Factionalists claimed that the mental states must be defined through specific functional roles that they play in explaining the behavior of organism in different positions. FODOR the contemporary American philosopher believes in some sort of functionalism which is known as psycho-functionalism. He also believes in intentional realism with respect to mental states and a form of non-reduction physicalism. He creates a hypothesis called the language of thought, which is a combination of realistic reading of mental state and computational explanation of the process of reasoning that both are based on aforementioned beliefs, in order to provide a physicalistic response for the old ambiguities of the philosophy of mind. According to this hypothesis, thinking and reasoning occur in one mental language. The mental language has syntax and semantic and reasoning includes a syntax process on mental representations. The main aims of this study firstly is to provide the theoretical explanation of this hypothesis as well as explaining the most important features of the language of thought and secondly to provide a critical study of that hypothesis by the means of examining the arguments posed against or in favor of that hypothesis.

Introduction: In this article, FODOR’s argument in favour of psychological individualism is studied. FODOR states that psychological individualism is motivated by two taxonomic principles: (A) that cognitive/scientific psychology individuates psychological states with respect to their causal powers; and (B) that psychological causal powers supervene on subject’s intrinsic physiological state or subject’s local microstructure. Then, FODOR’s across-context test is examined. In order To understand whether causal powers are the same or different, the individuals “across contexts rather than within contexts” must be considered. According to FODOR, the idea of the cross-context test is that individuals have the same causal powers if and only if in every context (actual or counterfactual), they have the same effects. That is to say, uniformity of causal powers can only be assessed by appealing to sameness of effects with respect to (actual or counterfactual) shared contexts. Three replies are presented which all reject the cross-context test. The paper concludes that the three replies can reject the cross-context test. Thus, the FODOR’s across-context test in favour of individualism is correct.

In this article, I examine FODOR's modal argument for individualism and for narrow content. FODOR's modal argument wants to show that my twin-earth and I have thoughts with the very same causal powers; XYZ-thoughts and water-thoughts are not different causal powers with respect to water- behaviors and XYZ-behaviors. If this is so, FODOR argues, then my twin and I do not differ in any psychological state, and individualism is true. FODOR examine his argument by “no-conceptual-connection test” or “New Logical Connections Argument”. Therefore To see whether causal powers are the different, there must be the no-conceptual connections between cause-properties and effect-properties. FODOR argues that the difference between my water-thoughts causing his intentional water-drinking behavior and my twin's XYZ-thoughts causing his XYZ-drinking is a conceptual difference. Hence, the water/XYZ thoughts are not different causal powers. finally, I show that FODOR’s version of the New Logical Connections argument or FODOR’s no-conceptual-connection test don’t work. If this is so, Then FODOR's defense of narrow content and individualism does not sufficient.

This article is focused on Quine's "Two dogmas of empiricism". We discuss about his holism. His holism has two aspects: epistemological holism (EH) and meaning holism (MH). The third thesis that we discuss about is "Rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction" (RASD). FODOR & Lepore (1993) have not opposed EH and RASD, but they claim:a) RASD is a premise for EH argument.b) Although Quine's EH is regarded as a premise for his MH argument, but this argument is not defensible.On the other hand, Okasha (2000) and Becker (2001) show:(a) Quine's EH is a premise for his RASD argument.(b) The inference of MH from EH is defensible.At this article: (a) both claims of FODOR and Lepore, have been rejected and defended of the claims of Okasha and Becker, and (b) added a claim: RASD and MH (the both is based on EH) are the same, in fact, they are one thesis.

Introduction Daily weather informationis currently available for about 40000 stations across the world. But, distribution of these stations is relatively uneven in some parts of the world. Moreover, there are often large amounts of missing values (Schuol and Abbaspour, 2007: 301). Using generated data can help fill missing or even to correct erroneously measured data (FODOR et al., 2010: 91). LARS-WG is a stochastic weather generator which can simulate weather data under both current and future climate conditions at a single site (Semenov and Barrow, 2002: 3).

Massive Modularity Hypothesis of Mind assumes that the mind is composed largely, or perhaps even entirely, of modules. Since the publication of Modularity of the Mind (FODOR, 1983) modularity has occupied a central role in the studies of mind and cognitive science. But in philosophy there is no agreement about this role. In this paper, first I propose that many of these problems are the effects of the FODORian base of Massive Modularity Hypothesis, and then I suggest taking Simon’s works on complexity as a proper base for modularity. In the last section of this paper, I consider two common characteristics of mind, i.e. domain- specificity and encapsulation, and argue that in shadow of Massive Modularity Hypothesis these characteristics can be explained better.

The view that one's observations are depended on his/her epistemological network and are flexible due to trainings and expectations, is a long-lasting view which has a special place in the philosophy of science. The opposite view says that there is an impenetrable layer in observation which is resistant to influence of any educational and epistemological structure. In this paper, we first present these views according to Churchland and FODOR, the main figures in the camps respectively. Second, more importantly, we will defend a more moderate view which is based on a graded account of observation. The latter view accepts rigidity in the level of sensation while acknowledges that observation is flexible in higher levels. According to this view there is no need to appeal to flexibility of sensations to explain why there are discrepancies in observational reports and judgments.

