KNOWLEDGE (JOURNAL OF HUMAN SCIENCES)
Year:2010 | Volume:- | Issue:62/1|Papers Count:7

There is a clear distinction between “Vernunft” (“reason”) and “Weisheit” (“wisdom) in the German language and their equivalents in other European languages. But this distinction disappears when in the Persian translation of Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra in which the translator uses an equivocal term to translate these terms: “kherad”. In Persian, “kherad” means both “reason” and “wisdom”. Darius Ashuri, the distinguished translator of Nietzsche’s books, sometimes translates “Vernunft” into “Aql” (“reason”) and sometimes into “kherad” (“wisdom”). He also translates “Weisheit” into “kherad” and uses many synonyms for it, among them, “farzaanehgi”, “hekmat”, and “kheradmandi”. These equivalents and synonyms create gross confusion about the concepts of “reason” and “wisdom” in Nietzsches’ work. In 1382/2003, Noshin Shahande published a book entiteled Woman in Nietzsche’s Thought. In chapter 3 with the title of “The Woman-Praise in Nietzsche”, she suggests that there is an identity between “woman” and “wisdom” in Nietzsche’s thought when he says, “Brave, Unconcerned, mocking, violent-thus wisdom (kherad) wants us: she is a woman and always loves only a warrior.” Then, she cites several statements in which Nietzsche says, “There is always some madness in love. But there is also always some reason (kherad) in madness.”; “The body is a great reason (kherad), a pularity with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a shepherd.”; and “Your little reason (kherad), my brother, which you call “spirit” - a little instrument and toy of your great reason (kherad).”Misled by the incorrect translation, she concludes that the identity of “woman” and “wisdom” in Nietzsche’s work. In this paper, I try to following the rules of text studies in biblical scholarship, “lower criticism” and “higher criticism”. Therfore, at first, I attempt to cast a light an Nietzsche’s text to find all of what he says about “reason” and “wisdom”. Then, I try to make a possible interpretation of Nietzsche’s words about the “woman” as a metaphor for “wisdom”.

Derrida's main critique of Western thought and structuralism is that it presupposes binary oppositions and the dominatim one of the aspects. This essay has two main aims: 1- Derrida wants to depart from binary oppositions. 2-Concepts of “trace” have roots in concepts of Plato's “khora”, Husserl's “Vor-Zugleich”, Saussure's play, Levinas's face and Heidegger' s instrument and phenomenon.

For Hegel, phenomenology is an Idea which is determined in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The importance of this fact is that, in spite of some accounts, this Idea is a concrete Idea with a determinate problem, issue, duty and position in Hegel’s system, not a general method for analyzing every philosophical discussion. However, based on some reasons which this paper discuses, there are some radical differences about the nature of this Idea and its position and its function. We rarely can see such a diversity concerning a book in the history of philosophy. In this paper, I talk around the very problem. I firstly, find the main reasons of genesis of this variety; after that, I find a structure for categorizing the different accounts of Hegel’s phenomenology. Finally, through making a critical review on the main approaches of Hegel’s phenomenology, I portray the necessity of offering a solution to this issue in order to achieving a kind of interpretive togetherness.

The article seeks, through a glimpse in to the young Ahmad Fardid's works, to attain some main characteristics of his next thoughtful development in order to provide a background for a more scientific and just judgment about him. The survey of the young Fardid's works can help us to understand better the story of the presence of Heidegger's thought in Iran. More clearly speaking, unlike those who conceive of the spiritual, meditative interpretation of Heidegger's thought in the horizon of the tradition of Iranian-Islamic wisdom as an arbitrary and non-scientific one, the article attempts to set forth the question whether the responsibility of such a spiritual interpretation of Heidegger's ideas in the horizon of the tradition of Iranian-Islamic wisdom lies with Fardid or others. In the writer's opinion, Henry Corbin is the very person who is the responsible of such an interpretation. This point has basic effects on the question of the validity of spiritual, meditative interpretation of Heidegger's thought in the horizon of the tradition of Iranian-Islamic wisdom.

How can one predicate human attributes to God? This question is, rehaps, the most important question which has posed by religious philosophers in the course of the uses of language in religion. How can described by human language?The negative answer to this question does not lead to knowledge of God and the affirmative loads human thought to conceive of God in anthromorphic terms. Some philosophers have posed different solutions. Thomas Aquinas and Paul Tillich believe that religious language is analogy and symbolic language. Some believe that it is, basically, non cognitive and others believe that it is meaningless.But William Payne Alston, has posed an absolutely distinct view.According to him, one can use human language, meaningfully and literally, to describe God. Alston, elucidating an deliverance, resorts to the functionalism doctrine. According to this doctrine, we can predicate functionally the principal core of meaning to God which is a shared content between God and humans by ignoring corporeal and spatiotemporal qualities. Therefore, one can talk about God in a meaningfull and literal manner.

Foundationalism is one of the theories proposed concerning the structure of justification and knowledge. This theory, as well as alternative ones have faced many objections. Some of these objections have questioned the foundational structure of justification, in general, and tried to rule out basic beliefs or to promote a symmetrical structure for justified beliefs. The others just criticize certain versions of this theory and deny some of the main claims of foundationalism such as non-doxastic justification of basic beliefs, their infallibility and the inference of basic beliefs from phenomenal ones. In order to explore these objections and respond to them, this paper is in three parts: the first part deals with objections of beliefs that are claimed to be justified as non-inferential. In the second part we try to explicate objections raised in connection with the non-doxastic justification of basic beliefs and the third part specifically deals with the criticisms of classical foundationalism. We conclude that despite many objections, this theory still is the most reasonable theory concerning the structure of justification and knowledge.

Gadamer regards understanding as a dialectical action brought about by the fusion of the horizon of the interpreter and horizon of the text. In contrast to the Enlightenment approach, the dialectical understanding is non-methodical and unpredictable. That is why Gadamer considers understanding as an event or accident. Accordingly, understanding is no longer the passive discovery of an object over a subject; it is the interaction of one subject with another during the process of dialog. Therefore, truth is not a pre-existing phenomenon, only discovered by the subject. Truth is created in dialog and through dialog. The structure of dialog is based on questions and answers. The interpreter embarks on asking questions about the text in order to solve his modern questions, making the text speak for itself. Rising out of and carrying tradition, the text questions the hermeneutic condition of the interpreter through its answers. The dialog leads to the opening of the text towards the interpreter and the opening of the interpreter towards the text. It ends in the fusion of horizons, elevating the interpreter to a wider understanding and horizon.