Avicennian Philosophy Journal
Year:2021 | Volume:25 | Issue:65|Papers Count:13

An important task in the fields of ethics and practical wisdom is the examination of whether and how alteration of dispositions is possible. Avicenna is among the philosophers who believed in the alterability of dispositions, and in his several works explained how the alteration could happen. He thought that deplorable dispositions have their roots in lack of moderation in powers of the soul, especially the powers stimulating the animal soul. Therefore, from his point of view, alteration of disposition is realized only through moderation in those powers as well as through the triumph of intellectual power. By moderation in powers, Avicenna means the establishment of a middle course between two extremes, and believes that this is realized in two ways; The first way is based on trying to do good deeds and being careful about one’ s jurisprudential duties and prayers, and ethics is responsible for explaining these affairs. The second way is through moderation in temperament, which is more difficult and studied in medical science. Moderation in temperament, he thinks, is possible, first, through using foods and spices that right the temperament, and, second, through imagining a moderate temperament. In his view, the second way is far more impactful than the first, due to the status of the soul in managing and affecting the body and the degree to which the soul can influence the body.

God’ s prior knowledge of the creatures, before their creation, is one of the most complex topics of God’ s attributes in theology, which various opinions have been expressed about it, one of the most famous of which is Ibn Sina’ s inverted forms. In this article, we aim to review Lahiji's different readings of the theory. Lahiji first accepts the famous reading of Ibn Sina’ s imprinted forms. According to this theory, God Almighty precedes the creation of objects by imprinted forms that are based on the divine Essence and the essentials of the essence. But this theory was criticized by many Islamic philosophers and theologians after Ibn Sina. Therefore, Lahiji raised objections by presenting a different reading of the theory of imprinted forms to get rid of the drawbacks. He believes that 'Ilm-i Ijmā lī (collective knowledge) is the same as Ilm-i Tafṣ ī lī (detailed knowledge). And their differentiation is due to the analysis of the human mind; whereas the knowledge of God is being the same as the Divine Essence in terms of simplicity and oneness. Due to the fact, therefore, the different reading of the scholar Lahiji is getting close to Mullah Sadra's theory expressing God’ s eternal knowledge of the creatures is collective as well as detailed.

Perhaps it can be said that throughout the history of philosophy what make the concept of universal problematic were its epistemic, ontological, and theological functions. Of course, such functions are the results of ultra-understanding in terms of logical views. In this regard, Avicenna's particular view of the natural universal, which in the light of its unconditional credentials emphasizes its nature and description of rationality, made it possible to compare with Hegel's concrete universal with the same description. Therefore, the relationship between the sensible, the rational world, the immateriality of the soul, the universal relationship with one's own individuals, and the problem of identity and individuality are among the issues that justify the functions. But what expresses the relationship between Hegel and Avicenna's thoughts in this article is, first of all, their focus on secondary or philosophical intelligibility of the universal and its functions-which have been shaped in the light of Aristotle-Platonic thoughts. Undoubtedly, in analyzing the universal and its determinations, both thinkers accepted its objective realization in its individuals but according to Hegel, the concretive universal in the term of Avicenna's philosophy is a mixed and conditioned essence of the thing which is presented on a level beyond the essence and being (i. e. the intellectual form) and appears a quite affirmative mode. Whereas what obscures the natural universal with its negative mode at the level of essence is how it exists. Moreover, Hegel analyzed the concrete universal and allowed the inference of plurality from unity, an inference that Avicenna opposes due to the principle of al-Wahid (rule of unity). Therefore, Hegel has finally fallen into the trap of conceptualism.

Disinterestedness in the aesthetics means that the aesthetic judgment should be free or pure of any interests including cognitive, moral, and beneficial satisfactions. In other words, the aesthetic judgments should be grounded in disinterestedness in the sense of not being based on my mental desire, what is good, and what is morally good for me. Although the issue had been coined in the philosophy of Kant and has been introduced as one of the innovations of his aesthetics, studying Avicenna's thoughts on pleasure and beauty reveals that he, also, emphasized the issue. He used the specific term of “ Mola'em” defining as agreeableness and pleasure. In his opinion, Mola'em is the perfection and goodness of perceptive faculty or special action of the faculty. He emphasized that pleasure was perceived solely by the Mola'em so other things like agreeable, what is good for the perceiver, and what is morally good do not interfere to obtain Mola'em or pleasure in the faculty. Since the perceiving of beauty is limited in obtaining Mola'em or perceiving pleasure, the concept of disinterestedness in his aesthetics is apprehensible. Kant discussed four particular unique features of aesthetic judgments and calls them ‘ moments. One of them is the disinterestedness in aesthetic judgments. So, his argument is more obvious and deeper than Avicenna's. Therefore, first, I present a comprehensive review of Avicenna’ s thoughts on beauty and his idea about disinterestedness in perceiving pleasure and beauty by the descriptive-analytical method. Then, I would compare it with the idea of Kant about the disinterestedness in aesthetics. The results show that the disinterestedness described by Avicenna and Kant is similar. So, we can claim that the concept that Kant has focused on, had already been noted by Avicenna.

