NAMEH-YE-MOFID
Year:2003 | Volume:9 | Issue:2 (36 PHILOSOPHY)|Papers Count:10

In this article it is examined that if the soul and body in the Leibniz's philosophy are homogeneous or not and if there is any interrelation between them and how their  adaptation can be explained. In other word the views of Leibniz regarding the connection between soul and body are examined and criticized through a descriptive analysis of his articles such as Monadology and Discourse on metaphysics and his correspondence with Clarke and Arnauld and a study of the works of his commentators such as Larte, Russell and Ishiguro with regard to connection between soul and body. These views are analyzed and criticized and the following conclusions are drawn: 1- From Leibniz's view point soul and body are homogeneous; soul is a rulling Monad and body is a collection of infinite subjugated Monads, but we can not agree with this view, for there is no correct proof for Monad and this thesis that soul is a rulling Monad requires that in some cases body must be soul. 2- There is not any interrelation between soul and body in the Leibniz's philosophy and their adaptation is explained only by pre-established harmony, but this opinion requires that human freedom and the best proof for soul would be lost. 3- The composition of soul and body on the level of Monads is by way of annexation and on the level of phenomena is by way of unification and the correctness of this thesis depends on correctness of thesis of Monad and Leibniz's definition of soul and body. 4- soul is present all over the body, but this does not mean diffusion.

The relationship between the universe and the Origin is considered as a crucial issue in every philosophical and Gnostic (mystical) systems. This issue has come under close scrutiny in Islamic gnosticism especially in Ibn 'Arabi's' pantheistic. school of thought in dealing with the problem of God's self - disclosure, heavenly soul (nafs-e rahmani), 'Ama' (Deviation, Blindness), and eternal love likewise, the term (maya) and its connotations is studied precisely in the Indian gnosticism, especially in the doctrine of Brahma, Sankaya's school, i.e., Advaita Vedanta (non-dualist Vedanta). A contrastive analysis of such a term can open up new vistas for the study of the issue in question in comparative gnosticism, towards which the present article takes steps.

The distinction between the realm of substance and that of attributes is represented in Spinoza's ethics by means of a method known as dialectic. The most outstanding characteristic of this method is that it investigates various opposing aspects of an issue in relation to each other. Therefore, in a ethics, determinism is studied in terms of its relation to freedom. Although the subject of this article revolves around the relationship between determinism and freedom, it goes without saying that Spinoza studies such concepts as infinity, finitude, individual, society, part and whole in the same way.

In this article, article I intend to consider the explanation of the will and the ability of this explanation to answer the difficulties concerning this issue in Aquinas philosophy. He believed that the soul is a substance and its powers are described as accidents for it, namely they don't follow necessarily from the soul's nature. Aquinas accepted Aristotle's idea about the appetitive power as a distinct power of the soul. In this Philosophical system intellectual appetite is distinguished from sensitive appetite, The former is depending on understanding and the latter is related to sensation. The intellectual appetite is named Will. On the other hand Aquinas believed in free will Whose specific sign is choice. Therefore we ought to accept that the will is affected not only by intellect but also by sensation, and Aquinas believed it too. But if one describes the will as a intellectual appetite he will not be able to believe in the free will.

Justifications come to an end. Now, what is this end? According to Wittgenstein it is our manner of acting. It is our form of life which lies at the bottom of our language - games. Knowledge is possible only in this context. This paper considers the structure of this context through considering what Wittgenstein calls it world - picture. World - picture forms a coherent system. Which has been acquired by means of observation and instruction, and so it is something universal not personal and private. It is the ground of every human inquiry. However it doesn't mean its agreement with reality. At the same time its change throughout the time is not impossible. It remains that these properties of world-picture should be investigated in details.

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80) considers himself not a realist nor an idealist. As a phenomanalist, he believes that there is no reality like a nomen beyond the realm of phenomena (appearances) on the one hand, and holds that phenomena do not rely upon consciousness or the knowing subject on the other. Phenomena are self-subsistent. Thus, one faces two modes of being: consciousness and objects of consciousness. The former is referred to as "being - for - itself' and the latter as "being - in - itself'. For him, "being - in - itself' has three characteristics: 1) it is, 2) it is in itself and, 3) it is what it is. This article first seeks to study the phenomenological approach to the distinction Sartre makes between the two fundamental modes of being and then casts light on the three characteristics of "being - in - itself".

Today, education systems in Islamic societies face numerous challenges, and finding ways to meet these challenges is considered to be the most serious concern in the realm of education planning in Islamic societies. Among the challenges a Muslim community may face, one can refer to the propagation of post-modern doctrines such as the retutation of authentic epistemological resources, deconstructionalism, the refusal of any modeling in education, relativism, etc., each of which brings about callenges educational systems in religious communities face. One logical way to meet the challenges is to bring forth the competing Islamic theories in the areas in question; for example, we can make we of the theories and views put forwards by Muslim thinkers and philosophers. In this article, the writer attempts to make a comparative analysis of Rumi (of course, as a Muslim thinker, not as a representative or mouthpiece of Islamic theories) and certain views of post-modem thinkers. This article seeks to cast light on the possible similarities (common points) and differences (paradoxies) which exist in Rumi's educational views and post modern views.

Quine selects the scope of prediction and test of research in. In ' evidence' chapter he says that the forming of the critical systems starts with the stimulus of the senses, which gives us, the observation sentences. The observation categoricals are deduced from them. Tests are on the basis of these categoricals. He says he does not believe in the Cartesian scientific certainty, and then mentions his' theory of naturalized Epistemology' as an alternative way