JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Year:2017 | Volume:19 | Issue:2 (72)|Papers Count:11

"Invention" and "discovery" can be seen as two responses to the question of what from the "meaning of life". During the last few centuries, this state of question-response has been one of the most significant issues related to humanities including whether or not one can simultaneously take for granted the inventory (secondary) meaning of life while adopting the objective (real) meaning of life. This research tries upfront to respond to this question by drawing conclusions from the contemporary philosopher David Wiggins. According to Wiggins, the meaning of life follows as the result of concomitance between human mental powers and objective values. He places this view on a phenomenological discernment into morality thereby he can put forward moral values as not entirely independent of the subject and its interests and sensitivities not entirely interrupted of reality. Human sensitivities have a strong impact upon moral language; agreement on them stabilizes moral judgments, and the truth of moral judgment relies on reality. That is why one can maintain that meaning is something discovered-invented per se when human interests and sensitivities accord with the world and human perspective reveals the objective characteristics of his/her existence and the world.

In his book, while referring to anti-euthanasia arguments such as "prima facie right to life", "possibility of arbitrary encroachments", and "venerability of moral independence", Rosenberg draws a careful sketch of pro-euthanasia arguments including "possibility of preventing any potential abuses" and "necessity of eschewing incurable sufferings". For him, this challenge has been given rise not out of realities but out of the two sides' different perspectives upon human rights; the challenge lies at the core of the fact that whether "moral" species of human individual derives from her "natural species" or from "functional species". Considering the fact that haecceity in all human beings is justifiable, Rosenberg comes to realize the two sides as mainly different in responding to the question whether the human haecceity is a stable/permanent degree or a transient one. He himself takes it for granted that the individuals' "moral" species, just like their "legal" species, comes true as an acquired phenomenon irrespective of reality to the extent that he treats the individual as having absolute, negative, and passive right to life. By indicating the confusion lied between moral "permissibility/permission" for and moral "desirability" of euthanasia, he deems analytic philosophy to obviate all of these challenges. However, he finally assumes the problem of the moral agreeability of euthanasia as unendingly controversial, and sees any judgments pertaining to the problem as originating from common sense as well as scientific shifts thereby becoming exposed toward gradual changes. Rosenberg's view grapples, as his own theory's blind spots, mostly with such problems as begging for the question fallacy, relativism, and contradiction all of which gain their own roots in his materialistic standpoint on the nature of humankind.

Kant realizes the principle of autonomy of the will as the sublime principle of morality. To him, if the principles we will are constituted by a being which poses universal laws, our "will or want" also acts autonomously and independently. Accordingly, moral laws are not only posed by humankind herself but she obliges herself to act according to the laws she herself has posed. Therefore, Kant takes autonomy into meticulous consideration in the realm of action and agency. With this in mind, the current article analyzes this principle on the basis of three extant interpretations of autonomy that is individual, moral, and political autonomies; it elucidates these three kinds of autonomy while referring to their propinquity with Kant' s. Ultimately, it comes in conclusion that whereas they have been grounded in different contexts, they do not mainly differ from Kant's autonomy of the will because of their commonality in the two meanings of "being free from dependence" and "capability to pose laws". For Kant, the autonomy of the will can be treated as some kind of moral autonomy: one must be bound/subjected to duties of morality in order to apply or act according merely to one's individual autonomy thereby the political sovereignty can also achieves its entire autonomy.

By exploiting the method of analysis and inference, this article tries to put forward a precise sketch of Mullā Sadrā's philosophical perspective on the connexion of human imagination with her identity. Such an accurate sketch can provide a framework of and an outlook on the characteristics of genetical intermediations of imagination in shaping/constituting human identity. (Human) species-based form, (hāl) fluid form, and (habitus/malakāt) ultimate form are all the key concepts to explain human identity and its intrinsic fluidity. Imagination has been utilized to refer to a set of the soul's capabilities to encounter and deal with imaginary forms including remembrance (musavira), manipulation (mutisarifa), form-making of rationals (ma' qūlāt), and rationalization of forms (mutifakkira). Mullā Sadrā's arguments for imaginary forms to be a) abstract, and b) being-oriented and issued by nature, and his arguments for the soul to be a matter (capacity) to be united with and receptive to these forms have been taken as his philosophical preliminaries to explain the connexion of imagination with identity. Imagination gets hold of an intrinsic mutual unitary connexion with identity. With its intermediation and trihedral presence, imagination can be realized as constitutive of, origin of preservation of, and intermediary to the awareness of identity. Having been shaped in the commencement stage, identity is an entire requisite for imaginative processes like formation, preservation, manipulation, and recall of imaginary forms (takhayyūl).

Differentiating between the pearl and shell of religion can properly be recognized as a fundamental issue from which a vast number of pluralists have benefited so as to make robust bedrock of their own pluralistic theories while validating it in regard to Muslim Sufis. As one of forerunners of Islamic Sufism, Sayyid Heidar Āmulī has given a peculiar significance to the differentiation because he, as his main ideal, seeks for reconciliation of Imāmia Shi' ites and true Sufis, and finds the key to this theoretical objective to lie in the classification of divine sciences and religious duties. Hence, most of his works have been written to provide explanation for the pearl of religion in which one can find some notable phrases such as "surface and interior of religion" and "exoteric path (sharī'a), esoteric path (tarīqa), truth (haqīqa)". Nonetheless, Sayyid both directly and indirectly denies intra- and extra-religious pluralism. To evaluate the dimensions of the pearl and shell of religion in his view as well as the question of how to differentiate between them is the main concentration of this article; this article obviously portrays the fact that contending for the differentiation does necessarily not point towards arguing for pluralism.

