PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
Year:2010 | Volume:5 | Issue:16|Papers Count:7

Epistemic contextualism is a view in epistemology that the semantic contents of knowledge-attributing sentences vary relative to the contexts of knowledge attributers. Traditionally, epistemologists regard the semantic content of knowledge sentences as invariable across contexts. This traditional prevailing view is famous to "invariantism". According to Subjective sensitive invariantism (SSI), the truth conditions of knowledge attributers are constant in different contexts, but truth values of them vary relative to the contexts of knowledge attributers. Recently, Stephen Shaffer, a proponent of epistemic contextualism, has criticized SSI. In this article, after defending of SSI in contrast of Shaffer’s arguments, I argue his arguments are unsound.

The greatest problem and most semantic vagueness on talking of God refer to semantic analysis of human traits and their attribution to god. When these attributes apply in usual linguistic use and normal circumstances they have clear and intelligible sense, though such attributes and predicates use for a transcendent, non corporeal, and infinite being is problematic. A few theories exposed to solve (or overcome) this puzzle. Here, I only illustrate Plotinus and Gazi-Saeed’s theory and demonstrate how Gazi-Saeed’s theology is influenced by Plotinusian one. Both believed that, considering ordinary language use, we can only talk about god in negative way. It seems, however, insisting on speaking of god negatively without using other methods, restrains us from talking about god genuinely.

Metaphysical debate between realists and anti-realists is here at issue. P. Railton claimed that these debates reduced to explanation. All topics such as IBE, unification of scientific theories, science progress, concept of observation, experimentation and primacy reductionism deal with and depend on explanation.Railton suggests that metaphysical debates on the alleged topics reduced to explanation because it depends on our account (and understanding) of the world and its necessary persistent of phenomena. Since, our perception of facts of worlds come to date which are not neutral and value free, the conflict couldn’t remove. In Railton’s view, very conflict and challenge go head to controversies without any plausible outcome.

Many biologists believe that evolution is grant theory in modern biology. Believing on the centrality of evolutionary theory to the rest of biology is a special case of a more general idea: nothing in biology can be understood completely without attending to its history. According to this idea, we should regard biology as a historical science rather than a nomothetic one. But it may be supposed that as physics have been changed from a historical to nomothetic science, biology should also be changed to a more “accurate” science, that is, a nomothetic science. In this essay, I try to reject this idea by presenting some historical evidences to show that it is not because of evolutionary theory that biology is historical.

In early Wittgenstein view, philosophic, aesthetic, ethical, religious, logical statements are nonsense because language is propositional and its statements are pictorial. Meaningful statements (language) is, only, factual statement (speech based on facts), in late Wittgenstein, in contrast factual statements (speech based on facts) are only a kind of meaningful statements (a dialect). Language is, essentially, a social and universal phenomenon not private one. Gadamer, also, argues that was (or is) never private. It doesn’t belong to individuals, but vice versa, the individuals belong to it. Here it is intended to demonstrate similarity between two philosophers in detial.

The reduction of properties, method, and other concepts of biology to chemistry and/or physics appears in early literature of philosophy of science and to now is one of most debates in it. First, here, the reductionist approaches are, briefly, introduced, then it is illustrated that which one is more applicable in biology, and is relevant to which topics.

Model concept is one of the fundamental concepts in philosophy of science and epistemology. The physicists do not solve a real problem, but instead they create a model to solve the problem with it. The word modeling is so comprehensive and to teach modeling is an example of a whole educational plan. Nevertheless, the students in traditional classes of physics course do not have a clear understanding of the word modeling, consequently, do not notice the role of this concept in physics. The fundamental principles of Newtonian mechanics can be considered as a system of regulations which defines the mixture of modeling games. The common goal of these games is to develop models of physical phenomena. This is a preliminary point for a new approach to physic education in which the students are taught from the beginning that the name of game is modeling in science. The main idea of systematic education is of explicit principles of modeling and the methods to make student familiar with a fundamental set of physical models, and exercise of modeling, authentication of model with experiment, and preparing model for justification of prediction and description of physical phenomena. This paper defines the physical, epistemological, historical and educational basis rationale of this approach.