PHILOSOPHY AND KALAM
Year:2022 | Volume:55 | Issue:2|Papers Count:12

Ibn Hazm al-Qurtubi and Mulla Sadrai Shirazi are both Islamic thinkers and scholars familiar with religious knowledge. Ibn Hazm believes that God's names and attributes cannot be understood and known; therefore, God cannot be described except by the names and attributes that are mentioned in the Holy Qur'an and  in the words of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH). On the other hand, Mulla Sadra believes that God is characterized by true perfections, even though these characteristics are not cited in religious texts. In addition, God is present in all His manifestations, and, for this reason, He is also characterized by the attributes of His creatures in the stage of His manifestations. In addition to that, absoluteness and unconditionality of God's existence requires that he includes all the things that exist - including their essence and their properties. However, even if we believe that the divine names and attributes are not conditioned, the politeness of service demands that we call Him by the attributes that He has cited in the Holy Qur'an.

The Transcendent Theosophy (Alhikmah Al-muta'liyah) is the result of the tireless efforts of Mulla Sadra (1050-979 AH), who was able to extract a brilliant gem from the innermost of two philosophical currents, the verses and words of the divine saints and Ibn Arabi's mysticism, and projected a rare wisdom from their hearts. The dynamics of this method, in an evolutionary process, finally led to Mulla Hadi Sabzevari (1212-1289 AH), the founder of a philosophical movement, based on the original principles of Sadra's wisdom and the initiator of a new method containing some innovative philosophical rules, grasped by his paying attention to his thought leader (Mulla Sadra)'s works, especially al-Asfar al-Arba'ah (Four Journeys), Souhravardi's al-Hikmah al-Ishraq, especially Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi's commentary on it, Ibn Sina's Isharat, especially Nasir al-Din al-Tusi's commentary on it, Mulla Abd al-Razzaq's Shawareq al-Ilham, and Ibn Arabi's Fusus al-Hikam. Sabzevari's philosophical works led to originating a new philosophical school, called the Sabzevari philosophical school. With descriptive and analytical method, this article tries to explain some of the Sabzevari philosophical school innovations.

In the works of philosophers, the existing division of beings into immaterial and material ones has been done based on different criteria. Peripatetic scholars consider material beings ascribed to prime matter. Although some philosophers, like Sheikh Ishraq, who deny the existence of prime matter, believe in both immaterial and material beings, they maintain that the criterion of this division is not the prime matter but other things such as impotentiality and potentiality, denying and acceptance of sensible indication, and absence and presence. Mulla Sadra has also used these criteria in the division of beings into immaterial and material. In this research, by descriptive-analytical method, we have shown the inefficiency of these criteria, and, relying on Mulla Sadra's views and principles, we have shown equality of existence with the immateriality based on the principles of transcendent wisdom.

Nazzam as a Mu'tazilite theologian and Kindi qua philosopher have used "argument from creation" in religious debates and their scientific works as a committed Muslim. The history of this argument stems from ancient Greece and has been experiencing fundamental changes to the Nazzam and Kindi’s era. This argument is one of the important arguments for God's existence among theologians, and Kindi's use of this argument does not mean that he is a Mu'tazili. This proof has two aspects, negative and positive, based on the Nazzam's view and has three different versions in Kindi's view. The main issue in this research is what the differences and similarities between these two views are? Is Kindi influenced by Nazzam or are both influenced by a common source? Nazzam’s negative aspects of the argument is similar to one of the Kindi’s three arguments, but the positive aspects of his argument have fundamental differences with Kindi’s. The aim of present research is to find similarities and differences of Nazzam and Kindi’s "arguments from creation" to study how they affect each other.

Causality, as a general rule in the argument from origination,  has a central role in the system of Maturidi theology. Abu_Mansour Matridi believes that in the argument from origination, the minor premise, "the world is originated", is understood through three ways: sense, reason, and narration, and the major premise "every originated needs a cause" is the content of the rule of causality and is self-evident.  We, after considering this argument, address the subject of theology, i.e., the nature of God. In this article, by examining the structure of "the argument from origination", according to Maturidi's view, we examine what exactly the "origination", as a criterion of the need for the effect of the cause, means in this argument.  We show that this term, unlike other theologians, in Maturidi's views, does not only mean temporal origination, but first and foremost means "existential poverty and finitude", and this thought in Maturidi's words, can be considered as a kind of historical and theological foundation for the emergence of the "theory of essential origination" by philosophers like Avicenna.

The division of the categorical propositions into the khārijī, ḥaqīqī and dhihnī (strict, external, and mental) is one of the most important novelties in Arabic logic. Although the conversion and the contraposition of these propositions are discussed intensively by Muslim logicians, the mixed syllogisms composed of khārijī, ḥaqīqī and dhihnī propositions have been considered by no logician but Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī who was the first and the last one we know to have investigated the mixed syllogism for the four figures in his books Qisṭās al-afkār and Sharḥ al-Qisṭās. Unfortunately, it seems that his results for the syllogisms lack sufficient precision; and perhaps this point, or the over-difficulty of the subject, has prevented the subsequent logicians to receive Samarqandī’s discussion and continue his novelties in this regard.

