This article analyzes John Rawls’s moral foundations and compares them with Descartes’ Provisional Ethics. The basis and consequence of these two moral theories are inclined, in the case of Rawls, to develop gradually. In the case of Descartes, they initially avoid lengthy philosophical assumptions and reciprocally settle for minimal intuitions or presuppositions in the field of ethics. Suppose Rawlsian liberal justice, as a whole, is regarded as a common denominator between law and morality and can be affirmed without attention to a particular school of thought. In that case, its more private aspect returns to the public sphere in the form of citizenship by a moral viewpoint, with the aim of interactions between individuals. It regulates, regardless of their intellectual orientation and behavioral tendencies. However, Rawls's theory, backed by Descartes's position, sees morality as a simultaneous right and obligation for citizens of a liberal society; A right that its provisional aspect does not preclude its generalization, but which is essential in the realm of the task of caring for its minimum character.