Philosophy and Kalam
Year:2015 | Volume:47 | Issue:2 |Papers Count:8

The important issue of epistemic impacts of sin addressed in thecontemporary epistemology may be studied from different aspects. One is related to the actual impacts which sin has on the securer of knowledge and the other on the relation of human being and God as the emanator of knowledge. In this article we address the first aspect in an analytic method from al-Ghazali’s viewpoint. This impact is a fundamental one on the end and function of reason and also on the process of knowledge and its product. Here we only discuss theimpact of sin on the end and function of reason in its three aspects: the impact of sin on the existential end of reason, its impact on the quality of turning reason towards the truth, and its impact on the emotion and the will related to the comprehension of truth. The impact of sin on the process of knowledge and its product won’t be discussed in this article.

“Critical thinking” is a way of thinking and also is a title for an area of knowledge stemmed from Dewey in the philosophy of education. Inthis article, after analyzing and criticizing some of the most notable definitions of critical thinking, we will show that most thinkers believe that critical thinking, as a general area of knowledge, is possible. Finally, arguing for the plausibility of the approaches that focus on critical thinking as a process, and the idea that the “differences” between views are not “oppositions”, we conclude that Richard Paul’s view is the most comprehensive position. And the suggestion (made implicitly) is that critical thinking is not just apedagogical matter, and demands some philosophical discussions.

“Tashbih” and “Tanzih” (Immanence and transcendence of God) arethe most enduring dispute in great religions. In this regard, an important question is: may God’s power, knowledge, and free-will alter like that of human beings. According to some holy religious texts, it seems that a personal God is found to be subject to change. This paper indicates that, contrary to Asharite determinism, Molawi believes in the infinite generosity of the Lord which may perpetuallybe applied for creatures. Molawi argues that lack of alteration in the divine will, namely, “Bada”, makes human’s praying useless. Heregards resurrection as an arena of alteration in the divine will and human destiny and entitles the other world as a trade city. This sort of belief results in humans’ continuous and infinite hope and prayer.

In this research, my problem is what the major criteria of Supreme Bliss in al-Ghazali's Thought are. The methodology in this investigation is analytic-descriptive. In his works, al-Ghazali offers different criteria, such as knowing God, Proximity to Him, meeting Him, to love Him and so on. To actualize the last one, al-Ghazali suggests two methods: one: interruption of concern with mundane world and abandoning any love but love to Him, and the other is to increase the knowledge of God. He, also, believes that the supreme bliss, theoretically speaking, is to discover Divine Glory and, practically, to have good beliefs and morals. I think that, al-Ghazali’scriteria are not exclusive, but they are compatible.

Virtue epistemology is a class of recent approaches to epistemology that, in contrast with analytic epistemology, focuses on epistemic evaluation of persons’ properties, rather than properties of beliefs. This paper seeks to explain the nature of virtue epistemology as wellas its main approaches. Explaining the nature of epistemic virtue as are liable belief-forming faculty and the character traits led to two approaches in virtue epistemology: reliabilism and responsibilism. Since the nature of virtue epistemology is better understood according to the nature of epistemic virtue, this element will be focused morethan the others. This paper first addresses the origin of virtue epistemology and, finally, after referring to some critiques, including divergent accounts of epistemic virtue, insists that understanding thenature, importance and complication of virtue epistemology requires amore comprehensive, flexible and reasonable definition of epistemic virtue.

Comparing the Islamic logic and jurisprudential principles, and basedon the separation between minor and major authorities (hujjiyyatsughrawi wa kubrawi), it can be proved that (1) minor authority of suitable verbal text per nexum (al-mantuq al-muwafiq al-iltizami), minor authority of suitable concept per nexum (al-mafhum al-muwafiqal-iltizami), and minor authority of contrary concept (al-mafhum almukhalif), if authoritative are not incompatible with obsolescence ofthe indication per nexum (mahjuriyyat dilalat al-iltizam). (2) Majorauthority of suitable concept per nexum (al-mafhum al-muwafiq aliltizami)and major authority of contrary concept (al-mafhum almukhalif), in the sense of argumentation for per nexum significant of the premise, is incompatible with obsolescence of the indication pernexum. (3) Major authority of contrary concept, because of rationality of significance, and major authority of suitable concept, due to existence of circumstantial evidence over prerequisites' instantiation, are out of obsolescence of the indication per nexum.

The Mulla Sadra’s ontological system and all his innovations in this field is based on the theory of the “primacy of existence” and “nonprimacyof quiddity”. The accuracy and validity of this theorydepends on the soundness of his arguments for primacy of existenceand his responses to the criticism and related doubts. Through an analytic approach, this article addresses Sadra’s responses to theShaikh al-Ishraq’s criticism on this issue. The article shows that Mulla Sadra’s responses to Shaikh al-Ishraq’s criticism are not successful.

Averroists are accused of believing the "Double Truth" theory, basedon which a proposition might be true in religion, and, at the sametime, its contradict is philosophically true. In this article, at first, thehistory and significance of this theory is investigated, second, the Averroes' view about the post-mortem existence of the soul is studied, and, third, through investigating his views, in his philosophical and theological works, we show that his points of view on materialintellect and its being common and single for all human beings in the afterlife (unity of Intellect) in his Philosophical works do not contradict his views on post- mortem existence of individual souls inhis Theological works.