The paper explains the link between fiscal decentralization and provincial, national, and aggregate government size. We discuss how fiscal decentralization measures (expenditure, revenue, and vertical imbalance) affect the government size. Fiscal decentralization is an institutional variable, which is related to the intergovernmental relationship, and can affect the ability of some provincial decisions. It affects on efficiency through reallocation of public resources to match with tastes and preferences of local residences. We show that: (1) the relationship between fiscal decentralization of expenditures and government size is negative for aggregate and national government, and positive for provincial governments. Thus, decentralization of expenditures tends to decrease aggregate and national government size. (2) Revenue decentralization measure does not have any significant effect on the income and their size of the provincial governments. And finally, (3) vertical imbalances tend to increase the size of provincial, national, and aggregate governments.