In this article, an attempt has been made to examine the doctrine of "denial of justice" in international law under the title "denial of justice" and its examples. Let us explain Iranian law and point out the effects of recognizing this doctrine in Iranian law. "Denial of justice" is a type of "severe injustice" that calls into question the basis of proceedings and lawsuits to the point where it seems that "rights are denied". Currently, since this doctrine does not have a binding aspect, if it occurs in substantive discussions, it can only be placed in the form of injustice, the subcategory of contradiction between Sharia and in contradiction with the basis and philosophy of law, and for this reason, it may be possible to consider its influence on the judicial decision was hopeful. But if there is a denial of justice regarding the formal regulations, we cannot take action to fix it and we have to comply with the formal law, even if it is unfair. Whereas if this doctrine is developed and considered as a rule or law or doctrine, it can be cited in different stages of proceedings and the judges will be obliged to resolve it. The purpose of this article is to identify and introduce the doctrine of "denial of justice" in Iran's legal system, so that it can enter Iran's law as a recognized rule and be considered and cited effectively. This doctrine can significantly reduce cases of rejection of lawsuits and petitions and avoidable delays, it can have a profound effect in preventing the loss of the rights of the litigants and the waste of time and cost of proceedings, and it can be a document for issuing more fair rulings. Paying attention and recognizing and finally using this doctrine, while creating a change in proceedings, can be a means of asserting the rights of individuals whose rights have been violated under circumstances and are desperate to resort to litigation.

The cornerstone of international investment law is to ensure the foreign investor's rights through international law standards including fair and equitable treatment. If the host state violates the standards, the foreign investor will not be obliged to raise a claim before local courts prior to international settlement of dispute. In contrast, in denial of justice, the investor must exhaust local remedies before seeking international redress. So in this respect, The Loewen case as an important arbitral practice on the relationship of denial of justice and exhaustion of local remedies will be analyzed in this article. The approach of Investment treaties will also be evaluated. This article concluded that arbitral tribunal in Loewen has made mistake by distinction between local remedies and finality rule. In order to resolve this ambiguty and confusion in investment arbitration in the field of denial of justice, one should wait for the treaty procedure of the states in bilateral or multilateral treaties for mutual encouraging and supporting of investment

Some believe that God cannot be considered "infinite" because, firstly, "infiniteness" is the modes of the quantitative entities. Secondly, an infinite being contains infinite plurality that is incompatible with God's true unity. Third, the infinite being, itself, is impossible to exist. Therefore, they argue that the narrations that speak of God's infiniteness do not actually mean that God is infinite, because the relationship between finiteness and infiniteness is the relationship between habitus and non-habitus. Hence, by denying finiteness in the quantitative entities, infiniteness cannot be deduced, just as with denying literacy in the stone, it cannot be argued that "the stone is illiterate. " Since the followers of this view adhere to this idea because of their religious concerns for supporting narrative arguments, after analyzing the claims of the deniers of this view, we have proved God's infinity through the religious texts to provide a detailed answer to the deniers of God’ s infiniteness. Using the rational and narrative method, this paper proves God's infiniteness, and evaluates the opposite view.

Arabic and Persian rhetoric is largely under the influence of Islamic ideology and, in fact, the ideological controversies in the field of Islamic theology have shaped the core of many rhetorical studies. Most of the rhetoric historians have addressed the binary opposition of literal/figurative language, which was common between Muslim rhetoricians, but they never mentioned that there were some theorists who didn't believe in figurative language at all. The "denial of figurative language" is usually attributed to early figures such as Abu-Ishagh Esfarayeni, but the most zealous advocate of this idea is Ibn Taymiyyah Damishqi. This article introduces the problem of figurative language and the ideological beliefs which have given rise to the rhetorical theories, and then goes on to show the theological context of the controversy over the denial of figurative language. Finally, the article addresses Ibn Taymiyyah's theory about figurative language and its influences on the history of Islamic rhetoric.

David Hume is apparently the first that has reasonably denied the metaphysics: His method for so doing is that, he divides all sciences into two kinds, "Relations of Ideas" and "Matters of Fact", and then, he pronounces as meaningless whatever which can not be classified under these two kinds. The present paper intends to clarify the views of Hume in contrast to metaphysics, and to show that the theory of "The Origin of Ideas" is not, as it is believed, the most fundamental one in his philosophy, but, "The Procedure of Science Formation" is basically prior to the aforementioned theory and to his other theories. Then, it has been tried to show that, he cannot deny the metaphysics, regarding to his empiricism, because in this case, he comes into an unsolvable contradiction that will make him give up "denying metaphysics".

The present article explores the issue of metaphysics and its position in Wittgenstein’s thought using a descriptive-analytical method. To accomplish this, several points are highlighted. Firstly, there is a kind of continuity between Wittgenstein’s ideas. Secondly, metaphysics serves as one of the elements that can be used to assert a connection between Wittgenstein’, s views. Thirdly, based on these two points, metaphysics is not rejected in Wittgenstein’, s philosophy but rather deemed necessary. Since Wittgenstein’s primary interest was to discover meaning through the relationship between language and reality, he argued that language could only represent a part of reality due to its limitations. However, a component of reality-the essential part-cannot be expressed by language but may just be showed. Wittgenstein demonstrated that reality extends beyond what language conveys by drawing definitive boundaries around language and knowledge in both his Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. While in Tractatus he adopts a moral approach to distinguish what can be said and what can be shown, characterizing essential concepts such as God, morality, and religion as what can just be shown, in his Philosophical Investigations he adopts an aesthetic approach to demarcate what can be known and what can be shown. Furthermore, given the position assigned to them by Wittgenstein, metaphysical concepts are descriptive norms that serve as foundations of empirical and scientific knowledge. Finally, we show that metaphysical concepts are not only undeniable in both Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations but also necessary Wittgenstein’s thought in arriving at his notion of reality.

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