Beauty perception is one among many other human perceptions. Aesthetics deals basically with understanding this kind of perception, and endeavors to explain its characteristics. In two books (one philosophical and the other mystical) of ' Allāma Tabātabāei, one can find out immediately that this kind of perception is introduced as contingent perception. There is no clear elucidation of this kind of perception in these two books. The authors' main objective is to come in some justifiable conclusions with regard to the perception of beauty while considering it as a contingent perception. This article, on the basis of its proposed definition of the act of contingent-making, throws light of inquiry on the fact that the attribution of beauty to things and states by the faculty of imagination is a contingent attribution and the attribution can be considered as true once it is attributed to the authentic truth. Having brought forth the philosophical characteristics of this kind of judgment, the internal factors pertaining to the perceiver and the external factors related to the perceived/perceptible are clarified as well. Finally, this article shows that how this kind of perception like other contingents leads humankind to his/her own true perfection.

There is a robust proliferative mainstream of narrations about the ancient easterners' and Iranians' thought impact upon the ancient Greek philosophers. From western thinkers, there has remained a valuable works concerning the impact. In this article, my main objective is to somewhat reread this susceptibility of Plato's philosophical thought. My attention is attracted toward some western philosophy historians' views pertaining to the origin and provenance of philosophy. Émile Bréhier contends that there is no definite response to this problem. Since ancient times, there have been two opposite stances upon this issue. Bréhier maintains that the Greeks themselves did not excogitate philosophy but inherited it from non-Greek peoples. Charles Werner holds that the Greeks did owe their philosophy-doing to the easterners, and were entirely aware of this fact, and have portrayed heartily respect while speaking of the eastern civilization and sciences. Plato can be recognized as one among many others who has been influenced by the ancient eastern and Iranian thought. He has benefited mostly from the ancient easterners' and Iranians' thought in formulating such theories as ideas or forms, philosopher ruler, different human taxonomies within Ideal State (or Utopia), etc. He has been able to reread and scrutinize these theories within his own philosophy.

Among lots of rational arguments for Imam's infallibility one can pick up impossibility of progression of Imams; incumbency of preservation of Sharī' a; and incumbency of conformity with Imam –for which Imami scholars have always argued enthusiastically. On the other hand, other Islamic denominations including Mu' tazila do appropriately not valorize the infallibility, and have strived to object to the arguments for Imam's infallibility such as the abovementioned ones. Having put forward a sketch of and an introduction to the two books, namely al-Mughnī and al-Shāfī, along with a definition of infallibility, this article will explain and illustrate the aforementioned rational arguments from the viewpoints of the two scholars. Alongside this argumentative route, it will be clarified that Qāzī's objections cannot undermine the arguments because, while dealing with the argument for impossibility of progression, the main emphasis of Imami scholars has been placed upon people's fallibility not upon the problem of punishments accomplishment (Iqāmat al-hudūd). Furthermore, in the argument for preservation of Sharī'a, Qāzī's proposed alternatives cannot be sufficient in order to preserve Sharī' a, and in the argument for incumbency of Imam's conformity, one's failure to follow Imam can be justifiably interpreted as undervaluing Imamate. Nonetheless, some of Sayyed Murtazā's responses stay in need of further illustrations.

Our knowledge of God the Almighty finds its root in the pre-birth world (' ālam al-dhar), and both Quranic verses along with Islamic narrations speak certainly of an intuitive knowledge of God we have acquired from the pre-birth world; such an intuitive knowledge is stabilized within us human beings once we have taken stride in this world. However, the significant point to raise here is the fact that human beings have sunk into oblivion such a great event with regard to the monotheistic knowledge of the pre-birth world: this innate knowledge can be disclosed in two situations of a) severe misfortunes and b) coming-closer death. Moreover, the knowledge can be flourished/remembered when one decides freely to chase the divine messengers' reminder through which one can remember the very divine intuition, and can find the truth of innate monotheistic knowledge within oneself. In order to explain how to reveal the monotheistic knowledge of the pre-birth world, the first step is to shed light of inquiry on such subject-matters as the innate knowledge of the pre-birth world in Quran and Islamic narrations, consolidation of the monotheistic knowledge in the pre-birth world, oblivion of the event of the pre-birth world, necessity of the knowledge of the pre-birth world thereupon this article proceeds with the question of how to explain flourishing of the monotheistic knowledge in the pre-birth world in the two situations of coercion and freedom in light of the Quranic verses and Islamic narrations.

Afsāniʹhā-yiĀrāmʹbakhsh (‘Tranquilizing Myths’) is a newly published (Spring 1396 Sh./ 2017) research work by the contemporary Iranian philosopher Saeid Zibakalam. It is composed of eight essays entitled, respectively, “The myth of free irreligious outlook”, “The myth of the universal Rationality”, “The myth of free-thinking”, “The myth of the Nature of Argument”, “The myth of the [Quranic] advice for ratiocination”, “The myth of impartiality”, “The myth of humanity’s expectations from religion”, and “Some myths concerning theory and theory-construction”. A number of prevalent ideas, especially among the philosophers, are investigated in the essays to show that each of them is either entirely fictitious or lack a widely accepted, unique meaning. The present piece of writing is devoted to a general review of the work, some contextualizations of its content, hints to various challenges that it rises, and also several critical points. My overall assessment is that the Afsāniʹhā-yiĀrāmʹbakhsh is one of the most serious intellectual/ philosophical works in Persian that has appeared in recent decades, and a careful engagement with it is strongly recommended for anyone who wants to be acquainted with the latest development of Irano-Islamic thought in its frontline.