Studying some of Mahvash Ghavimi’ s works in the academic and general area shows that she attaches significant importance to textual approaches. Contrary to many books that only explain the theories, Ghavimi in her three books, Sher No Dar Bouteh Naghd (Modern Poetry Criticism), Ava and Elgha (Sound and Suggestion), and Gozari Bar Dastan Nevisi (A study on Writing a story), after introducing Russian Formalism and French Structuralism to readers, in order to prove their effectiveness in literary research, uses them in examining and analyzing different types of Persian literature texts. This study tries to explore the origins and consequences of this approach in addition to Ghavimi’ s method of using a textual approaches in the analysis of Persian texts. Although Ghavimi acts correctly in her analysis of Persian poems and novels with the help of textual approaches, she sometimes ignores its fundamentals, such as avoid judging and evaluating, as well as avoiding nationalism in the study of literature. Her emotional bond to the contextual approach, both in theory and in practice, is so profound that she cannot measure it accurately.

Some scholars have considered al-Makdisi (ca.355 H.), the author of Al-Bad wa l-Tarikh, as a “rationalist” and a mu’tazili. That is because of the examples of rationalism in Al-Bad are appearing significant and bold. Al-Makdisi has used the term “rationale” in verbal deductions such as proofs of prophecy and Sharia, analysis of historical reports, and when seen fit, has quoted Greek philosophers and great mu’tazilis scholars. After studying his methods of epistemology, philosophy, and reviewing reports in the aforementioned book, the present author has posed the question of where rational deductions of al-Makdisistand in reviewing historical reports. Finally, the author has come to the conclusion that contrary to other scholars’ opinion, al-Makdisi is unsure and insecure amid two currents of rationalism and textualism. Therefore, in spite of frequent insistence on rationalistic views, the historical reports of al-Makdisi are actually not different from other historical-narrative texts of his time.

The transition from the reform movement of the sixteenth century and the enlightenment of the eighteenth century led to the formation of legal modernity alongside philosophical modernity, political modernity and scientific modernity, which are characterized by legal textualism. Based on this approach, judges should present the result of their judgment within the framework of legal texts and formal judicial logic. The subject of this article and the main question of it is: “ What are the foundations on which legal textualism are based and what are its consequences in modern judicial systems? ” In this article, we will first deal with the concept of legal textualism with a descriptive method so that we can then deal with the epistemology of the principles of legal textualism and its consequences with an analytical method. The results of this article introduce the principles on which legal textualism is based. In addition, the result of this article will reveal that the rigid approach to law and inferential method is not always in accordance with legal ideals and justice and it will confuse the ontological, epistemological and anthropological foundations of legal systems based on the principles of modernity with traditional and religious legal systems.

