KHERADNAME-YE SADRA
Year:2010 | Volume:15 | Issue:2 (58)|Papers Count:12

One of the most important principles of old logic and Aristotle's philosophy is the principle of presupposition, based on which "the affirmation of an attribute for a subject is posterior to the affirmation of that subject." From among the important consequences of this principle, we can refer to the following two propositions:1. An affirmative proposition without a subject is false.2. A negative proposition without a subject is true.The following two propositions are in opposition to the principle of conversion by contradiction because of the following example: A. The general negative proposition of "no non-existent is non-existent" is true because of the lack of subject (according to proposition 2).B. The conversion by contradiction of this proposition, i.e. "some non-existents are not non-existent", is false (This is because it is the same as the particular negative proposition of "some existents are not in existence". The opposite of this proposition i.e." every existent is in existence, is true.This indicates that the principle of the conversion by contradiction does not preserve the truth of the proposition, whereas the "preservation of truth" has been mentioned in the definition or the principle of conversion by contradiction. This example of this principle is in contrast to the second consequence of the principle of presupposition (proposition 2). In this paper, some other examples of the principle of conversion by contradiction will be presented which are inconsistent with the second consequence of the principle of presupposition proposition. Since the principle of conversion by contradiction has two definitions (given by early and contemporary philosophers), the inconsistency of the principle of presupposition with this principle will be explained based on both definitions and with the help of some related examples. Some solutions will also be provided in order to remove this inconsistency, and it will be shown that none of them will be helpful in accomplishing this task. Finally, the standpoint of modern logic in this regard will be evaluated.

Man cognizes existents through either acquired or presential knowledge. The former includes concept and judgment, and concept consists of sense perception, imagination, and reason. Having access to sensual and imaginative concepts about corporeal existents is possible for all human beings. However, some philosophers believe that most people cannot reach the level of rational (universal) concept.One cannot receive sensual imaginal knowledge from abstract existents. Therefore, the only possible concept of abstract existents, just for a few of them, is the (universal) rational concept. Man cannot perceive the objective disengagement of the soul through universal concepts.Philosophers such as Mulla Sadra who believe that acquired knowledge cannot help man to understand the reality of the soul, while presenting some arguments in order to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul, believe that they lead to certainty. Given the fact that arguments produce acquire knowledge, their purpose is to create rational certainty rather than one that can be attained through intuitive knowledge. The arguments adduced for the demonstration of the immateriality of the soul can be classified based on their principles.

A study of Mulla Sadra's method of interpretation reveals that he considers Ta'wil to be a method based on three elements: revelation (Qur'an), rational analyses (argument), and purification of the soul (gnosis). Mulla Sadra's genius lies in the fact that he combines these three elements, which lead to a single truth, with each other and removes their apparent inconsistencies with the aid of ta'wil.He has frequently emphasized that the basic condition in ta'wil is being in agreement with the Book and Sunna, so that both testify to its being true. Otherwise, the ta'wil will be absurd and sinful and nothing but idle talk and blasphemy.

Historians of philosophy claim that Aristotle was the first to discuss substance extensively. He analyzed this issue in his books, Categories, Metaphysics, and Physics, for three different purposes. In Categories, after examining the different types of subject and predicate, the first and second substances have been distinguished from each other. In Metaphysics, he has dealt with substance with the purpose of a search for the existentiality of existents based on four aspects: essence, universal, genus, and subject. Finally, in his Physics, another interpretation of substance has been given in order to clarify the issue of a fixed subject in the course of motion. Consequently, some of his critiques have accused him of self-contradiction in these works. This paper is intended to clarify this problem by reference to the works of Aristotle and the analyses of his commentators.

In this paper, the writers have compared Mulla Sadra's philosophical ideas concerning the intellects and the angelology of Nahjulbalaghah. In doing so, they have studied all of Mulla Sadra's philosophical and interpretive books and collected his ideas on the intellects. Moreover, they have also had a thorough study of the content of Nahjulbalaghah in relation to angels. Then, only by the study of the two attributes of the "abstraction" and "plurality" of angels (in Nahjulbalaghah) and the intellects (in Mulla Sadra's philosophy), they have concluded that favorite angels correspond to the intellects only if they are at the level of perfect abstraction. However, in the case of ontological decline and assimilation of those angels in form and configuration to their lower world, they will not correspond to the intellects. In terms of plurality, angels are also as numerous as the intellects and enjoy specific and gradational multiplicity. Nevertheless, nothing has been mentioned concerning the origin of angel's plurality in Nahjulbalaghah.

In comparison to the universal worlds of being, the divine decree is the same level of intellectual forms, which is beyond natural and soulish forms. These forms, which are emanated from Almighty Necessary in a sudden and immediate form, are considered to be one of the levels of divine Knowledge called scientific decree, which, at a higher level, leads to the essential divine Knowledge. On the other hand, the cause-effect order of the world of being and the attribution of this world to its perfect and life-giving cause, which is the origin of the necessity and appearance of the world of being, is the same objective decree. Therefore, the divine decree manifests the attribution of the whole world of being at two scientific and objective levels to Almighty Truth.A correct explanation and analysis of the issue of the divine decree must be done by paying attention to both divine knowledge and the necessity of the order of the world.  This is because the divine decree clarifies both of them and paying attention to one of them and ignoring the other cannot reveal the truth of the issue of the divine decree to us. This paper is intended to explain and analyze this issue in the Transcendent Philosophy based on the works of Mulla Sadra and 'Allamah Tabataba'i.

The rise of the Transcendent Philosophy and the opportunity to benefit from the interplay of philosophy and gnosis provided the chance for researchers to examine philosophical issues based on gnostic principles, while appreciating the rational-philosophical explorations of early philosophers. From among these issues, we can refer to the createdness of the world.Apart from the four different theological and philosophical analyses of this issue, that is, temporal createdness, essential createdness, perpetual createdness, and natural createdness, some of the followers of the Transcendent Philosophy have tried to present a new design of the createdness of the world which is essentially different from previous ones. They have done this based on gnostic teachings, such as the principiality and unity of being, manifestation of existence in the arc of descent, the necessity of the nature of existence, and the like. Based on the three theories of nominal createdness, actual createdness, and createdness by truth, which were presented by Haj Mulla Hadi Sabziwari, Ilahi Qumshe'i, and Allamah Tabataba'i, respectively, there is no word about the precedence or non-precedence of the existence of the world by non-existence, in the sense that is discussed in theological philosophical sources, anymore. Rather, exiting the interiors has replaced it in the analysis of the createdness of the world. This is because, in the gnostic view, the world is one of the manifestations of the divine existence, which is not prone to non-existence.As a result, when going through its descending levels, existence has moved from unity to plurality, from inward to outward, and from hiddenness to openness, and the material world gradually shows itself.In this state, there remains no place for lengthy and, at times, useless discussions about the quality of the union of the created and the pre-eternal, and the changing and the fixed.