Since the beginning of the 20th century, philosophers of science—both realist and anti-realist—have shown a special tendency toward the concept of ‘structure’, mainly to address certain problems in the process of understanding science (particularly some serious problems arising from successive and deep changes in scientific theories over time). In this regard, different forms of ‘structuralism’ have been developed thus far around the belief that science is only capable of revealing the structure of the world (and not the ontological characteristics of its objects). However, all structuralisms have been subjected to a very serious criticism known as ‘Newman's objection’, which states that if structure is supposed to be the most we know about the world, then the only thing we will actually know about the world is cardinality, i.e., the number of related objects.Given the importance of structuralism in the philosophy of science as well as the seriousness of Newman's objection, the goal of this paper is to introduce both realist and anti-realist scientific structuralism and examine and evaluate how successfully they respond to this criticism. The findings of this examination suggest that both of these structuralisms are incapable or at least substantially problematic in answering Newman's objection, mostly due to their structuralist nature and underlying ideas.

Future Contingency has been an old debate between philosophers throughout history. On one hand, Aristotle thinks events of the future happen contingently. On the other hand, Diodorus believes what happens in the future is now determined. Diodorus has presented an argument for determinism based on a few premises. Logicians and philosophers try to avoid determinism by denying the first premise of Diodorus, which is the necessity of the past. However, they only regard a qualified version of this premise based on the medieval argument for determinism while some other philosophers consider this premise in a general way. A new argument shall be presented in this paper for determinism similar to the medieval one based on the general version of the premise which is not rejected by systems which reject the medieval argument. This flaw originates in a few properties of the branching model for time. We shall show what this property is and how it would be possible to resolve the problem this property creates.

This article is a critical examination of The Book of Happiness (sa'adat..name),which is one of the works of Sa'd aI-Din Mahmud ibn 'Abd al-Karim ibn Yahya Shabistari (d.720 A.H.), the composer of the well known The Rose Garden of Mystery (gulshan-e raz). In particular, the present article analyzes Shaykh Shabistari's criticism of philosophers and theologians, and compares the contents of The Book of Happiness and The Rose Garden of Mystery.The author of the present article wishes to establish that, contrary to the predominant scholarly opinion, The Book of Happiness must have been written before The Rose Garden of Mystery. The preoccupation with theology, philosophy, and philosophers which is to be found in The Book of Happiness is unbecoming of the lofty station of (the later) Shabistari.

According to Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), the hypothesis that provides the best explanation for a group of observed phenomena is probably true. One of the key objections against this line of thought is “the bad lot objection”. According to this objection, the idea that the best of available explanatory hypotheses will be more likely to be true presupposes that the truth is already more likely to be found among them. But we have no reason to believe it. The most prominent criticisms against this objection are argument from Bayesianism (Niiniluoto, 2004), argument from a pair of contradictories (Lipton, 1993), argument from self-destruction (Lipton, 1993) and argument from distinction between material content and form of IBE (Schupbach, 2013). In this paper, we evaluate these arguments and show that all the arguments but the last one misses the mark.

Protest style is one of the most widely used discourse styles of the Holy Quran. In this research, by rereading and searching in the domain of interpretive and literary books, the widespread use of protest sentences in the Qur'an and its variants is presented, then by regular categorization as well as the separation of single-subject protest sentences from the multi-faceted, general omissions in the identification verses, They have been studied and documented, then the four most commonly used denominations of affirmation, rejection, interpretation and rejection of the word of the unbelievers. The purpose of the present study is to answer the question of how to use the expressive style of protest in the Holy Quran as well as to resolve the ambiguity of the discrepancy and the relationship between the verses of the protest and other verses. This research is an analytical-descriptive one, during which it is found that about twenty cases of the objections of the protest sentences and their examination prove that the object of the protest method in the Holy Quran is completely purposeful and in its proper place and used according to the present circumstances. It is, and is, in quantitative and qualitative terms far beyond the style used in the Arabic prose and discipline texts, as well as being one of the most important literary, literary and content miracles of the Holy Quran.

Greater Good Theodicies are among the main responses to the problem of evil. These theodicies look for a greater good that can explain the consistency of the existence of evils and the existence of the omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God. After reviewing some versions of this kind of theodicy and the conditions they aim to meet, a fundamental objection is discussed - the moral objection. According to the objection, the greater good theodicies in principle violate some moral principles, such as the Kantian principle of mere means or the Pauline principle. In response, the defender of the theodicies might argue that there are counter-examples to such moral principles. It is argued that although these counter-examples make room for a possible defense of the greater good theodicies, the mere fact that it might be at times morally permissible for human beings to violate those moral principles is not enough to claim that the same is true in the case of God. However, first, still there might be other ways for the defender to defend the greater good theodicies against the moral objections. Second, it is important to pay proper attention to the significance of greater good theodicies beyond the sphere of theology - that is, their importance to religious studies and their moral significance.

In this paper, after a short review of the conception of justification in political philosophy, I describe the concept of ' burdens of judgment' in Rawls's political philosophy and show how the effects of the conception prevent people from reaching agreements on the most political, moral or religious judgments. Then, I describe the ' Asymmetry Objection' to Rawls's political philosophy and mention some contemporary political reactions to it briefly. I' ll then take Quong's solution for this objection. This solution is based on a distinction between two different kinds of disagreements which are called foundational and justificatory disagreements respectively. Quong claims that the mentioned distinction corresponds the distinction between the disagreements concerning the matters of justice and disagreements concerning the matters of good. After describing Quong' s solution, I' ll criticize it and through some points concerning the epistemology of disagreement show what revisions it should have if it supposed to work and solve the problem.