Journal of Existence and Knowledge
Year:2015 | Volume:2 | Issue:1 |Papers Count:8

One of the most interesting topics in Islamic and Western Philosophy is to determine the boundaries and limits of reason in knowing the real world. Following the existential limits of reason in knowing the reality, we come to its limits in announcing and asserting the facts. In this article, by appealing to the authorized criterions, I try to show both the cognitive and the assertive limits of reason and, thus, to determine the realm of necessary silence of reason about the objects of the world. However, the realm and object of necessary silence of reason is attainable to rational speech in a specific way. The structure of the reason and the special character of the objects allow that rational speech and rational silence come together without causing contradiction.

In search for the best justification of religious belief, first platonic knowledge is examined vis-à-vis empirical and rational knowledge. Then, it is illustrated how platonic teachings has been used to explain and justify religious belief. Finally, through the criticism of the use of platonic knowledge, it has been shown that Islamic mysticism or Irfan does not provide any justified knowledge and, therefore, cannot be used as the epistemological basis for religious belief.

This article intends to draw out the ontological as well as epistemological principles of Plato’s early dialogues specially Laches, Euthyphro, Euthydemus and Hippias Major, based on three elements that I call 'Socratic circle', namely Socratic question, his disavowal of knowledge and elenchus. Those principles are enumerated as knowledge of what X is, bipolar epistemology, bipolar ontolgy, split knowledge, split being and knowledge of being. This article tries to show that these principles are consistent. The parallelism of the epistemological principles with the ontological ones and their similarity in some specifications, like their being absolute and split, are taken as evidence for such claim.

It is commonly believed that Spinoza is a rationalist philosopher who considers imagination as the lowest kind of knowledge and of the least importance. Through examining two important ideas of Spinoz’s, i.e., imaginary concepts of free man and democracy, and by showing the importance of these ideas in Spinoza’s philosophy, I argue that, contrary to received view, imagination has a very important role in Spinoza’s philosophical system.

In Vico's viewpoint, Cartesian thinking method is based on segregation and analysis of concepts, and the ultimate aim of this method is gaining certainty. The certainty is merely achievable in the frame of clearance and distinctness. For Descartes, it is impossible to achieve clearance and distinctness in historical and cultural studies, thus there is no place for such branches of knowledge in his method. According to Vico, Cartesian reason is devoided from its past, history and society. In his view, the crucial fault of Cartesian reason is its neglect of the role of faculty of imagination in the process of historical development of reason. Vico introduces a kind of thinking method among the ancients, which he calls poetic wisdom. In this method, reason with the aid of imagination, instead of segregation, analysis and criticism, attempts to find and make relation between different issues and domains that finally leads to new horizons. Poetic wisdom does not make human devoided from nature, history and society, rather it seeks synthesis and unity.

Quine is an empiricist. But he objects the previous empiricists. We want to show that Quine is in fact an objector of the epistemological tradition that Descartes founded, and the empiricists that Quine objects are followers of that tradition. Here we emphasize two specifications of Cartesian tradition: (1) foundationalism (2) trying to answer the problem of justification. We show that Quine’s epistemology rejects both of these. Two traits of Quine’s epistemology that have important roles here are holism and naturalism.

Phenomenology of Spirit is commonly considered Hegel’s debut where he explained, for the first time, his unique dialectical approach. However, it is usually forgotten that the Phenomenology of Spirit is not an independent work, but a result of Jena's philosophizing period (1801-1806) which produced, in addition to a number of other texts, a collection of manuscripts of Jena’s system (Jenaer Systementwürfe). In this collection, Hegel initiates the idea of 'systematic truth' as a 'universal process'. One of the most essential parts of this system is Metaphysics, in which Hegel implies a dialectical transition from first grounds of human understanding (principle of contradiction) to the sublime form of truth (absolute spirit). The present paper analyzes three main parts of Jena’s Metaphysics – that is, transition from ‘Cognition as a System of First Principles’ to ‘Metaphysics of Objectivity’, and finally to ‘Metaphysics of Subjectivity’.

In his Oriental Essays, Ibn-Sina puts away the languge of argument, and presents his philosophy by using fictional language and metaphors. To investigate why Ibn-Sina has used such an artistic language, in this paper, first, we will consider the special function of genere of fiction in Ibn-Sina’s opinion. It will be shown that for Ibn-Sina the imaginary language of poem has exceptional role in moral guiding the addressees of his philosophy. Then, by focusing on the common points between art and morality from Ibn-Sina’s philosophical point of view, the theoretical foundations of studying ethical problems in a framework of art will be examined. After explaining the role of imaginal power in the epistemic process of abstraction, we will show how Ibn-Sina has used an imaginary language to make his moral principles acceptable. Finally, by appealing to imagination as a mediator between sense-perception and intellectual discernment, the relation between vrious aspects and fields of Ibn- Sina’s moral philosophy as another consequence of his use of metaphors and imaginative language will be introduced.