Wisdom and Philosophy
Year:2019 | Volume:15 | Issue:2 (58) |Papers Count:8

In this paper we will consider the idea of logical pluralism with emphasis on Beall and Restall's (2006) account of pluralism. We begin by specification of logical exclusivism, logical relativism and different accounts of logical pluralism and their difference with Beall and Restall's account of logical pluralism. We show that Beall and Restall believe in a kind of semantic logical pluralism according to which there are different plausible interpretations of the "case" in Traski's definition of validity. On the other hand, they also believe the so-called idea of normativity of logic. According to the idea, the notion of logical validity has normative implications for evaluation of arguments in natural language. Our key claim is that the latter claim undermines Beall and Restall's logical pluralism, that is, the normativity of logic collapses their logical pluralism into logical exclusivism. The study of different formulations of the normativity of logic is less considered on debates relating to logical pluralism. Along with considering logical normativity, we will criticize Beall and Restall's pluralism.

Although the matter of the “ Other” have not been considered by Muslim scholars as an independent issue, there is capacity to discuss the matter in all schools of thought in the Islamic world, especially that of mysticism. For this reason, one can examine the “ other” in the works of Ibn Arabi as a representative Islamic mysticism and search his intellectual foundations. The fundamentals such as the symbolism of divine names, the widespread adoption of the field of salvation, and the inaccessibility of the whole truth can clarify the position of this well-known mystic against the “ other” . One of the most important foundations of Ibn Arabi’ s ontology in his approach to the “ other” is the symbolism of divine names and considering the “ other” as one of the divine names. Avoiding monopoly on truth and knowing the “ other” from bliss and salvation is also a positive view towards the “ other” . Ibn Arabi’ s emphasis on the lack of clarity of the truth and it not being exclusive to a particular group or sect will lead to search for truth in the religion of the “ other” .

Kant and Levinas’ s point of departure in their works was the criticism of the Western tradition. The former proceeded to criticize a tradition that gives credit to object versus subject which ultimately leads to the spread of skepticism in epistemology and ethics. By referring to the Copernican Revolution and validating the subject both in ethics or epistemology, Kant seeks to guarantee the validity of knowledge on the one hand, and the applicability of ethics (where the agent of ethics is involved in its generation) on the other. Similarly, in the works of Levinas also the same attempts have been made, that is, he too proceeded to criticize the philosophical tradition in which “ the same” and “ self” are placed against “ otherness” and “ alterity” . He puts emphasis on both the Other and otherness and tries to build a metaphysic based on our relationship with the otherness (in a general sense) and other (in a specific sense). Levinas introduces “ heteronomy” before Kant’ s “ autonomy” and builds ethics based on our relationship with the other. The present paper argues that in comparison with Levinas’ s heteronomous ethics that relies on man’ s sentiments and feelings, Kant’ s autonomous ethics that emphasizes on a sort of common rationality among human beings seems to be more plausible and applicable in human society.

This essay deals with Descartes' Provisional Morality and some of its epistemic requirements. Here, we shall introduce two rival readings of these principles, one of which does not give a plausible position to these principles and does not consider them to be an essential part of Descartes's system, and the other assumes these principles to be both permanent and universal, and then present our explanation to the epistemic realm and also the human realm of these principles. First, we have presented our account of the relation between these Maxims with Cartesian key elements, namely Doubt and Method. Then we discuss the basic nature of Provisionality of these Maxims; a concept that is apparently normal but has relatively different results and requirements. I argue that the moral code has an epistemic character, not a time; time also depends on the events of Reason. Also, while we argued that these principles cannot be considered temporary, we have shown that the idea of some Descartes commentators that these principles, from the very beginning, were permanent and universal is a misconception that can't be imposed on Descartes. Based on our argument, these principles can be transformed into permanent principles in certain epistemic conditions that we have explained, but at the same time, in certain circumstances, they may also be disaffirmed and, as a result, become temporary principles. When these maxims count as the product of an argumentative process, then a non-argumentative description such as the conservatism of these principles will be an abnormal description that is unrelated to Descartes' will.

