Philosophy and Kalam
Year:2017 | Volume:50 | Issue:1 |Papers Count:8

The present paper aims to explore the relationship between religion and ethics from the perspective of Ibn Taymiyyah and Robert Adams. For this purpose, this article investigates comprehensively the standpoints of these two thinkers in four parts. The results of the research reveal that from the perspective of Ibn Taymiyyah, ethics is dependent upon religion in four dimensions (ontological, epistemological, semantic, and normative). According to Adams, although ethics is dependent on religion in ontological and normative dimensions, they are autonomous regarding epistemological and semantic dimensions. The critical analysis of these two perspectives results in two conclusions. First: there are considerable similarities between these two viewpoints prevailing over their differences. Second: these two thinkers have not provided a proper definition of the relationship between ethics and religion and have not clarified the ethical interaction between God and man.

Soren Kierkegaard considers truth from two aspects, objective and subjective, and accordingly classifies it. With respect to the importance of individual and his/her choice, truth is subjective. From the perspective of objective truth, truth is conceived as an object which is somehow related to the subject. From the perspective of subjective truth, the truth, itself, is concerned, even if it is not appeared objectively. Now the main question is that of the relation between truth and faith. Subjective truth is an eternal truth connecting to the existence of man. Kierkegaard's discussion of truth aims at offering a justification of faith, in his special sense of faith, through showing that the believer is subjectively "in the truth". Faith or subjectively being in the truth is the highest truth attainable for an existing individual.

Distinguishing between potentiality and actuality, Aristotle solved many contradictions among past philosophies. Avicenna used this distinction to solve some epistemic problems. He introduces the term potential knowledge whose instances we can find in his philosophical works. Knowledge of the implicit conclusion in the premises, knowledge of some logical rules, knowledge of the interior parts of a quiddity, knowledge of the self-justified propositions, knowledge of reasoning, and self-awareness are instances of potential knowledge in Avicenna’s philosophical works. The instances of potential knowledge have two criteria in common. First, we have them in our inside existence; so we need nothing for making them actual but mental intention or mental intention accompanied with inner contemplation. Second, all these instances are implicit implications of a more general knowledge. As the knowledge of reasoning and self-awareness need only inner contemplation to become actual, they are more actual than the other instances; so the potential knowledge is gradational.

The theory of emanation (udur) is one of the solutions proposed in the Islamic philosophy for the problem of causation relation. This theory originates from the Neo-Platonist philosophy. In Avicenna’s works, this theory is sometimes based on the ‘determination of the effect by its adequate cause’, and sometimes on the notion of ‘causal necessity’. This article shows that Avicenna has argued for the theory of emanation based on a new model he provides for the latter notion. Avicenna discusses a new analysis for the relation between cause and effect according to which effect should be ‘possible by itself. He argues that a being which is possible by itself does not come to existence unless it is necessitated i.e., it comes out of the mere possibility—by some other thing that is ‘necessary by itself’. Therefore, ‘necessitation’ plays the most crucial role in bringing something that is possible by itself to existence.

Individuality, one of the important metaphysical issues among peripatetic, illuminational, transcendental philosophers, as well as Imamie and Ash' ari scholars, has also drawn the attention of Abd al-Razzaq Lahiji. The theological views of khaje, Eiji, Jorjani and Davani make Lahiji analyze and evaluate the views of peripatetic philosophers on this issue. Lahiji believes that individuality is subjective since it does not have an independent existence in the external world and is not but the very specific existence of the thing and its individual essence. Like the existence, Individuality is unified with the essence in the external world and is separated from it only in mental analysis, and in the mind, the essence is attributed to the existence. In this article, it is shown that there is no difference between Lahiji and Mulla Sadra views on the definition of the individuality, the manner of its being and what it depends on. Both of them maintain that individuality is the especial existence of the thing, the existence which is the same as its reality and its external existence.

The first chapter of the paper discusses the concept of “Propositionality” attributed to logical arguments, and by adopting the criterion introduced by Christopher Martin, the “Propositionality” of logical arguments is elaborated based on the Principle of Substitution in compound propositions. The second chapter discusses the viewpoints of Kamran Karimullah on the “non-Propositionality” of Al-Farabi’s conditional arguments and “Propositionality” of Avicenna to reach a judgment. In this approach, the “non-Propositionality” of Al-Farabi’s logical teaching is confirmed not only in its dialectical context, but is also confirmed beyond it. The chapter continues by showing that Avicenna’s viewpoints on the conditional arguments and propositions maintain differs somehow from modern “propositional logic” despite satisfying the criterion of propositionality.

Robert Adams, Inspired by William Alston's theory of doxastic practice, forms his moral epistemology and coins the term of “evaluative doxastic practice”. The inputs of evaluative doxastic practice are historical and cultural tradition, as well as feelings, emotions, inclinations and desires. These inputs accompanied with thinking about them bring about moral beliefs as outputs of evaluative doxastic practices. In Adams’ view, moral faith provides the confidence base of moral beliefs formed thorough evaluative doxastic practices. Moral faith is necessary because the moral beliefs are not above any kind of reasonable doubt, Although there are not any reasons against them.

The logical constants are defined by operational rules in the inferentialism theory of meaning. Arthur Prior’s counterexample (Tonk) makes a major challenge for the inferentialism. He shows that every arbitrary operational rule can describe a logical constant and this makes logical constants defective and incompatible with the system. In response to this problem, Belnap Offers conservativeness and uniqueness requirements for the operational rules. In this paper, we have evaluated the conservativeness requirement. The main question investigated is “how the conservativeness as a criterion provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for logical constant definition?” The hypothesis that we are to establish is the inability to achieve the definition of logical constant by conservativeness requirement.