The naturalistic approaches to ethics try to find some solution to the problems of moral philosophy with an emphasis on the findings of empirical science. One of the most famous naturalistic approaches to ethics is evolutionary approach. Evolutionary explanations of morality have always been accused of committing naturalistic fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy has two versions: Humean and Moorian. Hume's reading, also known as deductive version of the naturalist fallacy, suggests that the inference of values from facts is a kind of fallacy. Moore's version of naturalistic fallacy, says that defining moral properties based on immoral properties, and in particular natural properties, is impossible. In this article, after introducing Ruse's evolutionary ethics, his reasons for not being committed to naturalistic fallacies are brought. Then we answer the question whether or not Ruse really avoided the fallacies. Our answer to this question is affirmative. But, along with critics like Rottscheafer and Martinsen, we will show that the cost of avoiding these fallacies has been discarding the objectivity of ethics. Would Ruse, without endorsing an illusionary and subjective account of morality, avoid the naturalistic fallacy? We will demonstrate that such a reading can be offered by giving a greater role to culture. Thus, the purpose of the article is to oppose Ruse's illusionary readings of morality and to defend an objectivist reading. In our opinion, elements of this reading can also be found in the work of Ruse himself.