Hegel reads Kant's three critiques, that of the Critique of Pure reason, Practical Reason, and Judgment with a critical approach. The critique called "empty formalism", in different forms, is present in Hegel's works, from youth till death, thus sometimes is hidden in others critiques and sometimes is so obvious that hides other critiques within itself. But finally, the base of it is founded upon the idea that Kant's morality is a non-historical, formal and empty one, thus, in concrete situations of action, it cannot assist moral agents and does not tell him/her how to act. For Hegel, the main reason of this inability stems from Kant's strict and arid morality, which by transcending practical reason and detaching its relation with wants and particular and subjective inclinations, makes it empty and reduces it to a universal form of law.

This article tries to answer the question that if spirituality is an existential transcendence, how can one clarify the anthropological approach as the basis of spirituality based on the philosophy of Jaspers? The author, by presenting an existential presentation of spirituality, shows that the four dimensions of Dasein, Absolute consciousness, Spirit and Existence (Existenz), as the basis of the Jaspers' anthropology provides a comparative possibility of expressing a new and fundamental reading of "spirituality as existential transcendence". Accordingly, spirituality is an internal jump, which is understood by the perception of the existence, and the consistency of spirituality is also a self-evolving action to Approaching existence. On the other hand, Jaspers perceives philosophy as an inner action that leads man to an existential path to gain credible knowledge of himself and reality. Therefore, a spiritual person who has attempted Approaching to transcend existential becomes aware of his original self. This consciousness is not related to objective consciousness, since this mode of consciousness that occurs in the context of "Absolute consciousness" can be replaced by any other perception and interdisciplinary finding; rather, the consciousness that Jaspers means is a kind of spiritual understanding that makes sense of one's life.

One of the most controversial debates on Hegel’ s Philosophy is the question of ancient or modern aspects of his philosophical system. On the one hand, focusing on Kantian dimension of Hegel’ s Philosophy, some Hegel scholars have regarded his project as the completion and radicalization of transcendental philosophy. On the other hand, some others emphasize on Hegel’ s conception and elaboration and also transformation of classical metaphysical concepts of Plato and Aristotle; hence, he introduced his new ideas in the context of ancient metaphysical tradition. Focusing on Hegel’ s interpretation of Aristotle’ s concept of God as self-thinking nous, this study shows to some extent, in explaining the most important concept of his philosophy i. e. the Absolute and its synonyms, that he is indebted to Aristotle. Although with his own conception of this concept, he opens a modern way to reinterpret the concept of absolute. Accordingly, the identity of subject and object has overcome the Kantian duality between apperception and the world, and the rejection of nature’ s actuality in its immediacy has preserved the Kantian criteria of the conceptual determination of the world.

Epistemological orthodoxy is a purist one in the sense that it permits only truth-related factors to be relevant to whether or not true belief amounts to knowledge. Contrary to this orthodoxy, ‘ Pragmatic Encroachment’ argues that embracing fallibilism we must concede that in addition to truth-related factors, there are pragmatic conditions on knowledge mainly in what is at stake for us in our practical situation. Independent of fallibilism there is also a positive case for ‘ Pragmatic Encroachment’ to be made namely a principled argument for a pragmatist link between knowledge and action (KJ). What you know is warranted enough to justify you in both action and belief. KJ is defended on the basis of two premises on reasons, and when combined with fallibilism, it entails the denial of purism. This may seem counterintuitive; thus, theories like epistemic contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism have tried to combine purism and the intuitions concerning pragmatic encroachment. This endeavor, as we shall show, is without success. Critical reflections on pragmatic encroachment are based for the most part on its relation with belief, including certain conceptions of outright belief and degrees of confidences or credences in graded belief. In contrast to what these reflections aim at, pragmatic encroachment is not reducible to a pragmatic account of belief. Bearing in mind above considerations, it may turn out that the denial of purism is not as much counterintuitive at it may seem.