In transcendental philosophy, an economic utopia is a city in which all the souls are completely perfect in their mundane aspect. At first, this article, by interpretation-oriented method, presents a novel view of knowledge in transcendent philosophy by drawing the theory of intensification knowledge (al-Ilm al-Ishtidadi) as an epistemological basis that is founded on philosophical principles such as the correspondence of man with the levels of existence, the correspondence of the levels of existence with knowledge, the relation of man to truth, and draws the properties of an economic utopia. The highest level in the series of intensification knowledge al-Ilm al-Ishtidadi) belongs to the Prophet, who is the leader and at the highest level of existence in the city and, according to a revelatory (wahyani) method and distributive justice, brings the city to the highest level of evolution, and after the Prophet, those close to him are in charge of these matters. An economic utopia based on the characteristics of intensification knowledge, gives the citizens outcomes such as "utilization of material resources", "development of human capital", "employment commensurate with the capacities of each level of existence", "job satisfaction", "economic stability", "expansion of economic welfare" and "economic development." Some obstacles of formation of the economic utopia are included: "accumulation of wealth", " spread of poverty", and "dependence on material things", which are discussed in this article.

According to Sheikh Ahmad Ehsaei, all mundane creatures are composed of matter and form. The matter is the fundamental part of all physical beings and the cause of their individuation such that the lack of matter leads to their destruction. Although the occurrence of form on matter removes its ambiguity, it is dependent on matter in its realization. Sheikh argues that the cause of restoration of souls and bodies is the same, and, based on shariah and reason, full evanescence of creatures is impossible. Therefore, physical resurrection is realized with matter and in the process of substantial movement. This movement does not arise from the essence of an object; instead, it is achieved through God's agency. The world of hurqalya plays an essential role in explaining the Sheikh's point of view, who considers man to have two bodies and two corpses. In addition, hurqalya is the intermediate between this world and the hereafter. Sheikh, furthermore, assumes the main components of the human body belong to this mundane world.

Naïve realism is one of the theories of perception that says: while perceiving, we become aware of the very external facts and their properties—not through something else such as sense data nor through something else such as representational mental states. Of the most important objections to this theory is the time-lag argument, which says: because it is possible that an external fact disappears or changes its properties while the light is reaching to the eyes and then to the brain. It cannot be said that we become aware of the very external fact. In this inquiry, we, with an analytical approach—conceptual and systematic analysis—and using Mīr Dāmād’s «Dahr» doctrine, reply to this objection and show that physical objects have a static aspect too, to which we connect when we perceive.

This paper evaluates Ian Barbour's view on the role of paradigms and models in the formation and understanding of religion. Based on Thomas Cohen's view about the role of paradigms in scientific theories, Barbour has shown that just as we do not have pure empirical observations, we also do not have pure religious experience, stories and rituals, for, just as observations are theory-laden and scientific theories are paradigm-laden, religious experiences, stories and religious rituals are also religious beliefs-laden, and religious beliefs are religious paradigm-laden. On the other hand, he believes that just as models within a paradigm are effective in forming and understanding scientific theories, they also play a fundamental role in the formation and understanding of religious beliefs. In this paper, the Barbour's view is first explained, then in the evaluation of his view, the paradigmatic view of religion, Barbour's attention to the role of models in religion and the hermeneutic aspect are considered the positive points of his view, and an attempt has been made to overcome criticisms such as unrealism and relativism of the paradigmatic view and models. But it seems that, firstly, the definition of religion by religious experience, religious stories and rituals is considered a kind of reductionism, and, secondly, it is possible to use religious theories instead of "religious beliefs" and consider religious theories as corresponding to scientific theories.

Explanatory defense of theism is a method based on "inference to the best explanation", and probability that Swinburne defends. In this method, monotheistic theism, as a hypothesis, competes with other competing hypotheses, such as materialism, humanism, and non-monotheistic theism. This competition is in the form of inference to the best. In this article, we examine Swinburne's method by stating the main elements of his view. We have come to the conclusion that Swinburne's quantitate method in defense of theism, the use of challengeable premises, and non-adjutancy of causal explanation are among the most important challenges to which his view is faced.

In his al-Mabda' wa l-Ma'ād, Ibn Sina demonstrated the union of the knower and the known. This demonstration is presented exclusively in this book. The authorship of this book is certain because of manuscript evidence and historical documents. As can be seen from comparison of the results of this demonstration with passages from further works of Ibn Sina such as al-Shifā, al-Najāt, al-Ishārāt wa l-Tanbihāt, and al-Mubāḥaṯāt, Ibn Sina accepted the union of the knower and the known differently from Porphyry. Ibn Sina's view on the union of matter and form shows similarities and differences with this one, which is illustrated in two natural and metaphysical perspectives in his works. This article presents three main points: (1) a critical edition of the text; (2) an explanation of the demonstration of the union of the knower and the known in comparison with other Ibn Sina texts; (3) a critical analysis of the Leiden University Library manuscript (No. 1020a) that contains a different text than other manuscripts about this topic.