the lost goods of the contemporary era, and it has had a considerable impact on the security policies of various countries.The principal issue addressed in this study is that meaning, myth, and narratives have been ignored in the identity policymaking processes, particularly at the social, national, and regional levels. The main research questions to be answered in the present paper are as follows: 1. What were the features of the identity policy in the third decade of the twenty-first century? 2. How can they set the stage for stability and balance? In the hypothesis, the authors argue that “the identity policy is based on the knowledge of the forms of cultural, historical, and ideological conflicts of the actors, and results from the mechanisms based on the intersubjective interactions. In order to find answers to the questions, we rely on the constructivist approach and Alain Touraine’s new paradigm for the analysis of works by several prominent scholars. Using the method of conceptual analysis, we attempt to delineate the signs of meaning, myth, and narrative in the twenty-first century’s identity policy. The findings of this study are related to the paradigms of identity, media, and network society policies which can pave the way for increasing the power of some countries, but they can also be signs of security threats for others. The paper’s innovation concerns the effect of narrative and mythic signs on the identity policy.

In the context of the resurgence of strategic rivalries between Russia and the West in northern Europe, Finland has the longest border between Russia and the West and is a buffer zone. Finland is formerly a Russian colony and has experienced close ties. In fact, Finland has the closest and most nuanced relationship with Russia. Maintaining good neighborly relations was a lifeline for Finland after the Second World War, and hence it developed a distinctive version of neutrality where it constantly anticipated Russia’s reactions to its foreign— and sometimes internal policy moves. Although the relationship with Russia is fundamentally different now, anticipation of Russia’s reactions is reflected in the Finnish foreign policy style. Furthermore, the level of activity and density of political and economic links between Finland and Russia stand out in a Nordic comparison. Although Russia is Finland's most important security threat, it has never faced Russia in the post-Cold War era and has strangely managed its relations and secured its national interests and security. A key factor in Finland’s current security policy line is the guarantee of credible defense based on military non-alignment, albeit without reference to a policy of neutrality and most often without reference to an attempt to remain neutral in the event of a war. In the "worst case" scenario, in which Finland is attacked, the country would have its independent defense but it would also be able to receive the available outside assistance. This success was due to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine of the Cold War era. The innovative Pasikkivi-Kekkonen doctrine had been an important factor in the management of Finland-Russia relations since the Cold War. Sometimes, this doctrine is mentioned as a supporter of Finland's neutrality policy, but the concept of this doctrine is broader and more pragmatic. The question to be answered is: How has the Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine affected Finland's security relations with Russia in the post-Cold War era? In the hypothesis, it is asserted that despite the expansion of relations between Finland and the West after the Cold War, the Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine has been the dominant approach in orienting its foreign policy towards Russia. This approach reflects the two areas of relations with the European Union and interaction with the US-led NATO. In order to examine Finland's security policy towards Russia in the form of the aforementioned doctrine and the method of tracking the process, it was concluded that Finland succeeded in creating a special type of neighborhood policy in the form of its innovative doctrine in order to de-escalate tensions with Russia and maintain its interaction with the West. and even have extensive relations with NATO. This policy became the foreign policy of this country; and even the issue of Finland’s NATO membership can be analyzed in the same way. Given the importance of Russia in Iran's security policy, Finland's strategy can be a way to optimize our country's strategic choices against this actor and is a step towards producing literature on the Nordic and Scandinavian studies. This defense “credibility” aims on the one hand to provide a sufficient threat effect and on the other hand, to allow for a political solution in a hypothetical conflict situation through a combination of Finland’s own defense and possible out-side assistance. At a political and security policy level, this type of military non-alignment allows for nearly everything except NATO membership. Russia’s overall attitude toward Finland’s current military non-alignment is clearly positive. However, from a Russian perspective, slightly controversial or competing interpretations have been made about the nature of Finland’s military non-alignment. With respect to Finland’s current line, the vagueness of the concept is a problem, should Russia in some situation aim to define the contents of military non-alignment and thereby of Finnish politics.