Conventional theories of demand under asymmetric information do not emphasize the effects of risk aversion on insurance demand and do not consider negative correlation between risk aversion and risk level. In this paper we focus on the effects of risk aversion on life insurance demand.We use logistic regressions and apply dummy variables to show whether independent variables such as education, occupation, sex, age, income, wealth of household and other factors as criteria for risk aversion, have significant effects on the demand for insurance. Our results show that age, gender, and employment don' t have any significant effect on the demand for life insurance. But education, marital status, care, health, premium levels, future uncertainty, income level and life expectancy have significant effects on the demand for life insurance in Iran.Since individuals with high level of risk aversion purchase more life insurance than high risk individuals (lower risk averse individuals), we conclude that adverse selection doesn’t exist in Iranian life insurance market. In other words, the Iranian life insurance market faces an advantageous selection situation rather than adverse selection.