RESEARCH ON METAPHYSIK
Year:2014 | Volume:49 | Issue:16|Papers Count:7

Hilary Putnam, who was once one of the representatives and proponents of scientific and metaphysical realism, became an unrelenting opponent of metaphysical realism during the mid-70s. Having argued against alethic and ontological dimensions of metaphysical realism, he proposed “internal realism” as an alternative to it. Putnam’s major objection to the alethic dimension of metaphysical realism was that this philosophy brings about an unbridgeable gap between the truth of a proposition and our epistemic justifications for it. As to the ontological dimension of metaphysical realism, he proposed the criticism to the effect that according to this philosophical position the world consists of “readymade” objects. Putnam poses these criticisms because, as he argues, firstly, truth cannot be considered anything but the ideal justification; and secondly, the world is not made of ready-made objects, but rather it is we that cut up the world into different objects when we take a conceptual scheme. Indeed, according to Putnam assuming any “external perspective”, whether about truth or about ontology, is meaningless. Having introduced and reviewed Putnam’s arguments in rejecting metaphysical realism, this article explains and examines the basic elements of internal realism. The results of this article show that Putnam’s objections against metaphysical realism lack the necessary credibility and strength; and at the same time his proposed alternative (internal realism) has serious problems that made to be addressed. By his chosen conception of truth, internal realism, cannot touch its stated purpose; i.e. the removal of a huge gap between the truth of a statement and our knowledge of it. The ontological claims of internal realism are not, indeed, the reliable and true consequences of the thesis of conceptual relativity, which is considered as Putnam’s main base in this regard, but rather it is more a consequence of mistaking the linguistic issues with ontological ones.

The works written in Persian about Jacques Derrida or the works translated into Persian about and from him have concentrated on Derrida’s aesthetic tendencies and forgotten his political philosophy and thought. But, we should know that his political philosophy and thought are so rich and working on them is necessary for our philosophical communities. In English-speaking world, it is for a decade that Derrida’s political thought has attracted writers’ and scholars’ attention. The works written in this period have concentrated independently on Derrida’s political philosophy and thought or have ‘politicized’ his aesthetic concepts. In this essay, we are trying to investigate the concepts of law, justice and responsibility in the philosophy of Derrida. First, we will clarify the distinctions between law and justice. For doing so, we will pay attention to Derridean concept of ‘deconstruction’. For Derrida, as we will see, law is ‘de constructible’ and justice is ‘undeconstructible’. Second, we will investigate the relations between law, justice and responsibility. We will conclude that justice, contrary to law, does not prevent us from taking responsibility.

Law is one of the key concepts in ancient Greek political thought. Two different legal political terms were used for the concept of law in ancient Athens -although not simultaneously. Before putting an end to the tyranny of the Pisistratidae at the end of the sixth century, qesmV was used in the sense of state law whilst after the Cleisthenes democratic reforms at the beginning of the fifth century, nomoV was the official legal political term. This study reveals that such terminological change from qesmV to nomoV reflects a profound change in Athenian political thought. Considering the fact that language mirrors thinking, this change in terminology may reflect a change in Athenian thinking. Hence, through philological analysis, this article aims to expound how ancient Greek political thought altered. Attempting to redefine the unit of Greek political life, poliV, according to new meaning of the law, this paper is a contribution to the ancient Greek political philosophy.

Husserl and Strauss are two philosophers that intended to reform philosophic thought and thereupon political philosophy. But despite of common view about end and foundations, how and why Husserl is included in the class of pioneers of battle against metaphysical philosophy and Strauss is reputed against him as the leader of classic and Conservative Philosophy? According to Thomas Spreagens’ epistemological method, even though this Germanic teacher and his pupil have common preoccupation about the sunset of philosophical truth-seeking thought, their different understanding of themes of this crisis and ideal aspect have been ended in different and maybe opposite philosophies. Unlike Husserl who set a kind of Humanism and inter-subjective understanding as intellectual and cultural base for his plan, i.e. Phenomenology, Strauss talks about the natural essence of political issues and dependence of political philosophy on regulations which are out of human’s control. Thus, the type of post-metaphysical political philosophy that finds political objects inside ordinary life and social and historical relations and understandings is derived from Husserl’s Phenomenology, but Strauss’ insistence on classic political philosophy cautiously seeks to answer fundamental and pervasive political questions, while continuously and modestly exploring the nature of political issues.

Derrida’s deconstruction is formed in relation to different philosophical movements such as existentialism, phenomenology, and structuralism. In this inquiry, we will search the origin of deconstruction in texts and philosophy of Friedrisch Nietzsche. We will show that Derrida’s thought is a development of Nietzsche’s critic of metaphysical thought. Most important Derridean concepts such as metaphysics of presence, diferrance, and critic of logo centrism are basically Nietzsche an. Nietzsche was very pessimistic about philosophical thought and sought a no nphilosophical and no ntheoretical thought. He introduced art as a view to the world that is free from limitations of theoretical thought. In Derrida, also, we can see this pessimistic view to philosophical thought, but he insists that this view is formed inside of philosophical thought. He introduced a practical thought instead of theoretical thought and systematically criticized the latter. We will show that Derrida’s deconstruction is an attempt to make a distance from theoretical thought and, thus, is a Nietzsche an movement. This is an attempt to find a way in philosophy that does not have to be theoretical; an attempt begun in Nietzsche and culminated in Derrida.

On the assumption that some Muslim philosophers have been more important than the others in the history of Islamic philosophy, a number of philosophers including Al Kendy, Ibn Sina, Suhrevardi and Mulla Sadra have been chosen in this study. Of course, it should not been forgotten that our approach in this article is not only historical. In other words, we are trying to show that Theologia is important in Islamic philosophy from different aspects. At first, we introduce this work briefly and then treat wrong ascription of this work to Aristotle and the malleability of some Islamic philosophers from it. Some Muslim philosophers have ascribed this work to Aristotle whereas some others have ascribed it to Plato and both groups have used its doctrines for explaining their ideas. This resulted in numerous problems in their doctrines amongst them is the unity of opinion between philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle, considered as an important and serious presupposition in the doctrines of most Muslim philosophers.

According to our terminology, the mechanism people follow in moral judgments, which is far from the sayings and rules of moral philosophers, is folk morality. Above all, people in moral judgments regard human moral capacity and do not expect full morality of any one. People suppose that perfect moral life is an ideal which is beyond human abilities. This hidden presupposition forms the foundation of human moral behavior. On the other hand, it seems that the moral systems originating from moral philosophy have been constructed a priori and, assuming a perfect man, they expect people to become such a person. It seems that it is necessary for moral philosophers to change their way and begin speculation with respect to people’s moral capacities. In this paper, we argue that minimal ethical speculation increases the level of morality in society. The basis of this turn is new progresses and findings in the field of psychology and the connection between psychology and moral philosophy; a connection which will be more and more important for moral philosophers parallel to scientific progresses. Of course, this is an immature idea and therefore confronts with some critiques.