KNOWLEDGE (JOURNAL OF HUMAN SCIENCES)
Year:2013 | Volume:- | Issue:68/1|Papers Count:7

Resurrection in Avicenna's philosophy has received a great deal of attention, which can be discerned from the great number of his writings on this topic. What remains controversial about him, however, is his viewpoint on physical resurrection. Resurrection in Avicenna's philosophy is suspended between negation and affirmation. In Avicenna's works, there are two major viewpoints on physical resurrection, which will be discussed in this paper. Avicenna, in his treatise Adhaviyyeh, expresses his belief that physical resurrection is philosophically and logically impossible; therefore, when it cannot be justified though reason, we need to interpret Quranic verses and consider them as intelligible to sensible analogy. He brings up spiritual resurrection and considers resurrection joys and sufferings mentioned in Quran and Sunna allegorical and figurative, which are easier for common people to understand. In his al-Shifa, al-Najat, al-Mabda' wa l-Ma'ad, and many of his other works on resurrection, Avicenna states that the only way to prove physical resurrection is through revelation, not reason, and thus when one believes in the Prophet Muhammad and Quran, he can believe in physical resurrection through the text of Quran and hadiths.

This article considers the concept of pastorship and its relation to the denial or creation of subject. Foucault, like Nietzsche, by reducing of pastoral morality to the will to power and exercising of domination, believes that end of this morality is denial of subject and nihilism; an end which is presented through rejection of life and resentment towards powerfulness. The shepherd reduces the Christian subject to a knownable object. He wants to know subjects because he must take care of them. In Foucault’s view, this is dangerous: reducing subjects to dependent and obedient persons who will be unable to create. This article criticizes this narration of Christian morality.

Divine knowledge is one of the most important issues which separates the mystic from the scholar by a basic difference with knowledge. We can explain a kind of relationship between Hallaj's and Kharaqani's mystic views through thinking about their words and analyzing their theoretical views, then express their similar ideas about knowledge of God. Hallaj considers two particular features for divine knowledge and accordingly reveals its main meaning in two principles: men's in inability to achieve God knowledge and Extinction by excluding individuality and whatever there is other than God. Kharaqani is a mystic from the forth century Hegira who expressed words similar to the theme of Hallaj's speachs around one century after him, in which men's inability to achieve divine knowledge and extinction are a mystic deliverance factor and his achievement to ideal perfection (God knowledge). In this paper the main approach is analyzing and matching the views of these mystics about knowledge that eventually will lead to a kind of unity, which is real reflection divine knowledge in their views.

It seems that conceptualization of politics and its concrete features are the main concern of the political philosophy. Articulating the rigid demarcation between the public realm and the private realm, between man and citizen, Arendt maintains the transcendental status for the given realm which, by definition, is the only sphere for performing political action. Accordingly, the political philosophy and its different disciplines, including feminism, cannot avoid this philosophical articulation. Here, the functions or the malfunctions of transcendental philosophy are traced and how the immanent philosophy by challenging the very rigid demarcation of the public/private and finally the transcendent opens the new road, with the new possibilities, to politics is seen.

Jerome Shaffer (1962) showed that Kant’s approach to the issue of existence results in at least two one. According to the first problem, which has been called “the problem of contradiction”, Kant’s approach implies that ‘exists’ is both a real and a non-real predicate. According to the second, which has been called “the problem of triviality”, Kant’s view of existence implies that in the act of predicating, either the subjects cannot have exact objects as their extensions and/or no predicate could be a “real” predicate. The paper starts by formulating these two problems. Then Richard Campbell’s (1974) and Nicholas Everitt’s (1995) views, under the title of “logical approach” are explained. These philosophers, using some logical tricks, such as considering ‘exists’ as a mere “relational predicate”, or introducing a demarcation criterion to make a proper distinction between real and non-real predicates, have tried to interpret Kant in such a way, as to find proper solutions to the aforementioned problems. In this paper, however, it is shown that none of these solutions, which are arguably among the best solutions that have ever been proposed, are successful and satisfactory.

Heidegger tries to achieve the essence of technology by leaving common concept of technique. This concept is the instrumental definition. He tries to arrive at new understanding through the concept of causality and its Greek meaning. In this respect, the interpretation of the pre-Socratic path, for him, is quite notable. Although this topic about Plato and Aristotle’s views is somewhat unclear, the evidence confirms the compatibility between Heidegger and them. Heidegger believes that technology in modern thought is a kind of extreme reductionism. In particular, the creation of new scientific methods and modern science is rooted in this view.

Following Heidegger, Gadamer looks at history and understanding from the angle of ontology. This is based on his description of man as a being thrown into the world that belongs to history and is primarily affected by it. But his view with regard to history is open to the major criticism that he cannot extract an epistemological principle out of an ontological description of understanding and present a transhistorical criterion to measure the validity and objectivity of interpretation; so he clashes with the challenge of relativism. Yet Gadamer claims that his being accused of relativism is driven by his epistemological view of history, while his proposition delves deeper, dealing with understanding and history at the level of ontology. Gadamer is of the belief that history plays an undeniable role in promoting understanding. Not only do history and language not pose an obstacle to understanding, but they constitute the transporters of truth. Truth is projected to us through history and language. Therefore, a historical approach to understanding does not mean that everyone can tackle a topic in his own way, because though truth is projected in history and language, it is not made by history and language.