RESEARCH ON METAPHYSIK
Year:2009 | Volume:45 | Issue:1-2|Papers Count:8

According to Descartes’ metaphysics there are two different kinds of substances in the world of creatures: “thinking substance” and “extended substance” or soul and matter. In Descartes’ philosophy the soul is equal to the mind and considered as a “thinking substance”. This immaterial substance is the essence of the human being. Body, being considered as a “matter“, is an “extended substance” and entirely distinct from the soul. The soul, therefore, exists and may be known prior to body and, not being corporeal, can exist after human death. Hence, Descartes can prove the immortality of human soul in the framework of the principle of substantial distinction. On the other hand, as a physiologist and psychologist, Descartes indeed believes in mind-body union, so that some causal interactions between mind and body show their substantial union. In this essay, the authors show that Descartes faces a serious problem in combining substantial union of mind and body with their substantial distinction; despite of his efforts in introducing the idea of pineal gland, the problem remains unsolved. Therefore it seems that as he cannot dispense with his only reason for proving the immortality of human soul, he has to hold the mind-body distinction theory in his metaphysics. Indeed, Descartes prefers to support the distinction theory rather than union theory in confronting a thesis and an antithesis stating one of two theories.

Evolutionary theory contains two major ideas: common descent and natural selection. This theory goes back to mid-nineteenth century and Darwin. Some scholars have claimed that this theory had been given by Muslims such as Ikhwan al-Safa, Ibn Miskawayh, and Biruni. Among contemporary scholars who agree with this claim are Ebrahimzadeh, Motahari, and Azkaei. But there are scholars who disagree with this claim, among them are Nasr and Falatouri. Nasr says that those Muslims believed in "the great chain of being." And Falatouri says especifically about Biruni that he believed in some kind of gradual evolution, not a Darwinian one. In this paper we first explain these opinions. Then to clarify what is at stake, evolutionary theory and the great chain of being will be described. Criticisms and suggestions come next. We argue that because evolutinary theory was the result of gradual changes of the great chain of being, there is some truth in the ideas of the first camp. And because the great chain that those Muslims hold was of the type of that of Ibn Sina, there is also some truth in the ideas of the second camp. At last we claim that the great chain of the type that Mulla Sadra maintained is consistent with evolutionary theory.

The present paper is an attempt to illustrate the point that the basic issues in Aristotle’s practical philosophy in analyzing Heidegger’s existentialism are conceived of as the matter of ontology. Comportment of men in reference to beings (Verhaltenweisen) mentioned in Book Six of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics turns into comportment of constitution (Seinweise) in the new approach to Heidegger’s Being and Time (Sein und Zeit). What is of great significance for Heidegger is reviving the hidden ontological power present in the three fundamental modes of activity in Aristotle’s theory in which praxis is preferred to two other modes of activity drawn from being, i.e. theorie and poiesis. Heidegger diagnosed some proper definitions and descriptions regarding human life in Aristotle’s transcendental idealism which are not known in modern philosophy as in Husserl’s philosophy. If we reconsider existentialism under the shadow of Aristotle’s phenomenology and specially Nicomachean Ethics, we may find ways to better interpret Heidegger’s philosophy.

The purpose of the paper is to evaluate of Imre Lakatos' MSRP (Methodology of Scientific Research Programs). Presenting the methodology which is based on Popperian Refutationism, Lakatos intended to overcome Pluralism (, Relativism and Skepticism) and distinguishes the best theory (/program) in science. The question is that did the lakatos' secondary change in the form and content of MSRP -against some historical facts and criticisms- make some serious deficiencies in his methodology? The answer to this question is positive.One of Lakatos' changes in MSRP is to resort to a new concept of "rationality". Presenting a logical analysis, the paper shows that this change causes MSRP to be unable to distinguish the best program among others. Furthermore he gives a new definition of the term 'methodology'. This definition, in its turn, makes MSRP main task to be inactive.Showing the irreparable harms Lakatos' changes produce in MSRP, the paper shows that these changes not only cannot get rid of the deficiencies therein, but it is also unable to meet lakatos' original purpose for MSRP.

The thesis of principality of existence is one of the most fundamental subjects of Islamic Philosophy. In a way most of the discussions of philosophical problems in this school are based on theosophy, and somehow they are tied to it. However Mullasudra raises the discussion of principality of existence with two different approaches in his works. One is a Gnostic approach, and the other is his own and innovative approach, Sadraei approach.  In this paper we shall try to clarify the theory of principality of existence and compare the two approaches with each other, using the methodological tools, like discovering the basic questions, finding out the records and historical backgrounds, and requirements, as well as the consequences each involve.

In Islamic philosophy various interpretations are offered with respect to the concept “Nafs al-Amr”. These have resulted from the way different philosophers have tried to resolve the difficulties concerning the correspondence theory of truth in connection with various kinds of propositions. More complications are added when the theory of “Principality of Existence”, propounded by Mulla-Sadra, has found wide-spread acceptance. The complications result from the existential presuppositions of the theory. In these circumstances Allameh-Tabatabei has offered his own interpretation of “Nafs al-Amr”. In this article we offer a detailed description of delicacies in Allameh’s theory, with a careful attention paid to his words when he discusses the theory of Pricipality-of-Existence. In this connection of special interest would be his discussion of correspondence theory of truth with regard to some special kinds of propositions. We shall discuss also some of the criticism made of his analysis.

In his book Asaso Al-eqtebas, Xaje Nasir-od-dine-e Tousi has given an analysis of connected conditional propositions which is similar to the analysis of the conditional propositions in three-valued logic. It raises the following question: does Tusi accept propositions with values other that “True” and “False”? In this article we consider Tusi’s view and those of his followers, and compare it with those who accept the three valued logic. We will show that Xaje didn’t believe that propositions can have a third value. Also we will show that in his analysis of connected conditional proposition Xaje Nasir does not use the word “true” and “false” as they are commonly used by other logicians. They are rather used to mean true and false in the analytic sense. We conclude, therefore, that in the text we consider “true” and “false” are not used in their ordinary and common sense. They are used, rather, homonymsly.