Metaphysical Investigations
Year:2022 | Volume:2 | Issue:4|Papers Count:12

Mulla Sadra states the eleven principles in proving the bodily resurrection in volume ninth of the book of Asfar. In the ninth principle, he states that the imaginary world is a world that is not dependent on the body and is an abstract substance that is located between the world of intellectual separate substances and the material world. To prove this world, he suffices with the intuitions of mystics and the doctrine of the nobler contingent. Now Mulla Sadra uses the proof of the separate imaginary world in the discussion of bodily resurrection. Explain that since the soul is able to create beings in the separate imaginary world, and according to the substantial motion and existential intensity of the soul, which is the basis for proving the bodily resurrection, the soul is able to create a separate body in the imaginary world between the body and the worldly body is an object. Because the objectivity and individuality of everything exists in its form. So, since the soul is a soul, whether it belongs to the worldly body or to the imaginary body, it is still a body because objectivity belongs to that soul. So it is concluded that Sadra uses the separate imaginary world to prove the objectivity of the worldly and otherworldly bodies.

The issue of intelligence is one of the fundamental issues of human and one of the few issues that human beings is faced in all areas. It plays an essential role in various scientific fields, industries, individual and social life measures, etc. Intelligence is defined as a set of diverse general talents and abilities including learning and understanding things, adapting to the environment, utilizing past experiences, analyzing, applying sound judgment, and reasoning and finding the logical solution in the face of different situations and problems. However, so far the true nature of intelligence has not been introduced by scientists and they have limited themselves to its definition, function and types. The fancy in Sadra’ s philosophy is degraded intellect. Fancy replaces reason in relation to matter and imagination and perceives meanings and generalities when they added to details and instances. With a close look at the system of Sadra’ s philosophy and intelligence in the view of scientists; it can be argued that the fancy in transcendent wisdom is related to intelligence and can be analyzed in relation to each other.

Jonathan Kvanvig, a philosopher of contemporary religion, while rejecting traditional theories about the issue of the punishment of hell and torment in hell, believes that God created hell like paradise more than the attribute of his justice based on his love of servants, which culminated in The final choice of a person is to turn to God or turn away from Him. This reluctance and enthusiasm leads the hellish person, after the prescribed period of punishment commensurate with sin, to choose his own destruction, in which way the immortality of the torment will be removed from him. But it seems that such an account of the divine love that accompanies one's non-existence is not only an expression of the truth of God's love and kindness, but also inconsistent with God's purpose for the creation and continuation of existence and life. Therefore, the basis of expressing this love is not compatible with the destruction of man. But the full expression of divine love in the subject of hell can be declared in a place where the people of hell are called to join God, and they, after seeing the truth and learning from the consequences of deeds, respond positively to that call. Therefore, if we consider hell as a symbolic state of regret and regret resulting from the results of human choices and actions, since this regret and regret arises from within man and is not imposed on him from outside his being, it can not have the aspect of punishment.

In the discussion of the religious language, different philosophers have each addressed their own theoretical foundations and tried to theorize about this issue. However, in contemporary debates about the religious language, the relationship between nominalist approaches and the religious language has not yet been systematically examined and the dimensions of the debate have not been clarified. In this article, while introducing one of the most radical nominalist theories, namely Reism, we have studied the relationship between reism and the religious language. To this end, we assessed the historical relationship between nominalism and the religious language, especially from Ockham to Kant, and then, by proposing Kotarbinski's semantical perspectives as well as the logical system of reism, we applied reism to the religious language.

Searching for immortality and spiritual perfections is one of authentic and essential properties of human being. The event of death, but, is as the most important obstacle against actualizing human being’ s immortality. Since due to dying, his/her hope regarding immortality will be destroyed. So, if human being considers his/her immortality restricted to this mundane universe, confronting with death will involve with despair and lose his/her meaning of life. Answering to such a problem, the most significant strategy is the teaching of hereafter, that is, believing that death is not the end of our life, but the real object of our immortality will actualize in the hereafter life. By helping of such teaching, not only human being’ s authentic desire of immortality will get its real meaning, but he/she considers death as the primary step for interning to the immortal hereafter. So, teaching of hereafter, meanwhile guaranteeing the real object of our desire concerning immortality in the hereafter, makes meaningful his/her mundane life and its goods and evils. In this paper, it is aimed to analyze human being’ s virtues regarding immortality, and to study their relations with the teaching of hereafter, and their role for making meaning to his/her life by referring to Islamic teaching like the verses of the Quran.

In the phenomenology of Husserl, subjectivity is important as a prior necessity, insight, and a self-evident in our consciousness, hence it’ s not produced or cleared as content. Does it mean Husserl ignored subjectivity and its value as content in human minds? If it's not, how we have owned it? Or is it the subjectivity placement inside an object or against it? Neither! Because both of them may mislead us. We aren't the subject or its owner, we only select a single type of concept and delimit it by subjectivity. It's not a probabilistic action, because we only separate a concept from others, then introject it as a predicate without every content. After all, there are empty and it’ s only stimulate our sensibility without every new data. In this paper, we change our point of view from the primacy of the subject to the object’ s effect on consciousness as the sphere of ownness, between us and other things or other minds.

