Ma`rifat Falsafi
Year:2009 | Volume:7 | Issue:1 (25)|Papers Count:9

Aristotle as the inventor of the theory of the annexational synthesis of matter and form, and his followersc1aimthat physical objects are the products of two separate substances. They argue for this theory by the arguments from “potentiality and actuality” and “connection and disconnection”. On the other hand, Ishraqis as the followers of Shaykh Ishraq, deny the existence of matter as a separate substance, while admit the quality of potentiality in physical objects. Therefore, they do not acknowledge the annexational synthesis of matter and form.Sadr al-Muta’allihin suggests a new approach, according to which he rejects annexational synthesis, but proposes “unitary synthesis of matter and form” on the basis of his theory of “intensifying motion in substance”.

Khadjeh Nasir Tusi began a philosophical movement that ended with Mir Damad. They were influenced by the Ishraqi school, while benefited a lot from Peripatetic analyses. Regarding philosophical concepts, Khadjeh Nasir follows Shaykh Ishraq in considering them as merely subjective concepts, but some others, beginning from Qushji, regarded them as directed toward the objective world. Davani defined secondary intelligibles in a way that does not imply the non-objectivity of philosophical concepts. Mir Damad, on the other hand, realized that secondary intelligibles should be divided into logical and philosophical concepts. The first category is distinguished by its subjectivity in both qualification and occurrence, while the latter subjective only with regard to its occurrence.

Pantheism or the oneness of existence can be considered the most important proposition in most mystical schools. Different mystical schools diverge in their worldview as well as their instructions for spiritual journey, but it seems that most of them converge on this issue. However, logical and rational justification of this teaching has met serious challenges which could not be overcome but by only a few schools.The author in this article studies several mystical schools, surveying the issue of pantheism and related subjects, and discusses Mulla Sadri and Stace’s efforts injustifying the idea.

The theory of “physical origination and psychic survival of Nafs” is an innovation of Sadr al-Muta’allihin. It tries to establish the idea that human soul is a corporeal entity at the beginning and, as a result of substantial motion, transmutes into a psychic entity. Many interpreters of his ideas have dealt with different aspects of this theory, but it seems that the accurate meaning of “physicality” is ignored; the pivotal term in Mulla Sadra’s theory.There are two major definitions for physicality, one is “a kind of Corpus” and the other is “an entity with serious dependence on physical body”. The author in this article tries to show that Mulla Sadra meant the first meaning. He brings evidences form his writings to argue for his suggestion.

The author in this article has an historical review on different views of metaphysics. He believes that looking at the ideas of philosophers from ancient Greece, from middle ages, Muslim and Christian philosophers, and philosophers of the modern ages, reveals various aspects of metaphysics. He tries at the end to suggest a general plan to show both the form and the content of all metaphysical systems.

“Existence” is the fundamental problem of metaphysics in the eyes of most philosophers. But Shahrezuri, from the sinavi School of Islamic philosophy, and Kant, the German philosopher, are among scholars who deny the idea of metaphysics being based on the concept of existence. Shahrezuri remains within the borders of traditional metaphysics, while Kant criticizes that type of metaphysics and suggests epistemological metaphysics instead. Despite this divergence, there seems proximity between their criticisms of existence.The author in this article discusses, analyzes, and compares the ideas of the two philosophers in order to reveal their common grounds within the general sphere of their systems of philosophy. He suggests that their approaches reveal a logical perspective in dealing with this issue, which paves the way for the principality of quiddity.

There is a disagreement between Ibn Sina and Khadjeh Nasir in analyzing universally negative conditionals. Ibn Sina considers them as “negation of necessity”, while the latter thinks of them in terms of “necessity of negation”. Khadjeh Nasir emphasizes the difference between the two positions, and deems the former more general than the other one, but Qutb Razi claims that, according to Ibn Sina’s works, they are equal, despite their difference in meaning.The author in this article tries to show first, in the discussion between Khadjeh and Razi, Khadjeh Nasir is right; second, by reformulating Ibn Sina’s arguments, one can realize an important formal flaw in his analysis; third, Ibn Sina’s answers to this flaw are not acceptable; forth, one may find another answer to this problem by the help of Ibn Sina’s analysis, but it also falls short of resolving the issue. Therefore, the question remains open for further endeavors.