JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Year:2018 | Volume:20 | Issue:2 (76) |Papers Count:12

Introducing chance into the domain of Ethics means that there are factors outside a person's control that intervene and have an effect in his happiness. Since Aristotle stipulates the attainment of happiness to be in possessing virtues and enjoyment of external desires and also considers «human beings natural happiness» to be an ethical issue, it seems that he has admitted a type of internal and environmental chance into man's happiness; but despite this, he does not consider chance to be effective in evaluating a person's responsibility and moral status. Therefore, Julia Annas– a contemporary Neo Aristotelian philosopher – considers Aristotle to have committed the paradoxical phenomenon of «environmental and internal moral chance». In this article, while examining how chance was introduced to the domain of Ethics by Aristotle, we will go into a review of Julia Annas's view in this regard. By choosing an unsteady approach, Annas ultimately concludes that considering all the studies that have been done throughout history, one cannot reach a certainty among the views of the Stoics and Aristotle in regards to this topic and therefore, by not ignoring the view of the Stoics based on the fact that «man's happiness is generally free of chance», she does not disregard man's responsibility and moral status and therefore, she concludes he is not affected by moral chance.

This article delves into the study of the term «tark-i awlà » (abandoning performance of that which is better and doing that which is less than better) as an approach for defending the infallibility of the prophets when confronting verses from the Holy Qur‘ān that apparently prove the prophets committed sins; and after going into the semantics of « tark-i awlà », the following question has been made the focus of discussion and study: are the intellectual arguments proving the infalliblity of the Prophets in agreement with the fact that the prophets committed tark-i awlà? According to the author, considering that tark-i awlà is a type of error and lapse and because the intellectual arguments for infallibility (like the trust and certitude of the people, the guiding purpose of prophet hood, the necessity of following the prophets, the principle of luṭf (grace) and absence of disinclination in the hearts of the people towards the prophets) necessitate the negation of all types of errors and lapses from the prophets, the prophets must be infallible from tark-i awlà too and this approach by Islamic theologians in justifying the verses that indicate the committing of sins by the prophets is not successful. Accepting the committing of tark-i awlà by the prophets is to accept that they committed errors and is against the belief of the Shi‘a regarding the infallibility of the prophets. As a result, Shi‘a theology will face a great challenge in justifying the verses that indicate the committing of errors and lapses by the Prophets which, according to the author, necessitates a revision of the Shi‘a theological belief in regards to the absolute infallibility of the prophets.

Pascal's Wager argument, as one of the well-known arguments for proving God's existence or at least, the necessity of belief in God, has always been subject to a great many discussions and studies. This argument has also been addressed in the intellectual circles of the Islamic world and has been attributed to the Infallible Imams (peace be upon them) through Imam Muḥammad Ghazālī. A close look at the formation of this argument, the way Pascal has presented it, and the narrative text which can be considered the root of this argument, shows that these two have fundamental differences with one another; differences that result in the fact that the problems that apply to Pascal's Wager do not apply to the narrative text. In this article, in the first stage, an effort has been made to respond to some of the problems that apply to Pascal's Wager, and in the second stage, to show how the existing differences in the formation of the two arguments separates the two from each other and the problems that remain unanswered do not apply to the narrative argument.

Nowadays, the number of courses teaching hacking skills is increasing and has encountered a very warm reception. In some countries, teaching hacking and writing malware has been considered as part of course credits for students of the fields of computer and information technology. According to some, since teaching hacking and malware writing may lead people to criminal activities and people may misuse this expertise, it is in detriment to the society and based on this, it is unethical; but some others agree with this instruction and believe that in order to confront cyber criminals, we must be able to think like them. According to this group, security experts need to learn hacking skills and malware writing in order to better understand the weakness in the security of systems and to deal with malware and therefore, they consider it ethical. Thus, considering the increase in the number of malware and hacking courses being held, and also the importance of the security of computers, this article delves into the explanation, analysis, critique and study of the ethical arguments for and against malware writing and hacking skills education and some measures for the ethical use of these skills will also be presented.

This article endeavors to explain the real and metaphorical meaning of the Qurʼānic term « ‘Arsh » (throne) while analyzing its reality and endeavors to study the interpretation of ‘Arsh, the topic of God's establishment on the ‘Arsh and its relationship with the perfect human being in the words of Ibn ‘Arabī and Shi‘ite Imāms and the commentary of the Transcendental Philosophy commentators of the word ‘Arsh in verses of the Qurʼān; it then addresses the explanation of the terms ‘arsheh (deck), ārkeh (arch) and ārkheh (latin for arche). In reality, the same way that the word «‘Arsh » in the Qurʼān refers to the throne of Allāh which is the origin of origins of creation, in its real meaning, it has also been used metaphorically (like for example: jannātun ma‘rūshāt i.e. the ceiling of houses). The word arche was also used to indicate the origin of creation in Greek philosophy and also refers to niche or ledge in the art of architecture. In answer to the question of why the word «‘ Arsh » has been used in different meanings, one can say – according to the principle of hierarchy of existence in Transcendental Philosophy – that the reality of ‘ Arsh in each level of the levels of existence, has a manifestation in accordance to that reality and the earthly manifestation of ‘Arsh in the world is in the form of mosques and places of worship, and in the souls, is in the physical existence of the Prophets and Imams and consequently in the human beings who follow them.

