This article introduces the term "guerrilla tricks in arbitration", an issue whose destructive effects and the ways to deal with it is the focal point of conferences and scientific debates throughout the arbitration community. Therefore, it is necessary to study the destructive effects of guerrilla tricks in the emerging Iranian judiciary. The aim of the present study is not only to show the harmful effects of guerrilla tricks, but also to provide solutions to counteract such tricks. The research method is descriptive-analytical, and the data has been collected in library method, with emphasis on the analysis and interpretation of legal texts of the international arbitration, research and theories of the international arbitration community and reviewing the proposed regulations of famous arbitration centers such as ICC and AAA. Guerrilla tricks are a strategy used by the dissatisfied party in the arbitration process to derail the arbitration process or have the arbitrator's vote annulled. Such a person is called an arbitration guerrilla who, because he does not see the arbitration in his favor, tries to make the arbitration process difficult by requesting an extension of the hearing for illusory reasons, submitting irrelevant documents to the dispute and requesting the arbitral tribunal to review them, dismissing the lawyer and counsel in order to request a retrial, sabotaging in the provision of relevant evidence, placing pressure on witnesses and experts, protesting against the lack of independence of the arbitrator or lack of justice in equal treatment of the parties, engaging in verbal conflict with the other party to the dispute, showing disrespect to the arbitrator, disrupting the order of the arbitration session. This scroll of guerrilla tricks clearly shows how vulnerable the arbitrator is to the guerrilla behavior of the parties with all its benefits. Arbitration, once the flagship of speed, cheapness, and efficiency, is now becoming a passive, slow, costly, and inefficient institution. This plague is currently infecting Iran's arbitration. For example, the most important guerrilla threat to the arbitral tribunal is the frequent delays in arbitration proceedings. It is enough for the guerrilla to disrupt the arbitration process for three months and not attend the hearings and give no reason, and disrupt the order of the hearings, ignore the court orders, and dissuade witnesses from testifying. It is not before the time limit for arbitration set in the Article 484 of the Code of Civil Procedure has reached that either the arbitration, according to Article 474 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or the arbitral award, if one has been issued, according to Article 489 of the Code of Civil Procedure, could be annulled by the court. In fact, the Code of Civil Procedure not only does not prevent guerrilla tricks, but also provides unique opportunities for guerrilla arbitration to overturn arbitration. In this way, the arbitrators have no choice but to be indifferent to the principles of the trial so that they can issue a verdict within the prescribed time limit, and this contradiction undoubtedly completely destroys the efficiency of the arbitral tribunal. That is why care must be taken in setting the rules of arbitration, and arbitration in Iran will never flourish until a solution is found to counter guerrilla tactics. Accordingly, for the Iranian arbitration, which is at the beginning of the path, a solution must be devised to counter the guerrilla tricks. This article proposes five effective strategies to protect the arbitrator against the harms of guerrilla tricks. The first is the inclusion of an Asymmetrical Arbitration Clause in the arbitration agreement. In this way, if the other party does not cooperate, the plaintiff can decide on the details of the arbitration process on his own. The second solution is for the parties to agree on a regular and flexible timetable that provides for the deadline for petitions and actions required in arbitration. The third way to prevent guerrilla tricks is to attach some ethical precepts to the arbitration agreement. The benefit of this code of ethics model is that each party becomes familiar with its obligations and understands what behaviors will be considered guerrilla tactics. In this way, the arbitrator faces less challenge in punishing the offender. Two final strategies are formed to increase the managerial power of the arbitrators so that they can use their experience and knowledge to deal with the arbitration guerrillas. The fourth and most powerful tool against guerrilla tricks is Adverse Inference which is based on the assumption that the document that the defendant has refused to submit to the arbitral tribunal implies his conviction or proves his wrongdoing. The last resort is to impose arbitration costs on the guerrillas in two ways 1. Allocation of arbitration costs to the guerrilla at the time of the issuance of the award 2. To receive security against using guerrilla tricks. Thus, if the proposed solutions in the Iranian arbitration law and the bylaws of arbitration institutions have a strong presence, Iranian arbitration will be free from guerrilla and guerrilla tricks in arbitration.