LAW REVIEW
Year:2004 | Volume:- | Issue:30|Papers Count:8

There are few, if any, topics of the law or relationships of which the law takes cognizance which are not affected to a greater or lesser degree by the principles of estoppel. When an estoppel binds a party to litigation he is prevented from placing reliance on or denying the existence of certain facts. From the point of view of the party in whose favour they operate, estoppels render the proof of certain fact unnecessary, and from the point of view of the party against whom they operates, estoppels have the effect of an absolute exclusionary rule. Also it is possible to argue that estoppel is better regarded as a matter of pleading or substantive law, rather than a rule of evidence. Estoppels are of three kinds; estoppel by judgment (or record), estoppel by deed and estoppel by matter in pais (or by conduct). This article discusses the basic principles of estoppel with only such specific application thereof as appears to be essential to an effective presentation of the subject.  

Punitive Damages are not compensation for injury and is levied to punish reprehensible conduct of defendant and to deter its future occurrence. Common law is the base of this approach. According to the U.K. House of Lords, there are some restrictions in levying this kind of damage. These restrictions have been fully respected by the courts of all the Commonwealth States except Australia and the United States. Even in the United States this approach has been recently extended to cases in which a foreign State is a defendant. This practice poses the question of the legality of Punitive Damages in International Law. A study of international responsibility rules and relevant case law shows that although there are some similarities between Punitive Damages and Satisfaction in international rules of State responsibility, it is not principally permitted to pass a judgment on punitive damages against a State. Therefore, the recent practice of the United States courts in convicting foreign States including Islamic Republic of Iran is a violation of international law and entails in international responsibility of that State.  

Foreign State immunity from jurisdiction of internal courts of another states as a customary rule of international law has been appeared in states’ practice and also in legislations passed by their parliaments (states like U.S.A, U.K, Australia, Canada, South Africa, Pakistan, etc.,). State immunity as a rule of international law has developed from its beginning (i.e. the Schooner Exchange Case) by many experiences. Here we can refer to the Absolute and Restrictive state immunity theories as its classical examples. But in this paper we just focus on its recent experience, i.e. the anti-terrorism act of U.S.A and Iran’s jurisdictional counter act.Despite the validity of the state immunity as a customary rule of international law in itself, there is not such a consensus among states’ practice and opinion regarding its limitation and the state immunity rule is on change constantly. However, for the time being, this rule is experiencing the Anti-terrorism act of U.S.A and the Jurisdictional Act of I.R. of Iran’s. These acts, which gave jurisdiction to the national courts of their states, open a new window to the state immunity at present. After considering these acts, and specially Iran’s jurisdictional act, we have to categorize them as a new exception to state immunity rule, or we have to classify them as a new opponent rule of customary international law.The rise of other exceptions to the rule shows us that what is important in appearance of the exceptions is a positive state practice from one hand and silence of other states in another hand. Recent situation, however, does have resemblances to rising process of other exceptions. At first Iran and U.S.A. legislations as state practice, then silence of other states to the appearance process as second, and finally international atmosphere in the case of terrorism in general. But any final conclusion on the case needs passage of time to deal the jurisdiction based on anti-terrorism attitudes properly.

The religion of Islam is a proclaimer of peace. In This religion, war has been legalized to defend individual, national and human rights. In accordance with the political Islamic jurisprudence, the contracts of obligation (Thimmah), Security (Amān) Case Fire (Hodneh), Peace (Solh) and Arbitration (Tahkīm) are Considered as the ways of putting an end to a war.A Contract of obligation (Thimmah) is one that is held between the Islamic government and the followers of the book (Ahl-al-ketab). This Contract is always valid, even though a cruel or unjust ruler in Islamic world would have signed it. With this, the Islamic government is obliged to defend the followers of the book against any aggressor.With the Contract of security (Amān), life, finances and respect of the infidels who have fighted against Muslims, will be in Safe. The scope of this contract is not limited to the war period, but it may conclude other elements as temporary residence, touristic journeys, etc … in an Islamic Country.(Hodneh), namely, Cease fire, truce and Armistice is a Contract which is the most prevalent way of bringing a war to an end in our age. But it is temporary and not, necessarily, permanent.The contract of peace (Solh) differs from the latter’s, although its fundamental characteristic is to be permanent, and not temporary but, it is still a matter of discussion in political jurisprudence.The Contract of Arbitration (Tahkīm) allows hostilities to be settled by an impartial body.