FALSAFE-YE ELM (PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE)
Year:2019 | Volume:9 | Issue:1 (17)|Papers Count:8

In “ Birth of the Clinic” Foucault's shows that it was not the natural sciences but the clinical medicine that laid the foundation for the humanities. At the end of the book The Birth of the Clinic, he argues that the humanities are based on modern clinical medicine. The importance of medical science in the founding of the humanities, he says, is not purely methodological because human existence is defined or perceived as the object of positive science. Of course, Foucault does not make more of his claim and does not expand it. In this article I will try to show how this claim can be defended on the basis of his formulation of clinical medicine, and what implications it will have for the humanities. In order to understand comprehensively the thesis medicine should be framed based on the views of medical philosophers. Without these arrangements, it would be difficult to understand Foucault's claim. It seems that not only he has suspended implicitly or neglected many of philosophical issues of medicine in the Birth of the Clinic, but also his interpreters were unfamiliar with the tradition of medical philosophy. First, I'm trying to show that medicine is a different mode of thinking than the natural sciences, if that were not the case, Foucault's claim would be so trivial: human being has been transformed to the object by medicine, and it was then that the founding of the human sciences was inspired by the natural sciences, which is a mistaken belief. This section will be based on the views of Ludwig Falk on the serious differences between medical thinking and the natural sciences. I describe the structure of clinical medicine and its various disciplines and their interaction. In this is based on Kazem Sadeghzadeh ideas. In the next section, I will attempt to show how Foucault has formulated modern clinical medicine and its evolution in the form of three-level spatialization. In the final chapter, I will show how Foucault's formulation of clinical medicine can form the basis of the humanities. Thus this article appears to be an attempt to link the philosophy of medicine and the philosophy of the humanities through a new reading of the Birth of a Clinic

Fakhr al-Dī n Rā zī is a thinker of the 12th century who had a significant role in the dialog between two philosophical doctrines of his age, i. e. Peripateticism and kalā m. He followed peripatetic methods to develop kalā m theories. Razī ’ s theory of motion is in the frame of kalā m Atomism. In this paper, I will show how the atomistic theory of motion is in interaction with Aristotelian fundamentals in Physics. I will show that Razi asserts discontinuity of motion, by relying on Aristotelian Continuity principles and rejecting to some premises. Then, I discuss the significance of this theory from the history of science’ s view.

John Dewey in the art as experience presents an exquisite theory of aesthetic and art, which its roots can be found in his evolutionary and Hegelian views. The book introduces a new look to art, besides, marginally, compares science and art to guide the reader in reaching the author's views in the philosophy of art. The present paper seeks to rewrite Dewey's view of scientific realism. In this rewriting, the claim is that by making comparisons between art and science as Dewey did during the writing of the book of art as experience, we can reach to a better understanding of the current debate between scientific realists and social constructivists in the philosophy of science. In fact, Dewey illustrates the continuous interaction of human and the environment, which is neither consistent with the usual readings of realism in the philosophy of science nor with the general interpretation of social constructivism.

The connection between low of nature and natural things is an important problem in metaphysics of science. There are two groups that defense this connection. The first who believe that low are contingent, suppose this connection is week. The last think law is grand in properties of natural kind. Essentialist as an example of last group, in any view, claim that natural laws, metaphysically, are necessity. Backing to history of science as a usual method, essentialist find out the relation between kinds and law. In this Issue, by explaining the alchemical Mizan law, we study the relation between essentialism and mizan.

Motion is one of the main features of natural philosophy, which together with the formation of Newtonian-Galilean physics, is the most important subject of kinematics and dynamics in the new physics. One of the scientists who played an important role in shaping Galileo's views was Ibn Bajjah (Avempace) (1098-1138). He was a natural philosopher of the 12th century AD. Ibn Bajjah' s mechanics is built upon two general Aristotelian axioms that emphasize natural motion and Algebraic (Qasri) motion. In this article, the bases of movement by Ibn Bajjah are studied based on the motive factors in the movement of the natural body, ie, "form" and "weight". This review is based on the important theory of "matter and form" and the essential principle of "nature does not work in vain " and was done for the first time

Goodman was the first one who answered his own riddle of induction, although a relativist answer which opened a way for his constructivist ontological project. Realists, concerned with inductive knowledge, however, attempted to retrieve this kind of knowledge by attacking his answer and providing alternative answers to the riddle. Here I examine three reactions, by F. Jackson, C. Elder and P. Godfrey-Smith. This examination proceeds concentrating on the idea of natural kinds; whether this idea can open a (realist) way to deal with Goodman’ s riddle? Jackson’ s suggestion is examined borrowing Elder’ s and Godfrey-Smith’ s critics. Then I will go to Elder’ s suggestion showing that it involves begging the question. Then Godfrey-Smith’ s suggestion, which is indeed a reconstruction of Jackson’ s idea that appealed to rules of statistical methodology instead of a philosophical conceptualization, is examined. This suggestion seems to me a prpoer idea to deal with Goodman’ s riddle, on the on hand, and deeply relies on the idea of natural kinds, on the other. However, it is cannot disable Goodman’ s own suggestion, which is also weaker metaphysically.