Introduction The ethical dimension of adjudication and the extent to which judges may moralize the law constitute one of the most fundamental and contested issues in contemporary jurisprudence. With the growing complexity of social relations and the emergence of novel public and private disputes, courts frequently encounter statutory texts that appear incomplete, ambiguous, morally deficient, or inadequate for delivering substantive justice. This gives rise to a central theoretical question: to what extent may—or must—a judge ethically shape the law through interpretation? Legal positivist and textualist approaches prioritize enacted law and maintain a strict separation between law and morality. From this perspective, judicial ethics are fulfilled through faithful adherence to legislative intent and textual meaning, even if the result is morally unsatisfactory. In contrast, instrumentalist and interpretivist approaches view law as a means to an end, permitting judges to incorporate moral principles into legal reasoning in order to achieve genuine judicial justice. The present article examines the possibility and limits of ethics-based judicial interpretation by analyzing two competing paradigms: textualist positivism and instrumentalist interpretivism. Its central thesis is that the legitimacy of judicial ethical intervention hinges on whether law is conceived as an end in itself (subject-centered textual authority) or as an instrument for realizing justice (means-oriented interpretive authority). Method This research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology grounded in doctrinal legal analysis and jurisprudential theory. Classical and contemporary theories associated with positivism, textualism, and interpretivism are examined to elucidate their foundational assumptions concerning judicial authority, ethics, and legal validity. Primary legal-philosophical texts, models of judicial reasoning, and theoretical debates on judicial discretion, morality, and interpretation constitute the core materials. The analysis is conceptual and normative rather than empirical, seeking to identify the theoretical locus of each school regarding judicial ethics. Theoretical sampling focuses on representative doctrines within positivist-textualist and instrumentalist-interpretivist traditions. Textualist positivism is analyzed through principles such as textual objectivity, separation of law and morality, and prohibition of judicial moral creativity. Instrumentalist interpretivism is explored through purposive reasoning, rational interpretation, and moral coherence. Given the theoretical nature of the study, precision is achieved through conceptual clarification, internal coherence, and fidelity to original frameworks. Analytical strength derives from systematic comparison and clear demarcation between the paradigms. The study integrates normative legal theory with analytical jurisprudence, combining descriptive exposition of doctrines with evaluative reasoning on their implications for judicial ethics and justice. Conclusion The findings demonstrate that the possibility of ethics-based judicial interpretation is fundamentally contingent upon the underlying conception of law. From the textualist-positivist standpoint, law constitutes an autonomous normative system whose validity is independent of moral content. Justice is presumed rather than substantively realized. The judge’s role is confined to applying enacted law, with ethical reasoning excluded from interpretation. This position is defended on grounds of preventing judicial dictatorship, preserving legal certainty, avoiding normative disorder, and safeguarding legislative supremacy. Judicial moralization of law is thus impermissible, and the judiciary is characterized as the “servant of the legislator” (‘abd al-muqannin). In contrast, instrumentalist interpretivism conceives law as a means for achieving genuine judicial justice. Legal authority is purposive rather than intrinsic, and statutory meaning emerges through interpretation informed by rationality, social evolution, and moral principles. Where provisions lack ethical substance or fail to address new realities, judges are permitted—and indeed obligated—to interpret law by reference to rational social practices (sīrat al-‘uqalā’), customary understanding, societal transformations, judicial exigencies, legal metaphors, and the instrumental function of norms. Within this framework, ethics-based interpretation is not judicial overreach but a necessary corrective mechanism. The judge ceases to be a passive executor and becomes an ethical collaborator assisting the lawmaker in realizing justice. Accordingly, the judiciary is reconceived as a savior and supporter of the legal system rather than a potential threat to its integrity. Ultimately, ethical judicial interpretation is neither inherently legitimate nor illegitimate; its validity depends on the governing theoretical paradigm concerning the nature of law and judicial authority. Recognizing this distinction is crucial for resolving ongoing debates on judicial ethics, discretion, and the moral boundaries of legal interpretation.

One of the most important issues in contract law is the interpretation of contracts. The parties to the contract may have disagreements in the meaning of the terms and phrases of the contract. The disagreement in the contact faces an obstacle in the fulfilment of contractual obligations and the courts must interpret the contract in order to the settlement of disputes and fulfilment of contractual obligations. The most important purpose of interpretation is exploring the common intent of the parties. Textualists and contextualists both claim to discover the intent of the parties. Textualists take consider intention as the real and true intention of the parties and search for it in the context of the contract. In contrast, contextualists consider subjective intention to be the real and genuine will of the parties to the contract and consider the text of the contract as an incomplete resource regardless of the context in which the contract is formed. Exploring the real intention under the principle of freedom and principle of voluntarism is assumed as one of the most important values of legal systems in the field of contract law in this article. Therefore, the main criterion for evaluating each of these approaches is the ability to achieve the actual intention. The contextualism approach has more ability and accuracy in exploring the real intention of the parties by using extensive evidence. Although the textualism approach is consistent with the real intention of the parties in some cases, it is not very successful in exploring the real intent of the parties due to the limitation of the cited sources. It can be said in this research by relying on descriptive-analytical method and by evaluating the rules of each of these approaches that systems that consider contract as merely a tool to realize economic values in transactions are more inclined to textualism approach, in contrast, in systems in which the contract itself has intrinsic value and the realization of the parties’ intentions has relevance regardless of economic values are more likely to adopt a contextualism approach. Accordingly, in the author’s opinion, ending the unfinished textualism and contextualism struggle depends on examining the value priorities of a legal system in the field of contract law which has been neglected in the research of the last two decades.

