KNOWLEDGE (JOURNAL OF HUMAN SCIENCES)
Year:2020 | Volume:12 | Issue:81/1|Papers Count:11

Moral semantics is one of the subjects of moral philosophy which discusses the semantic analysis of moral conceptions and propositions. Moral semantics has a close relationship with the ontology of ethical terms that solves many problems in moral philosophy. Major issues in moral semantics are the s tudy of the concepts of subject, predicate, and concepts in morality, such as perfection and happiness. This research intends to find Farabi’ s innovation by review of ethical concepts in Farabi’ s thought. Farabi considers the morally good as the relationship between moral actions and their result. He offers an explanation of the absolute good, rejects ethical relativism and proves realism about the morally good. He takes wisdom, in the special sense of the word, the virtue of a human unders tanding that intellects the bes t of things through the supreme knowledge. The supreme knowledge is a kind of rational knowledge with which humans get knowledge of the attainment to his perfection, through the firs t cause. Farabi by this meaning of wisdom explains the nearness of God and the need of man to God, even in achieving ultimate perfection. He by the definition of wisdom explained the kind of moral reality and the way to ultimate perfection in moral philosophy. It seems we can regard the explanation of the higher degree happiness through knowledge by presence of the relation of human perfections to the firs t cause, as completion of Farabi’ s theory.

The aim of the current essay is to s tudy the similarity between the epis temology of John Dewey and hermeneutical approach in philosophy. The author has sought to show that despite difference in intellectual origins of Dewey and such hermeneuticis ts as Dilthey one can find considerable overlaps between the epis temological approach of Dewey and the hermeneutical approach, and discern that they are basically of the same philosophical orientation. What is of a key role in the emergence of this interrelation is the concept of “ experience” . On the one hand, Dewey seeks via formation of a specific notion of experience – that as we see is different from empiricis t’ s notion of experience – to found his epis temology without the mediation of any metaphysical and transcendental idea. On the other hand, in hermeneutics of Wilhelm Dilthey the notion of “ lived experience” is of central place. This comparison reveals that the unders tanding of these two approaches of the concept of experience has numerous similarities and how these similarities close their philosophical s tances to each other insofar as one can s tate that Dewey’ s ins trumentalis t epis temology is indeed hermeneutical in its essence.

Merleau-Ponty’ s explanation of operative intentionality as embodied and motor intentionality opens a way to elucidate a new meaning of cons titution and objectivity. His analysis of such intentionality provides a tangible and pre-reflective but meaningful and embodied means for the purpose of having a world and intentional objects. Merleau-Ponty believes that consciousness, due to its intentional character, is directed toward its own objects in the world. The objects of consciousness are not determinate and definite things, but they are in the field that is intrinsically meaningful, and this meaning is revealed in the encounter of the subject. Consciousness uses the body as a point of view to encounter the objects. Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty places consciousness in the body and considers the body as a subject-body that is present in the world around itself and is in contact with the objects through perceptual experience. What emerges during this experience is a kind of pre-reflective perception of the tangible world as a place of practical life. The subject is always present within the world through his body and in this world he researches and acts and gives objectivity to indeterminate objects through embodied encounter. This determination is due to the motor intentionality and the synthethic unity of the body. In this article, we are going to highlight the role of the body in this determination.

Prior to transformation of actual phenomena to the ideals of scientific abs traction, the life-world points to the ground and foundation of them. The ontology of life-world that is seeking to grasp and unders tand essence of life-world as an a priori, aims at founding “ universal science” that Husserl has in mind. On the one hand Husserl thinks of life-world as foundation for entities that is opposed to scientifically true world, and on the other hand he thinks that objective science has rooted in life-world. In its concrete uniqueness the life-world is universal and includes of science, predicative-linguis tic and pre-scientific experience. Husserl’ s universal science should be able to grasp eidetic characteris tic of world, such a science had to concede a priori characteris tic of world as cons tructed through totality of essential possibilities not as perceived through empirical phenomena. Focus of ontology of life-world is on an a priori that defines s tructure of life-world, has eidetic characteris tic and that is open toward eidetic analysis. This is essence of object of science of life-world that makes such a science possible and necessary. It is possible because universal s tructures rules the life-world and is necessary because focus of science of life-world is on crisis of. meaning that demands a new and radical research.