Introduction Critical thinking refers to self-regulated thinking that involves fair reasoning without any bias or prejudice (Fell & Lukianova, 2015). It is also an active and skillful conceptualization, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of gathered or produced data using observation, experience, deep thinking, argumentation, or communication (King & DeCicco, 2009). The significance of critical thinking is highlighted taking into account that the Holy Quran inspires humans to nurture traits and characteristics that contribute to the growth of spiritual intelligence (Ibrahimi & Azapoor, 1388), and critical thinking is one aspect of spiritual intelligence, through which one seeks to find the right way to live. Indeed, in spiritual intelligence, critical thinking is referred to as critical existential thinking (CET) (King, 2008). Moreover, critical thinking is a kind of problem solving (Naddafi, 1385) and problem solving is an aspect of intelligence in general (Frensch & Funke, 2002), and of spiritual intelligence in particular (Ahmadi, Zamani, &Sarzaym, 2014). The significance of spiritual intelligence, and of critical thinking, is further recognized taking maturity in spiritual intelligence (spiritual maturity) an integrated proactive agent (Emmons, 2007), a framework for recognizing and structuring the skills and strengths (Amram, 2009), and an insight that induces tolerance, dauntlessness of life hardship, and allows finding rational humane solutions (Zohar & Marshall, 2008). It is the intelligence individuals use when resolving spiritual or moral value problems; therefore, spiritual intelligence enables one to find goals and a personal meaning for life (Hossainchari & Zakeri, 1388). Critical thinking is also related to creativity (DeWaelsche, 2015; Fell & Lukianova, 2015; Perkins, 2005). Indeed, creativity is a complex social, cultural, and psychological process that leads to new meaningful outcomes (Glaveanu, 2009). One significant aspect of creativity is emotional creativity, which together with critical thinking, emotional creativity plays a key role in the process of thinking (Thayer-Bacon, 2000) and is associated with different spiritual experiences (Averill, 2011). Sofar, no research has been conducted in the field of spiritual intelligence and emotional creativity, but researchers relate spiritual intelligence to emotional intelligence (King, 2008; Mayer & Gehe, 1996; Wigglesworth, 2002-2012; Zohar, 2010), and critical thinking to creativity (DeWaelsche, 2015; Fell & Lukianova, 2015; Perkins, 2005). Mayer and Geher (1996) have shown that spiritual intelligence is related to emotional creativity. Nevertheless, Malamiri and Fekrazad suggested that emotional intelligence and creativity are not related to each other. Karimi's results (1390), on the other hand, showed that spiritual intelligence and emotional creativity are the positive predictors of critical thinking disposition. Given the intimacy between cognition and affection, the question that arises here concerns whether instruction on spiritual intelligence could affect the students’ emotional creativity and orientation toward critical thinking. Although there are studies considering the correlation between, for instance, spiritual intelligence and critical thinking or spiritual intelligence and emotional intelligence, there is no research investigating the impact of spiritual intelligence instruction on both critical thinking disposition and emotional creativity. Research Questions-Does spiritual intelligence instruction have any impact on critical thinking disposition?-Does spiritual intelligence instruction have any impact on emotional creativity? Method This was an experimental research, using a pretest-posttest with control group design. The statistical population was all high school female students in Kerman and the participants were 34 students who were recruited through multi-cluster sampling method and were placed into two groups of experimental and control groups, using simple randomized method. To gather data, Ricket’ s critical thinking tendency and Averill’ s emotional creativity inventories were used as pretest in both groups. Then, the spiritual instruction as the independent variable (intervention) was conducted only in the experimental group in 10 sessions of 90 minutes each; the control group did not receive any instructions. At the end of instructions, the questionnaires were administered again in both groups as posttests. Data was analyzed using the covariance analysis. Results Results show that the spiritual intelligence instruction has a positive and meaningful impact on the intervention group’ s critical thinking disposition but it has no impact on their emotional creativity. Discussion The first hypothesis was confirmed and it is concluded that the spiritual intelligence instruction has an impact on critical thinking disposition. This finding is in correspondence with the findings of Azizi (2015), Karimi (1390), and Mollamohammadi and Etemad Ahari (2016). The finding is justifiable in that based on King’ s (2008) definition of spiritual intelligence, critical thinking is an aspect of spiritual intelligence and involves problem solving (Naddafi, 1385). In fact, as problem solving is an aspect of cognitive intelligence, spiritual intelligence also entails a type of critical thinking through which individuals can find the right way to live (Ahmadi, Zamani, &Sarzaym, 2014). Critical thinking encompasses all humans’ positive activities (FODOR & Carver, 2000) and spiritual intelligence instruction includes individuals’ spiritual growth which has an impact on their critical thinking disposition. The second hypothesis was rejected, indicating that instruction on spiritual intelligence has no impact on emotional creativity. No analogous research was found in the literature, according to which the results could be explained; however, a probable explanation might be the vagueness of the questions to the students that did not allow them to interpret them appropriately. Another explanation could be that both spiritual intelligence and emotional creativity are essentially complex issues (Amiri and Partabian, 1395) that are hard to comprehend (Averill, 2011). The studies conducted so far have reached different results (Karimi, 1392; Malamiri & Fekr azad, 2015; Mayer & Geher, 1996), which could be due to the use of different methodologies, instruments, or statistical population. Another probable explanation is in differences in some aspects of emotional creativity (Kanhai, 2014), uniqueness of the construct, and the existence of different kinds of creativities (Lim, 2005). It is recommended that this research be conducted in other academic levels, including university levels, on males, in other cities, with shorter questionnaires and more understandable items. It is further suggested that critical thinking and spiritual intelligence workshops be conducted for teachers and students.