The modern legal system in Iran has always been influenced by the textualism movement and legal formalism. The interactive resultant of these two currents has led to a kind of legal positivism in the Iranian judicial system, according which judges must present their judgment with formal judicial logic and within the framework of legal textualism. These assumptions lead us to the main question of this article, which is the nature of legal textualism and legal formalism and how they affect the rule of legal positivism in the Iranian judiciary System. In this article, we will first use a descriptive method to discuss the concept of legal textualism and legal formalism and legal positivism in order to be able to analyze the rule of paradigm based on these concepts on the Iranian judicial system and its consequences. The findings of this study will reveal that the rigid approach to law and the method of judicial inference is not always in line with legal ideals and justice. The other findings of this study will reveal interactive resultant of the textualism movement and legal formalism in the Iranian judicial system is the rule of kind legal positivism, which has confused the ontological, epistemological and anthropological foundations of legal systems based on the principles of modernity with the Islamic legal system in several principles of the constitution and ordinary laws.

Understanding Hadith’ enjoys a high ranking position among Shia scholars,however, Shia hadith thinkers’ understanding of the hadiths including religious hadiths is different. Some of the differences in understanding stems from hadith interpreters due to their diversity in their level of understanding people, their tendencies, the principles, and attitudes. What seems to bear significance is the difference in principles and foundations and the encounter of Shia scholars with narrative texts, which plays a significant role in the diversity of understanding the hadith. Among all these approaches, the discourse of textualism and rationalism of the 4th century scholars such as Sheikh Sadouq and Sheikh Mofid in the face of theological traditions are much discussed. It is obvious that the views of the holders of these two attitudes will lead to different understanding of the theological hadiths since the result of the textualism would be to stop understanding the text of some theological hadiths, and the result of of rationalism in the hadith will be the expansion of theological knowledge and evaluating it by means of reason. Having conceptualized understanding, rationalism, and textualism, the present study has used the historical and analytical sequence to examine  the distinctions of textualists and rationalists in some indexes including their conceptions and view on the acceptance of hadiths, as well as evasion from rationality through Ijtihad in theological hadiths, which causes different understandings in hadiths with regard to issues such as possibility of error on the part of the prophet, the deeds of servants, and the creation of souls before bodies.

Intellect and text are two basic sources of religious teachings. Scholars are sometimes classified into rationalists and textualists.This paper tries to demonstrate that how much Sheikh Saduq utilizes intellect in dissemination of religious teachings. in the meantime it is clear that Saduq is a rationalist theologian though his rationalism is different with that of others. First Sheikh Saduq's views on Intellect and reliability, and its scope will be verified and then his rational activities in the field of discovering the religious teachings and rational defense of them.

Abstract One of the most fundamental issues in Kalam (the Islamic speculative theology) and philosophy of religion is the relationship between reason and religion, which has been a major issue for many philosophers and theologians in the Western world as well as the Islamic world. There are many definitions of reason and religion and also different opinions about the relationship between them. Among the presented opinions, extreme rationalism, extreme textualism and moderate rationalism can be mentioned. In order to deal with the issues arising in the discussion of the relationship between reason and religion, various kalami schools have provided some solutions. One of the most important and influential kalami schools in the Islamic world is called neo-Mu’tazila. As critiques of the extreme trends of textualism and rationalism, Sheikh Muhammad Abdo and Muhammad Amara are among the most prominent neo-Mu’tazila Islamic thinkers whose ideas have been influential among Sunni Islamist. These two thinkers have made a lot of effort and have written many books in defending moderate rationality and fighting against extreme trends such as extreme rationalism and extreme textualism. Using library method, this paper introduced extreme textualism and extreme rationalism and analyzed their problems such as external obedience and prejudice to the surface of texts and ignoring reason, excessive exegesis of religious texts, promotion of historicism of religious texts and favoring secularism.