Media and its influence on culture has been one of the issues considered by the thinkers of Frankfurt School. Their line of thinking and research based on the criticism of contemporary human situation from macro and micro aspects led to the expression of theories concerning the emergence and influence of capitalism. Through critical considerations, they developed a theory called culture indus try (Kulturindus trie) regarding the domination of capitalism in communications, culture and art. By analysis of culture in indus trial society, they reached the conclusion that mass media have led to the combination of art, philosophy and economy and turned the cultural values to a commodity. Moreover, in the s tudies of art from a critical point of view in Frankfurt School, two types of art are raised: original art and reproducible and consumer art. Graphic design as a reproducible art, in addition to having an aes thetic aspect, due to economic relations of contemporary capitalism has had a considerable share in the domain of media and promotion and expansion of capitalis t hegemony. It has es tablished its own place as an art in the domain of media within the economic sys tem. In the present s tudy the author has sought to s tudy the media role of graphic design as one of the mos t important factors of information and dissemination of social science in the context of culture indus try and at the same time to assay the artis tic aspects of this field.

Hans Reichenbach is the firs t philosopher that codified in the contemporary philosophy of science to provide a distinction between context of discovery and context of justification. The separation of the philosophy of science from other fields of study and the denial of any logic for context of discovery of his two main purposes has been the expression of this distinction. Responding to the claims of Otto Neurath and the leftists of the Vienna Circle, the German political structure of the 1930s, and the establishment of independent scientific philosophy, the motivations became for design the distinction by Reichenbach. After Reichenbach, there were different readings about this distinction. Some readings of this distinction does not match with the early viewpoint of Reichenbach. In order to explication and explanation the distinction between the two contexts, he refers to fourfold tasks, one of which is the particular field of “ psychology” and tasks of “ descriptive” , “ critical” , and “ advisory” belonging to epistemology. From Reichenbach’ s view, context of discovery following the task of psychology and context of justification is play a role merely at tasks of critical and second part advisory, and tasks of descriptive and firs t part advisory outside of the scope of context of justification. The purpose of this research examination and analysis is Reichenbach’ s reading of distinction between context of discovery and context of justification to get a proper understanding of the firs t place of this distinction, and so is the explanation and description of the fourfold tasks of philosophy from view Reichenbach of through the distinction.

Reflecting on the comments of Avicenna and Aquinas loose doubt about opposition to them concerning how to communicate between human soul and the body. Two seemingly opposite theories; Avicenna believes that the human soul is required by communication with the body. However, Aquinas believes that the human soul does not need for intermediaries to unite with the body. To resolve the apparent opinions between the two theories; with analytical approach it becomes clear that each of the philosophers with two different perspectives to consider when considering the connection between human soul and the body. Firs t perspective s tates that human soul is related to the body as form, and the second perspective s tates that activity of the soul in the body begins. The resulting analysis is not only that the two theories are not contradictory of each other but, if a dispute occurs about the ques tion of how to make the connection between human soul and the body is due to their view of unity. As Avicenna rejects unity he calls the connection between human soul and the body as a kind of thoughtful connection, while Aquinas adopts unity, sees the connection between human soul and the body as a kind of union. However, both philosophers know the human soul needs to communicate with the body. Both philosophers believe that in order for the human soul to carry out its activities in the body, mediation is needed or as Avicenna puts it “ bokhari” spirit, and Aquinas corporal’ s (or vital) spirit.