Aquinas- in contrast to the explanation given by great commentators like Étienne Gilson - has neither made any corrections to Avicenna and Averroes' Necessity and Contingency Argument and nor does he essentially have an awareness of their points of difference. The contingency that Avicenna intends in the Argument of Necessity and Contingency, is essential contingency; but the contingency intended by Averroes is potential contingency and necessity according to him is also not necessarily Avicenna's essential necessary being. Aquinas did not pay attention to this point, which is why he could not even enter into conscious discussion in regards to their differences and make a correct judgment or at least consciously advocate one of the two. His first exposition is an amateurish combination of Avicenna and Averroes' expositions which denotes his lack of mastery over the philosophical foundations of Avicenna and Averroes. In his second exposition, according to one interpretation of it, the same problem applies; in addition to them being suppositions, he has also made mistakes. Anyways, being influenced by Averroes, he has formed his arguments in a two-phase form without knowing that Averroes had reason to do so. The focus of the natural causes and effects in this argument and the applicability of the impossibility of infinite continuity is one of the other problems of this exposition.

This article strives to explain the methods of the two sciences of Islamic Theology and Islamic Philosophy and subsequently study the methodical relation between them. These two sciences, as two independent sciences, have intersected with each other like other Islamic sciences over time; one such intersection is in terms of method.Islamic sciences (Qurʼānic exegesis, Jurisprudence, Theology, Philosophy etc.) are interconnected networks which have a great effect over each other. Regardless of the extreme views in this area, it can be said that from the beginning up until the present, there has been intersection between these two like, for example in the following areas: historical intersection, overlap in issues, methodical intersection etc. Considering the topic of this article, in analyzing the methods of these two sciences, we arrive at the conclusion that there has been a harmony and relation between theological methods which has undergone changes and evolutions from the beginning till now i.e. from the beginning of the initial polemic method and has ultimately changed into a philosophical and dialectical method, and between Islamic philosophical methods that have also undergone changes, i.e. from an absolutely rational method – in the manner of Greek Peripatetic Philosophy method – till the development of the various Islamic methods like: Peripatetic (localization of Islamic Peripatetic method), Islamic Illuminationism and Sadra's Transcendental Philosophy.

The issue of the Imaginal realm, as a realm between the Immaterial and Material realms, is one of the issues in which the Peripatetic philosophers disagree with philosophers of Illuminationism and Transcendental Philosophy. The Peripatetic philosophers were opposed to the existence of such a realm, but the Iluminationist philosopher and those of and Transcendental Philosophy defended the existence ofthe Imaginal realm and strived to prove it. Despite the fact that Mīrdāmād considers the existence of such a realm to be intellectually impossible and considers it to be a result of poetic feeling, he endeavors to present an interpretation of the Imaginal realm that would be accepted by the Illuminationist philosophers as well. On one hand he emphasizes the intellectual impossibility of the Imaginal realm and Imaginal existents on a Peripatetic basis and refutes their suspended state and on the other hand – due to Suhravardī's influence and following him – he accepts the existence of the Imaginal realm, within a particular interpretation - not as an independent realm, but rather as a higher and more etherean level of the material world. In this article, while presenting Mīrdāmād's view regarding the possibility of the Imaginal realm and its existents, we will indicate that Mīrdāmād's particular interpretation of the Imaginal realm is inconsistent with the views of the advocates of that realm and ultimately, Mīrdāmād is considered as one of the rejecters of the Imaginal realm.

The difference in Islam and Christianity's views in regards to the essence of revelation and prophets is the cause of a clear distinction between these two revealed religions. In Islamic sources, revelation is from the category of speech and word and Islamic theologians believe that God speaks to man in order to have a “connection with him” and shows Himself through a language that is understandable to man; but prevailing Christianity considers “revelation” to be of the category of action and of being an event and believes that God becomes embodied in a human form in order to have a «connection with man». The core of Divine revelation in Islam is the Quran whereas in Christianity it is the person of Jesus. Based on these two different views in regards to revelation, we will call Islam a «text-centered» religion and Christianity a “person-centered” one. The question that is raised here is whether these two different views concerning revelation– from strength of argument perspective – are on the same level. In order to answer this question it is necessary to first study the premises of each view, then to compare the degree of their reasonability and finally, it is necessary to evaluate the requisites of each view in different domains like theology, type of religiosity and the sciences that are formed around each one.

It is just recently that the term “combined philosophies” has entered into our contemporary philosophy and those who advocate this have made a studious effort in order to explain and clarify their goals and motives for creating and composing this new and emerging term. In this study, we have tried to explain the problems and faults of such an approach in philosophy by taking its origin into consideration; and ultimately, we have shown that the variety and number of philosophies in terms of historical periods, have had a religious and cultural history in different societies and have been different in accordance to the variety of motives that were present for the philosophers, while paying attention to the fact that philosophy is a universal science whose topic is “existence in the sense that it exists”. Therefore, if we return philosophy to its original meaning and take philosophical discussions seriously as per the demands of our time, there would no longer be a need for the composition and creation of this new term; especially if we pay attention to the fact that not only does this term not open new avenues for the progress of the advocates of philosophy, it also increases ambiguity and distortion in understanding and language in the field of philosophy and philosophical thought.