Ma`rifat Falsafi
Year:2014 | Volume:11 | Issue:2 (42)|Papers Count:8

Shaykh Ishraq is among the proponents of the theory of mental existence and has offered argumentations for it. He acknowledges the distinction between the world of subject and the world of object as well as the existence of intelligible forms in the mind; but the intelligible form, for him, is not the criterion for perception and intellection. understanding realities, for Suhrawardi, is realized through direct and immediate intuition of the soul, which he calls ‘the illuminative knowledge’. For him, then, the criterion for understanding is the illuminative knowledge of the soul; and the intelligible form, which is formed in mind along with illuminative knowledge and is an ideal being, is considered secondary and subordinate. The soul gains knowledge of objects through illuminative knowledge and, based on the argument offered by Suhrawardi, it is at this moment that the form of the object is realized in mind. Therefore, Suhrawardi’s belief in mental existence is not incoherent with illuminative knowledge, and they may be reconciled.

What is the function of imagination faculty among other cognitive faculties? Is imaginative perception a material entity, related to the world of sensible objects, or an immaterial one? Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi introduce the imagination faculty as one of the inner faculties, and imagination as one of the stages in perception. In the present article, first we state the cosmological and psychological bases of Ibn Sina’s view. He poses the imagination faculty in his own Peripatetic school of thought. He regards the imagination faculty as one holding in itself the forms existing in the common sense, and limits – in the course of imaginative perception – fantasy to the sensible world. We, then, will state the cosmological and functionalist bases of Suhrawardi. Suhrawardi, discusses the imagination faculty within the framework of an Illuminative school of thought. He, like Ibn Sina, regards it a material faculty; but he does not accept, in the course of imaginative perception, Ibn Sina’s theory, and regards the forms perceived in the imagination faculty as forms just appeared in the imagination faculty. For him, we have another world apart from the material world wherein the reality of everything exists, and in the course of imaginative perception, the forms existing in that world appear in the imagination faculty. He calls it ‘the world of ideas’ (pendent forms). At the end, we will deal with the common points and differences between these two philosophers.

In the first pages of ‘theology’ in his Isharat, Avicenna claims that we may find out an abstract non-sensible thing through investigating the sensible things. By superimposing mixed quiddity over the non-conditioned quiddity, he argues that non-conditioned quiddity is free from the material accidents of mixed quiddities, hence non-sensible. This leads to misunderstanding that he regards the non-conditioned quiddity as existing out of the mind; thus, Khwaja Tusi, unlike some of his books that regard general entities out of mind as impossible, in interpreting Avicenna’s statement says that non-conditioned quiddity, while non-sensible, is out of mind. This is in spite of the fact that Avicenna, based on his other books, regards general entities existing only in mind. It seems that in Isharat, Avicenna is seeking to prove that general entity in mind, i.e. non-conditioned quiddity in mind, is an abstract entity; thus, he prove an abstract being.

The contrast between philosophical intellect and religious intellect as well as the denial of philosophical intellectuality are among the new discussions dealt with by some authors in the sphere of religious thought. Self-sufficiency of philosophical intellect and its slavery in the hands of philosophical rules of the ancient Greece are among other doubts casted upon philosophy. No proper understanding of the meaning of intellect and intellectuality in Islamic philosophy and insufficient acquaintance with pure thoughts of that philosophy are among the main reasons for such misunderstandings. The present article reviews the meanings of these terms in original texts of Islamic philosophy to answer the abovementioned objections and doubts.

According to the theory of essential dualism, human being is composed of two different essences, i.e. soul or non-physical mind, and physical body, which are essentially divergent. The best-known contemporary expositor and proponent of this theory is Rene Descartes. He has given this theory a new life and formulated numerous arguments for it including language usage, behavioral creativity, methodical doubt, distinctive sensory perception, and the indivisibility of soul.In this article, we have first clearly explained those arguments, and criticized them. In addition, some objections are mentioned, with which essential dualism, in general, is faced.

Philosophical hermeneutics is one of the most important hermeneutical approaches founded and explained by Martin Heidegger, and formulated and developed by Hans-George Gadamer. In his best-known work in hermeneutics entitled Truth and Method, Gadamer, who was a special disciple to Heidegger, analyzed and broadly reviewed the theory of methodical hermeneutics. Methodical hermeneutics attempts to present principles, rules and methodology of correct interpretation of texts. Gadamer, however, based his hermeneutics on negating methods and phenomenology of existential understanding, and presented dialectic understanding based on his hermeneutical principles.The present article describes and analyses the way Gadamer based his philosophical hermeneutics on negating methods so that it can explain “dialectic understanding based on question and answer” as Gadamer’s alternate method in negating methods, and also it can provide an opportunity to investigate that method. In this way, it will be clarified that his model suffers from many drawbacks such as ambiguity and vicious circle.

One of the important principles used in proving some of the basic propositions in new logic as well as many propositions in mathematics is ‘mathematical induction’. The question is whether this principle is an axiomatic one. Apparently, common sense does not prove it as axiomatic. Thus, the clarity of the demonstration for propositions based on the above principle is doubtful, and the justification of such demonstrations is contingent upon acknowledging the accuracy of the principle of mathematical induction. The authors think that the above principle is provable by relying on primary notions and principles governing the set of natural numbers; and thus by proving it, the probable concern about the doubt on logical strength of the principle of mathematical induction and the propositions based on it in new logic is removed.