NAQD VA NAZAR
Year:2020 | Volume:25 | Issue:3 (99)|Papers Count:7

David Hume, an empiricist philosopher, accounts for the contents of conceptions and beliefs by observing their origins; since he thinks that according to the copy principle a conception or belief with a vague origin— one that cannot be traced back to a specific impression— has no specific content and will thus be absurd. Hume adopts the same approach in his account of the origin and content of the belief in the human soul or self or spirit, concluding that the belief in souls is neither rational, nor intuitive (the negative view)— indeed, it is originated in imaginations and is, therefore, erroneous and yet unavoidable (the positive view). In this paper, we will draw on the descriptive-analytic method to consider and criticize Hume’ s account of this and show that, on the one hand, his positive view is not satisfactory, involving a number of epistemic gaps, and on the other, he has ignored the role of knowledge by presence in his account of the belief in the soul.

A majority of Muslim philosophers believe that the human is composed of an immaterial soul and a body, where his nature is constituted by the immaterial soul. The immateriality of the soul implies that after its death and detachment from the body, the immaterial soul will survive without a need for a body, on the one hand, and will need no external factors for its survival, on the other. What is implied by the Quran, however, is that the human does not survive by itself and is annihilated with death. Thus, the human posthumous survival depends on God who gives a new life to some or all people with His power or revives them after an interval. The method of this paper is a composition of a logical analysis of the implications of the theory of the immateriality of the soul and a consideration of the implications of central Quranic verses concerning death, as well as a comparison between the two. The paper aims to show that the philosophical theory of immateriality of the soul is not compatible with some Quranic doctrines concerning death and afterlife.

In his Phaedo, Plato has presented three arguments for the soul’ s posthumous eternity. The first two arguments are articulated in a mythical-philosophical way on the basis of consecutive cycles of births. The third argument presented by Plato for the soul’ s survival after death is an argument from the soul’ s simplicity. He maintains that what has no parts is not corruptible, and since the soul has no parts, it will be eternal after the bodily death and will not be annihilated. In Islamic philosophy, one of the most important issues about the soul is the soul’ s eternity and its posthumous survival. Avicenna— the great Peripatetic philosopher— has presented arguments for the soul’ s eternity. We believe that his most important argument is the argument for the soul’ s eternity from simplicity, which was anticipated by Plato. In this paper, we seek to provide a historical consideration and analysis of Plato’ s view and its impact on Avicenna’ s simplicity argument. The method adopted by this paper is historical, involving citations of the texts, particularly those of Avicenna. The short reply to the main question of the paper is that Avicenna’ s argument for the soul’ s eternity from simplicity has a historical Platonic spirit.

The problem of dreams is an important problem discussed by philosophers throughout history. In ancient Greece, Aristotle wrote an independent essay on dreams, and Muslim philosophers have tied the problem of dreams with prophethood. The philosophical reflections of Avicenna, as the greatest philosopher in the Islamic world, on the matter are of utmost importance. He discusses dreams in terms of his account of the existence of the soul, its immateriality, and its faculties, particularly the imagination. On the other hand, Aristotle deals with dreams and their nature in terms of perception and the imaginative faculty. The main question in this paper is to elaborate and consider the accounts of dreams provided by these two philosophers. The paper seeks to uncover the distinctions and commonalities between the two, and the impact Aristotle had on Avicenna’ s account of dreams. The method is a comparative study of the two philosophers from the point of view of philosophy and the history of philosophy. The paper concludes that Avicenna has contributed great subtleties in his account of soul and dreams, although he was influenced by Aristotle.

The ontology of meaning seeks to find the truth and nature of the meanings of words; that is, it search the nature of meaning. Western intellectuals have dealt with the problem, providing a variety of theories in this regard, such as the token theory, the conceptual theory, the pictorial theory, and so on. Given the particular position of the issue in Quranic exegesis, the principles of jurisprudence, and certain theological problems, Muslim scholars need to provide an account for it. Thus, in this paper we deploy the descriptive-analytic method to reread and account for the views of two prominent Shiite scholars and exegetes, Fayḍ Kā shā nī and ‘ Allā ma Ṭ abā ṭ abā ’ ī . Having considered their theory of the “ spirit of meaning” — which is an important theory in Quranic exegesis and on which both insist, with remarkable agreements between the two views— we argue that this cannot be endorsed as a “ theory of meaning” although some people have tried to derive a theory of meaning from it, since it offers no answer to the question of what meaning is. On this account, although there are statements in their work which might imply their inclination toward a token or pictorial theory of meaning, they both endorse only the ideational (conceptual) theory of meaning.

he theory of the unity of existence is one of the most fundamental doctrines of Islamic Sufism and mysticism. According to Muslim mystics, the only true existent is God, and creatures are manifestations and modes of this true existent. The idea was there since the formative period of Islamic mysticism, and found its more accurate accounts after Ibn ‘Arabī’s emergence. Shaykh ‘Alā’ al-Dawla Simnānī—an influential mystic in the 14th century—rejected this theory. In this paper, I deploy an analytic method to consider and criticize Simnānī’s objections to the theory of the unity of existence, after preliminary remarks about his life and work as well as the circumstances of his time. Thus, I argue that Simnānī has criticized Ibn ‘Arabī’s view of the unity of existence and believed in the unity of intuition, instead, because of his belief in the necessity of the separation between Islamic doctrines and Indian religions such as Buddhism for purposes of preventing distortions in Islamic monotheism; because of his failure to grasp the depths of Ibn ‘Arabī’s words about the absolutely unconditioned existence which involves exaltation of God; and because of his confusion of various considerations of existence. Moreover, Simnānī does not believe that the unity of intuition is the ultimate stage of mystical journey, taking the last stage to be that of servitude.

he theory of the unity of existence is one of the most fundamental doctrines of Islamic Sufism and mysticism. According to Muslim mystics, the only true existent is God, and creatures are manifestations and modes of this true existent. The idea was there since the formative period of Islamic mysticism, and found its more accurate accounts after Ibn ‘Arabī’s emergence. Shaykh ‘Alā’ al-Dawla Simnānī—an influential mystic in the 14th century—rejected this theory. In this paper, I deploy an analytic method to consider and criticize Simnānī’s objections to the theory of the unity of existence, after preliminary remarks about his life and work as well as the circumstances of his time. Thus, I argue that Simnānī has criticized Ibn ‘Arabī’s view of the unity of existence and believed in the unity of intuition, instead, because of his belief in the necessity of the separation between Islamic doctrines and Indian religions such as Buddhism for purposes of preventing distortions in Islamic monotheism; because of his failure to grasp the depths of Ibn ‘Arabī’s words about the absolutely unconditioned existence which involves exaltation of God; and because of his confusion of various considerations of existence. Moreover, Simnānī does not believe that the unity of intuition is the ultimate stage of mystical journey, taking the last stage to be that of servitude.