RESEARCH ON METAPHYSIK
Year:2016 | Volume:52 | Issue:21 |Papers Count:6

Kripke uses a fictional skeptical character in order to review and refuses “cognitive meaning” theory. According to this theory, the propositions which contain reference to the meaning (like the proposition, “using the word ‘table’, Maryam means the table”) show the state of mind of belief which is a correct state of mind. In order to challenge this theory, Kripke uses another theory which is known as “Normativity of meaning” in philosophic literature. According to the latter theory, meaning of a word limits its application in a normative way; for example, if I use ‘table’, I mean table, then I should use this word for the things which are really table. On the other hand, in meta-ethics, there is a famous argument named “motivational introversion argument”, presented by Michael Smith, whose purpose is to reject “moral cognitivism”, the sentences which include references to moral concepts in an action (for instance, “killing is bad”) show state of mind of belief which is a correct state of mind. The following article is going to discuss the possibility of the developing of Michael Smith’s motivational introversion argument into the sphere of meaning. In other words, this paper is a comparative study of fields of meta-ethics and philosophy of language, i.e. it examines whether there can be an argument similar to Michael Smith’s so that one can come to reject meaningful cognitivism.

Moral reductionist believes that the reality of moral qualities are the same qualities which can be expressed with immoral words. Such an ontological view has an epistemological aspect which states our understanding of moral facts is either our understanding of immoral facts or our deductions of immoral understanding. From moral reductionists and especially the naturalists’ point of view, the ability to explain moral knowledge without resorting to some theories such as moral intuition is considered to be an important advantage and even a strong reason for their view. Therefore, the present paper is going to study the reductionistic explanations about moral knowledge and justifications of moral believes. We have come to the conclusion that among the explanations presented by the naturalists, analytic knowledge has the same problems which have discredited the theory of analytic reductionism. Also, deducing value from non-value is either facing the logical gap of is-must; or if there is a meaningful descriptive-valuable link, we can’t finally come to unconditional moral results.

A common understanding of identity is a logical principle with the formula A is A. In this understanding, identity is a principle which lacks dimension, and epistemic and existential meaning; therefore, with regard to this principle, nothing can be something else. In Greek thought, it was supposed to be the feature which helped understand existence. Identity has an important place in Plato’s thought that tries to establish a new society based on philosophic thinking and considers this rational thinking to be a virtue which attempts to reach a good idea. Hence, the predicate in Socratic proposition “virtue is knowledge” is only possible (something like virtue can be something else like knowledge) if identity is not considered as sameness but considered as a property which forms the essence of the creatures. Therefore, Plato should distinguish between sameness and identity. Ignoring this difference leads to misunderstanding Plato’s most important doctrine that is the ideas and their relation with each other (and with their instances). This article has tried to show:  a) what is the relation between the proposition “virtue is knowledge” and identity; b) what is Plato’s understanding of identity which let something be something else without being paradoxical with “being the same as something else”.

This article is going to study the relevant interpretation of stoic logic. Regarding this, first of all two main views with regard to the conditional propositions in stoic logic are examined. According to the first view which is emphasized by Becker and Egli the conditional proposition used in syntactic system of stoic logic is Philonic while based on the second view which is presented by some people such as Stopper, Nasieniewski, and Barnes this conditional proposition is the relevant conditional proposition. The first view has confronted important challenges including the paradoxes of material requirement of which the Stoics are aware and were working to fix them in their logical system. But the second view not only does not have the paradoxes of material requirements but also resolves the paradoxes of strict requirements. Therefore, in the second part of the article, according to Nasieniewski, the relevant formulation of conditional part of stoic logic is presented, and finally based on the left stoic sources, we are going to study the problems of such an interpretation.

Richard Rorty, who is a new-pragmatist and anti-essentialist philosopher, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, who is a traditionalist, are both of the prominent thought leaders in contemporary philosophy. Having challenged the rationality foundations and criteria in modern philosophy, especially the criteria which expand the scientific rationality day by day, they intend to expand rationality based on their own philosophic views in other areas including literature, art, and humanities. A careful studying of similar and different aspects of Nasr and Rorty’s philosophic opinions about rationality and criticizing them lead to understanding the limitations and shortcomings of modern philosophy as far as the concept of rationality is concerned, the ones which need to be changed, expanded, or moderated. Changing and moderating Nasr’s views is carried out through focusing on timeless and eternal aspects of man, and reaching the absolute truth to other sciences. Regarding Rorty’s philosophy, the same thing is happening by focusing on time and historical aspects, by creating correlation and democratic relations among all the men. Despite the fact that Nasr and Rorty’s views have fundamental differences, they have been the key to solving many problems in contemporary philosophy by revealing the damages of modern rationality.

Sohrawardi has a significant contribution in the theory of reality, as some of the basic principles of this theory have been droved from his viewpoint or have been the reflection of his thoughts. Different contrasting interpretations of Sohrawardi’s reality and reliability and not paying attention to his explicate have aroused extensive debates such as ,if Sohravardi cognizes existence as something credential and reliable , how would he consider human sensuality and its transcendent possessing a simple and nonidentity existence so that Mulla Sadra inevitably had to interprets his expressions to refute the contradictions. The main purpose of this paper is to review and analyze Mulla Sadra’s attributed contradictions to Sohrawardi in the matter of reliability of existence. This article is going to show: 1-The key to solve some of the ambiguities regarding the antecedents’ words is related to the terminology of expressions. 2-The authenticity and reliability matters are the progression of the matter of abundance of existence over substantiality. 3-Due to Sohrawardi’s explicit words, there is no contradiction in his speech, so it needs no interpretation.