Ma`rifat Falsafi
Year:2019 | Volume:16 | Issue:3 (63) |Papers Count:9

We live in an ocean of conventional affairs: some certain things such as money, bank, inflation, social traditions, university, president, and laws, which are not among objective and physical realities, and have no physical features. Public perception of these realities is that human beings have created them, but the important question is as follows: “ Why does a being such as human create such things? ” “ Are humans not able to achieve their goals without such conventional affairs? ” The following questions have been dealt with two thinkers with schools in conventional affairs, i. e. Allama Tabatabaie and John Searle: “ Why have human beings created things such as money, marriage, ownership, bank and organization in their lives? ” and “ What is the status of such things in the process of realization of human action? ” To answer these questions in the present article, we have firstly investigated the thoughts of Allama Tabatabaie and John Searle and, then, have stated four new analyses of the reason and necessity of issuing conventional things.

The main goal in the present article is an investigation of the classification of intelligible things into logical and philosophical primary and secondary ones as well as classification of the concept of existence under primary intelligible concepts. In this article, we have referred to the background of the issue of intelligible things in Islamic philosophy to scrutinize the argument for considering the concept of existence as the secondary intelligible concept, and to argue – assuming the principality of existence – that the concept of existence can be of the type of primary intelligible concepts. This article, while using a fundamental method, is not a descriptive one; rather, it is a criticism and presenting a view. Here, we prove that conventionality of the concept of existence does not mean it is a secondary intelligible concept. In view of the various intentions of existence and separating them from one another, the selected view of the article is explained and, finally, considering the objections and problems stated in the article, a redefinition of the philosophical primary and secondary intelligible as well as logical secondary intelligible is presented.

Interpretation of “ secondary intelligibles” is inextricably associated with ‘ principality of existence’ ; this mutual relation is more visible in the philosophical system of Sheikh Ishraq and transcendental philosophy. In this inquiry, it is clarified that Suhrawardi regards logical and philosophical secondary intelligibles as lacking inconsistent external existence, and absolutely negates their external realization, considers them as mental affairs, and – on this very foundation – puts forward the idea of principality of quiddity and conventionality of existence. This is while Mulla Sadra believes that since container of realization of relation is the very container of realization of the two sides of relation, both sides are realized in one container which is the very container of characterizing the subject by the judgment. Therefore, since characterizing in philosophical concepts is organized in the external container, philosophical concepts must have external realization as well. In the light of this fact, Mulla Sadra has reviewed and criticized Sheikh Ishraq’ s argument on conventionality of existence and has interpreted the mode of realization of existential concepts in the light of arguments for the theory of principality of existence.

The main goal in this article is investigating and explaining Aristotle’ s two-part or tripartite analysis of attributive proposition and reviewing some of the opinions and views in this regard. In this article, we have tried to adduce Aristotle’ s works to show that firstly, although in Aristotle’ s view, the linguistic analysis of attributive proposition can be tow-part or tripartite, in logical analysis, the attributive proposition is always composed of two min parts, i. e. noun (subject) and verb (predicate), and the relation thereof is not considered an independent part due to being included in the meaning of the verb (predicate); and accordingly, attributing the tripartite analysis of attributive proposition to Aristotle as a logical analysis is wrong. Secondly, unlike some views and opinions, we do not find two different analysis of attributive proposition in Aristotle’ s logical works, and the basis for his discussions on ‘ analogy’ in his later works on logic (early analyses) is the very two-part analysis put forward by him in his early logical work (regarding clause). The main method in this study is referring to the texts of Aristotle’ s words and – where necessary – to Aristotle’ s interpreters and his followers or critics, scrutinizing those words, and analyzing, inferring and concluding based on them.

Some of Avicenna’ s works and those of his pupils mention the primary nature of predication between genus and species, but in a sense quite different from the view presented by Allama Tabatabaie. This is in a way that primary predication in Avicenna’ s works and those of his adherents are an equivocation of what has been stated by Mulla Sadra and Allama Tabatabaie. Allama’ s view is based on the primary nature of predication between genus and species. The predicate is more general than the subject and finally the predicate and the subject are not conceptually united, which is a basic drawback of this view. However, considering the conventionality of objective existence in primary predication and contemplation on existentialism can be a solution to those objections. The discovering nature of predication among mental concepts compared to the external world in the primary predication and non-uniqueness of that predication in the realm of mental concepts would produce a new attitude towards essential primary predication. In addition, the role of existence in primary predication and conventionality of existence, even in essential features of the thing, can be explained on the basis of existentialism and the ultimate view of transcendental theosophy. Finally, after investigation of objections and drawbacks mentioned, the view is defensible.

The main question in this article is as follows: “ What is the origin of moral virtues? ” to answer this question, this study uses a descriptive-analytical method and relies on philosophical foundations to explain the meaning of monotheism and prove its originality for moral virtues. It also concludes that the basis of values and virtues traces back to the human’ s relationship with God; thus, what causes moral value for all acquired traits and human’ s volitional behaviors in various insight, attitude and behavioral domains is monotheism. This leads us to consider monotheism as the origin for moral virtues. Perfect monotheism necessitates that man does not regard anyone as the partner for God in the realm of beliefs. In the level of attitude, he must not have independent leaning towards anyone and anything except God; and in practice, he must obey God’ s orders independently. Indeed, monotheism is the source of faith in the level of insight, is the source of piety in the level of attitude, and is the source of servitude in the level of behavior. And these three virtues are absolute, and the condition for other virtues to be virtue is for them to be an instance of these three virtues.

Knowledge-therapy uses a series of techniques to solve many psychological problems and a wide range of psychological disorders. It is, however, not limited to a series of techniques; rather, it is a theory based on philosophical basis consistent with scientific methods. Pioneers and researchers of knowledge-therapy have not spoken of all intellectual bases knowledge-therapy. However, a review of discussions presented by therapists shows the effect of various philosophical foundations such as epistemic and moral relativistic thoughts. Accordingly, the present study aims at investigating the views of epistemic and moral relativism in knowledge-therapy and a review of those foundations based on Islamic thought with an emphasis on the views presented by Allama Mesbah Yazdi. This study is of documentary-analytical type. Its findings show that the pioneers of knowledge-therapy believe that there is no absolute and fixed truth. Besides, general and worldwide moral and spiritual values are rejected and all values are relative, personal and transient ones. On the contrary, according to Islamic thought, much of our knowledge is fixed, absolute and immutable, and moral relativism is an unacceptable doctrine; and there are absolute moral values beyond time and place.

Hermeneutics, as a type of knowledge dealing with the process of understanding a work, has three important schools: (1) classic hermeneutics; (2) philosophical hermeneutics; and (3) modern hermeneutics. Among them, the Quranic hermeneutics, as some knowledge that deals with exploring the process of understanding the Holy Quran, enjoys a series of discussions on the foundations of theology, anthropology, and studying the Quran; and its principles is at odds with the foundations of philosophical hermeneutics. The present writing uses a descriptive-analytical method to explore the Quranic hermeneutic bases of theology in Allama Tabatabaie’ s view. In this inquiry, it is clarified that three doctrines of ‘ divine wisdom’ , ‘ divine knowledge’ and ‘ divine speech’ form the theological bases of the Quranic hermeneutics, each of them stating some principles of the Quranic hermeneutics and having a direct effect on the process of understanding the Holy Quran.