NAMEH-YE-MOFID
Year:2009 | Volume:15 | Issue:1 (71 PHILOSOPHY)|Papers Count:10

Considering the characteristics of thought, Aristotle inclines in his On the Soul toward accepting the reality of a kind of intellect which is almost called "active intellect". His vague terminology and short statements concerning the ontological state of this intellect, however, has led to different, and in some cases, contradictory commentaries. In this paper, adopting a rigorous analytical approach to the issue along with appealing to Aristotle's own philosophical principles and texts, we propose a new interpretation according to which Aristotle believes in three kinds of intellect; an external active intellect (outside the human soul), an internal active intellect (inside the human soul) and a passive intellect so that the second and third are actually the same and consist in the actual and potential aspects of the single human intellect. As it is shown, this interpretation could be justified by several textual evidence and put an end to an old historical dispute.

In this paper, modern philosophy is regarded from the perspective of negative theology. The author shows that the anthropomorphic theology were dominant in Greek and Christian period; but after Renaissance, under the effect of new science and other causes, gradually a type of negative theology emerged and according to which, and in thoughts of thinkers, God distanced from man and world. This type of theology plays an important role in modern philosophy and the view of philosophers in modern ages.

Richard Rorty claims that, during the Enlightenment, philosophy helped the West get rid of medieval religious beliefs, and now it is time to get rid of philosophy and its dogmas too. Attacking foundationalism, he argues that we cannot devise a philosophical system on foundations that are certain and evident for all, and then deduce certain values and norms from it. Philosophy cannot be of any help for making a distinction between warranted and unwarranted assertions in morality and politics. The validity of moral and political values can only be shown pragmatically, when they make human life and coexistence easier in practice. Philosophy at the most can summarize systematically our culturally influenced intuitions, reconcile our judgments in various areas of knowledge, predict the consequences of combining certain strands of thought, and finally provide an argument for whatever we or our clients have decided to do. It may be asked whether Rorty, by separating philosophy from politics, has not deprived us from a valuable tool for recognising and criticising deficiencies and inequalities in a society. In this paper, first, Rorty's educational and professional background in philosophy is reviewed. Then, his arguments against philosophy, in general and Western philosophy, in particular, are mentioned briefly. Finally, the functions of philosophy from his point of view are discussed.

Having criticized the realstic account of subject, Kant introduced the notion of metaphysical subject in his philosophical framework. In Kant's view, metaphysical subject could make a room for both knowledge and moral law, generally speaking. Wittgenstein utilized metaphysical subject in his semantic theory in Tractatus which sounds Kantian. However, the difference between Kantian idealistic account and Wittgensteinian non-idealistic account towards metaphysical subject leads to the point that it is used in the Tractatus in the minimal sense. However, even this minimal usage of metaphysical subject produces a paradox in Tractatus. The paradox which could show the implausibility of the Tratctatus' philosophical project. This paper tries to elaborate the paradox and show its logical implications.

One objection made against the temporal parts theory is Haslanger's causal message argument. Haslanger argues that instantaneous temporal parts view cannot explain changes in natural objects and so it should be abandoned. In the present paper, endorsing soundness of Haslanger's argument, I make another objection to the mentioned view from the innumerability of instantaneous temporal parts involving in the constitution of any natural object. Then, I introduce and defend the idea that we may consider temporal parts as durable rather than instantaneous.In the remaining sections, scrutinizing this idea, I explain how it is possible to defeat two mentioned objections by relying on the idea of durable temporal parts.

In this paper, at first, we describe the standard version of epistemic theory of vagueness. After that we criticize two parts of that theory: first we argue that its solution to the epistemic problem entails paradoxes other than sorites; then we argue that the theory cannot justify its counter-intuitiveness. We will conclude that these objections can refute the standard version of epistemic theory of vagueness.

Counterfactual scenarios can be run in the case of scientific events, theories and achievements in the virtual historiography of science. We shall try to provide a comprehensive framework to categorise different approaches to the contingency/inevitability of scientific achievements. The proposed framework is an extended version of that presented by Fuller (2008). He has distinguished two approaches to the historiography of science: overdetermination ("Y had to happen, but it need not have happened via X"), and underdetermination ("X need not have happened, but once it did Y had to happen"), where X is the antecedent cause of Y.We have introduced four extra questions regarding the relationship between X and Y: whether Y depends on X or not; whether Y depends on an alternative of X or not; whether an alternative of Y depends on X or not; whether X is inevitable or not. On the basis of these questions, we propose our comprehensive framework, containing seven options, to categorise different approaches to the inevitability/contingency of scientific achievements. To show the overall adequacy of this framework, we will apply it to two historical cases, one from modern physics and one from Darwin's theory of natural selection.

Causal theories of reference in the philosophy of language and philosophy of science have suggested that it could resolve lingering worries about incommensurability between theoretical claims in different paradigms, to borrow Kuhn's terms. If we co-refer throughout different paradigms, then the problems of incommensurability are greatly diminished. This paper reconsiders the challenge presented to scientific realism by the semantic incommensurability thesis. The realist may dispose of this challenge on the basis of a modified causal theory of reference, as argued by Philip Kitcher. Having Kitcher's theory of reference discussed, we will argue that it fails to distinguish genuine case of continuity of reference and cases of discontinuity.