The interpretive competence of judges has always been a point of conflict. Its advocates regard it as an essential and efficient institution contributing to dynamism of laws, which can bring the laws closer to political and legal requirements in keeping with social change. Its critics, however, reject it claiming it can undermine the rule of law, increase the danger of abuse and corruption, and infringe upon basic rights. Regardless of these criticisms, interpretation of law is an inseparable part of legal resources, procedure, and adaption of laws to actual claims. Therefore, the concern and focus of legal discussions must be on how to supervise and control this legal institution, rather than reject it. In the first step, it must be ensured that principles of accountability and rule of law are observed, and then a balance must be struck between the interpretation made by judges and the spirit of law, legal principles, and human and citizenship rights. The realization of this aspiration is subject to a two-stage solution. Stage one: familiarity with the special, fluid nature of judicial affairs, and admission of its fundamental difference from execution of laws by law enforcement institutions. Stage two: recognition of interpretive competence as a special legal institution, and envision of control, priori, and posteriori mechanisms based on recently developed methods of supervision in administrative law, such as soft law and network supervision. In and of itself,