This article examines Manuel Vargas’ s revisionism, which is a theory of free will as a condition of moral responsibility. In this theory, both diagnos tic and prescriptive account of free will and moral responsibility in commonsense are explained. The diagnos tic account describes commonsense beliefs about free will and moral responsibility and prescriptive account aims to tell us how we ought to think about free will and moral responsibility. Commonsense intuitions about free will are Incompatibilis t and especially Libertarianis t. But prescriptive account can’ t be Libertarianism, since it has to assume indeterminism specifically in the subjective decision-making process, and this goes beyond the available evidences. It also can’ t be Eliminativism, because we can revise common sense about these things, in a way that to be consis tent. The prescriptive account is a kind of Compatibilism, free will, in this regard, is the ability to recognize moral considerations and guide their behavior in the light of these considerations. At the end, Vargas’ s use of Consequence Argument, citing empirical evidence, the use of a Compatibilis t concept of can and relying on Libertarianis t norms for interpretation his Prescriptive account has been criticized.

Subjectivism according to Heidegger’ s interpretation is the metaphysical foundation that begins with Plato and continues to Hegel and Nietzsche. Heidegger believes that Kant and Husserl have not only shown no way beyond Plato and Aris totle’ s philosophy and philosophy of medieval period, as well as in the new period, continued with Cartesian thought, but Kant himself and Husserl had a great anticipate in metaphysics of the subject. But the claim of this paper is that Heidegger disregarded the distinction between metaphysical and transcendental tradition in accordance with a consis tent narrative of Kant and Husserl’ s philosophy. By assuming empathy and accompanying Heidegger’ s critique of his tory of metaphysics, one can point to elements of transcendence in the thoughts of Kant and Husserl, which provides a way for non-humanis tic and non-metaphysical acquisitions of knowledge in the thought of these two philosophers. An intolerable and intangible thing that cannot be reduced to the subject and the object, but it is something that surrounds them and it is the foundation of thinking and the transcendental condition of any kind of human knowledge.

The present research is designed to answer the ques tion “ What is the relationship between the non-mental functions of the “ shabah” : with epis temological issues in Mulla Sadra’ s manuscripts? ” And with the approach of verbalization of the research in Mulla Sadra’ s lexical network He has been s tudying in the manuscripts of Mulla Sadra, He discusses the non-mental and non-epis temological aspects of the use of the “ shabah” word Like the organic nature, Conformity of exis tence and nature, Expressing the worlds of exis tence and their differences, And have introduced mys tical observations In each of them, relative or general correspondence of” shabah” / and truth has been accepted However, these are not at the initial viewpoint of epis temology and mentality But in the vas t majority of cases, they have epis temological manuscripts And in all cases, Mulla Sadra because of the great proximity Between theory of mental exis tence and “ shabah” theory Disregard the lack of realism of the “ shabah” in creatures outside the category of s tate/keif/ The realization of the “ shabah” is tolerated However, in cognitive cases, it is precisely clarifying this difference It. and solves it with its mental exis tence theory

The famous dispute between Illumination Philosophy of Sohrawardi and Transcendental Philosophy of Sadr al Motaallehin is on the denotation of the term “ wojud” (exis tence). While Sohrawardi says nothing is denoted by this term so “ there is nothing in reality the nature of which is exis tence” , Sadr al Motallehin says “ the only genuine reality is exis tence” , so, the term denotes. Among Sadr al Motaallehin’ s replies to Sohrawadi s tands out his new analysis of the predicate “ mowjud” (exis tent) in terms of “ that which exis ts” rather than “ an entity possessing exis tence” . Through this new analysis, he tries to retain the traditional belief that “ wojud” is a univocal term, count the term among denoting ones and at the same time, block the infinite regress. We can take issue with him on behalf of Sohrawadi: the new analysis is either applicable to all derivations of words that share the form “ mowjud” or is peculiar to this word alone. The firs t option faces numerous counter examples. The second amounts to begging the ques tion. Consequently, we can defend Sohrawardi’ s position: the term “ mowjud” is either equivocal or fails to denote anything objective and refers only to a subjective conventional concept. This difference of opinion s tems from a more profound one about the semantic theory of general terms or predicates.