Philosophical understanding of the concept of God, and theological understanding of the concept of God from the beginning has faced challenges and conflicts that may be the culmination of this conflict in the Tahafat of Ghazali Philosophers who excommunicated philosophers for believing in three issues. The purpose of this research is to re-read Ghazali's critiques of philosophers and to test his point of view, then to examine the strengths and weaknesses of Ibn Rushd's defense. Al-Ghazali has rightly realized that proving the existence of God is a difficult path by proving the step of the universe, however, believing in the temporal existence of the universe also has false consequences that are no less than the consequences of the teachings of philosophers. Regarding the knowledge of God in detail, Ibn Rushd's answer seems appropriate and can solve Ghazali's objection in this regard. Al-Ghazali differs from Ibn Rushd in that he cites the Qur'an to prove the knowledge of God in all its details, but the philosopher comments on something about which he cannot have a correct and accurate understanding. Regarding the physical resurrection, Ibn Rushd harmonizes the interpretation between philosophical truth and religious teaching, but with the disagreement of Ibn Rushd and Ghazali about the interpretation in the final judgment.

From the viewpoint of Hegel, dualism is the main reason for need to philosophy. He founded his school, in order to cope with dualism which was the main challenge of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant's philosophical schools. To deal with this challenge, Hegel needed to deny Kantian Noumenon as the main burden. As a result of this denial, He transformed both matter and form of Knowledge to mind. Considering that these two are created by the mind, it is necessary to reduce all beings to thought, and this is Absolute Idealism. In this article, the researcher employs the term" Omnijectivism" instead of Absolute Idealism. From the viewpoint of this school the world, and all beings are the result of the interdependency of mind and object or spirit and body. Omnijectivism of this school can be found in Hegel's particular analysis of subject-object, in the interdependency of finite and infinite, and his different approach to Absolute Spirit as embodiment of subject.

There is a facsimile copy of a manuscript, no. 113, in Minavi library which has a copy of “ Arba’ ein al-Haqayeq” (Forty Facts), a treatise that attributed to al-Ghazali. Studying this treatise shows it is not from Ghazali. Because, first of all, there are a few doctrines which are in contradiction to Ghazali’ s thoughts, such as of interpreting of the verse of Kuran (7: 172) about which Ghazali says it should be understand far from its literal meaning, or eliminating saying orally the Islamic words or acting according to Islamic laws from faith; secondly, the style of writing is not like of Ghazali himself or even his era; thirdly, the manuscripts that we have in hand is a new one, to such a extent that they are not reliable to attributed to him based on oldness of codices. In this paper I prove that this work is not from Ghazali’ s pen.

Max Scheler while examining the relationship between human cognition and social contexts along with real and concrete matters, has also considered the ideal elements and values in his analysis and among these, one of his main goals in combining sociological topics with philosophical themes have been to achieve a comprehensive knowledge of man. Despite acknowledging the influence of social factors, Scheler considers the principle of thought to be an independent category that cannot be reduced entirely to the external factors. This is an important point of Scheler, because, he does not make the development of knowledge dependent only on the influence of historical and social conditions, but also on human characteristics. In his view, in a comprehensive view of man, in addition to reason, his emotional and value aspects should also be considered. In this paper, by analyzing Scheler’ s phenomenological approach, including in the field of ethics, tries to show how he, by combining different fields, has gone beyond the usual dichotomies and developed the sociology of knowledge. The findings of this process indicate that the whole of Scheler’ s intellectual project is an attempt to integrate and accompany areas of human knowledge that at first seems contradictory and cannot be summed up, but with a comprehensive view of man and society.

Qualitative experience (Qoalia) is one of the biggest obstacles to the truth of physicalism. How to explain joy, happiness, sorrow and pain with physics is not a simple dilemma for physicists. In the meantime, Barbara Montero; One of the most famous claimants of physicalism, by presenting a special meaning of "is" in the definition of physicalism (everything is physical) claims that development can be created in the "physical" sense. For example, when we say "water is H2O", it does not necessarily mean that water is the same as H2O, but it can mean that water is derived from and composed of H2O. Correspondingly, qualitative experiences (mental affairs), although not the same as physical (mental) affairs, are metaphysical and based on them, and the same amount is sufficient for the qualitative experiences of physical experiences. In this article, we present the translation of "Physicalism" by Barbara Montero in three steps, critique metaphysics and prove that this doctrine proves the maximum coexistence or change between mental and physical matters. And the coexistence or change between mental and physical matters cannot be a valid reason for applying the word "physical" to qualitative experiences such as pleasure.