Ma`rifat-e Kalami
Year:2019 | Volume:9 | Issue:2 (21) |Papers Count:6

Some believe that God cannot be considered "infinite" because, firstly, "infiniteness" is the modes of the quantitative entities. Secondly, an infinite being contains infinite plurality that is incompatible with God's true unity. Third, the infinite being, itself, is impossible to exist. Therefore, they argue that the narrations that speak of God's infiniteness do not actually mean that God is infinite, because the relationship between finiteness and infiniteness is the relationship between habitus and non-habitus. Hence, by denying finiteness in the quantitative entities, infiniteness cannot be deduced, just as with denying literacy in the stone, it cannot be argued that "the stone is illiterate. " Since the followers of this view adhere to this idea because of their religious concerns for supporting narrative arguments, after analyzing the claims of the deniers of this view, we have proved God's infinity through the religious texts to provide a detailed answer to the deniers of God’ s infiniteness. Using the rational and narrative method, this paper proves God's infiniteness, and evaluates the opposite view.

In scientific texts, there are some questions such as the problem of evil, which empirical science cannot fully answer, and only religion and philosophy can play a role in these matters. Using a documentary analysis, the present paper examines the views of late Allameh Jafari on evil. He believes that in order to solve the problem of evil, it is necessary to explain two issues: life and its philosophy, and the justice and wisdom of God in the creation and destiny of humans. From his point of view, the judgment of human beings about the defects and evil in the natural world depend on their judgement about world and life events through a life-oriented outlook. If man reaches an immaterial and clear understanding of the system of being, and his tendency to a "reasonable life” is increased, he definitely abandons the natural interpretation of divine justice, is freed from the natural self, and the issue of evil will no longer pose a problem for him.

Time and place are two dimensions of the beings in the natural world. Commentators and Muslim scholars all agree on the fact that there is no time and place in the Resurrection, as there is no disagreement in the existence of time and place in the natural world. In the verses of the Qur'an and the traditions of Ahl al-Bait, time and place have also somehow been attributed to man in the intermediary world. Thus, using a comparative-analytical-critical method, this paper studies the verses and traditions that attribute time and place to the intermediary world. The purpose of this research is to resolve the conflict between rational and traditional arguments about time and place. The immaterial human soul in the intermediary world has no temporal and spatial dimensions. What is stated in verses and traditions in this regard can be interpreted as one of the meanings of imaginal time and place, connection with time and place in the natural world, control over time and place in the natural world, and so forth, so that the conflict between rational and traditional arguments is resolved and their initial opposition is settled.

One of the major issues in the field of eschatology is the transfer of good and evil acts of people to one another. Since such a phenomenon is not possible on the basis of philosophical rules and Qur'anic verses, some scholars have sought to justify it, so that on the one hand, they can resolve the apparent conflict in the narrative arguments, and on the one hand, it can be a warning for believers to practice more piety. According to the novel theory that the writer has developed, human action has two kinds of effects: internal effects, which are pertinent to the doer and cannot be transmitted to anyone else, and external effects for which the act and the soul, are the numerical cause, and hence, the act is transferable to non-doers. The arguments for the transfer of actions is related to the external effects. Using a descriptive-rational method, this paper first explains the main issue by elaborating on the arguments for the transfer of acts, and then proves the selected viewpoint by analyzing verses and narrations and criticizing some other views.

In some positions in his articles and in order to explain the basis of regarding revelation as vision, Dr. Soroush, claims that Mulla Sadra’ s interpretation of the initial verses of Surah al-Vaghe’ a and his emphasis on the realization of the Resurrection in the present time, confirms Sadra's belief in this theory. The present study reviews this claim under the two rubrics of Mulla Sadra's views on revelation and his views on the truth of the Resurrection. Mulla Sadra's revelation studies confirms that not only has he not acknowledged regarding revelation as vision in any of his views and beliefs about revelation, but he has emphasized that revelation has a verbal and oratorical reality. Of course, his main concern in this matter is to explain the quality of the physical nature of the process of revelation, including the nature of the relationship between the Prophet and the Angel of Revelation in the physical and sensible aspect of the revelation. But regarding Mulla Sadra's affirmation of the realization of the Resurrection in the present time, it should be noted that, in contrast to Dr Soroush's claim, Mulla Sadra has considered the time of the Major Resurrection as ambiguous. He has drawn a distinction between the Minor Resurrection and Major Resurrection and merely referred to the realization of the Minor Resurrection. In fact, what Mulla Sadra believes in is the Minor Resurrection, which Dr Soroush doesn’ t believe in, and what Dr. Soroush refers to in his sixth articles (the Major Resurrection) is not approved by Mulla Sadra.

How can one speak about God? This is the main issue in religious language and is analyzed based on a number of other issues. A series of issues deal with the relation of the meanings of religious sentences and propositions with the features in the real world. Do religious sentences or propositions, such as "There is no God but Allah" and "God is knower" mean to give us information about God's reality, or do they essentially have a practical function in our life? Common approaches to religious language are generally divided into two distinct groups: epistemological approaches and pragmatic approaches. One of the main problems with these approaches is their one-dimensionality. They assume that their descriptive and awareness-raising nature of the religious propositions is contradictory to their imperativeness, motivation and influence in our lives, while this is not the case. Our approach to religious language in this article is two-dimensional. In our approach, religious language is both epistemic and pragmatic. Our approach claims that it can adequately explain both dimensions of this language.