This article aims to review the theory of peripatetic hylomorphism and its foundations in the face of new physical perspectives (theory of Atom). For this purpose, two competing views of this theory in the history of Islamic philosophy, that is, the theory attributed to the Stoics (by Abolbarakat and Suhrawardi) and Atomism in its philosophical (small solid objects) and theology interpretations (a substance that cannot be further broken down), have been studied. Then, the approach of contemporary thinkers towards the theory of hylomorphism is examined. Furthermore, it has been shown that their views can be divided into three groups. Two groups of them have rejected the theory of hylomorphism. Furthermore, each of them has somehow supported one of its historically rival theories. Mohyeddin Elahi Ghomshei and Hassanzadeh Amoli have become interested in Atomism, and Mesbah Yazdi and Fayyazi have tended to the theory attributed to the Stoics. Others such as Fazel Touni and Allameh Tabataba’ i have tried to somehow reconcile this theory with the theory of small solid objects and a new perspective on physics. Nevertheless, some of the foundations of hylomorphism theory face various philosophical and empirical challenges. Such as knowing that the body is connected, the body parts are not present, and that the prime matter (Hyle) still exists.

Intellection is one of the most important characteristics of human beings. Therefore, discussing rational perceptions and the quality of their emergence is of great significance. Ibn Sina attributes the emergence of rational concepts to the generalization of partial perceptions and connection with the active intellect. In comparison, Mulla Sadra considers intellection as the result of observing the lords of types and being united with rational truths. According to both philosophers, the power of reason and rational perceptions are immaterial and independent of physical faculties. Hence, intellection does not inherently require the body. But due to the fact that the soul belongs to the body, it needs the body and its tools for reasoning. The body and physical faculties act as the underlying causes for the emergence of rational perceptions. On the one hand, according to Ibn Sina’ s duality of soul and body, the body is a separate being from the soul that provides the conditions for the perfection and actuality of the soul. On the other hand, according to Mulla Sadra, soul and body are united and thus are different, intense degrees of a single whole. Therefore, a degree would provide conditions for the perfection of another. In this article, we explore the role of the body in the emergence of rational perceptions and compare the views of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra on the issue.

Avicennian interpretation of the Verse of Light is not limited to the works of Avicenna. But, It has also been at the center of attention in other philosophies and approaches of Quranic interpretations. Ones who are interested in philosophy acknowledged Avicenna's interpretation and defend it, in a manner that rests on philosophical foundations, but ones who are not interested in philosophy pessimistically refuse it. Thus, the paper aims to study Avicenna's interpretation from the perspective of ijtihā di interpretation (an inferential method of interpretation). I will not employ a philosophical language that is perhaps not acceptable by many thinkers. Through this new perspective, I would raise arguments that reveal the accuracy of Avicenna's interpretation. In this study, I will show how Avicenna's interpretation is correspondent with esoteric interpretations of Verse of Light as well as other readings of the verse, interpretational narratives, and Ubayy ibn Ka'b’ s interpretation. Finally, I conclude that Avicenna's interpretation is not only incompatible with what generally is comprehended from the apparent content of the verse, but also is it completely compatible with some other readings of the verse. I will also show that, despite what some have claimed, Avicenna's interpretation does not impose a philosophical meaning on the Holy Quran.

Joy and sorrow are the most important and fundamental states that happen for every person in his life. Among Muslim thinkers, Ibn Sina has made great efforts to analyze and study these sensual qualities and has examined them in the light of the relationship between al-nafs al-nā ṭ iqah and the body, as well as the states of the vaporous spirit. The present study examined the three main issues: A) The reality of joy and sorrow; the corresponding relationship between pleasure and joy as well as sorrow and pain, and the occurrence of one state in human beings needs the occurrence of another state; B) The quality that joy and sorrow are manifested in the human soul; Ibn Sina considers Joy and sorrow to affect human beings in two ways: carnal perceptions and physical effects. C) The effect of joy and sorrow on human health and disease. Each of the joy and sorrow plays an important role in human health due to the effects they have on the vaporous spirit. According to Ibn Sina, the repetition of joy leads to more joy in human beings, and the repetition of sorrow leads to more sorrow in human beings. Other findings indicate that joy and sorrow are divided into three sensory, imaginary, and intellectual types.

We aim to explore emotions in response to artworks according to Ibn Sī nā 's philosophy. To arouse emotions and imagination are the main features that define an artwork in Avicennian philosophy. The issue finds expression mainly in his treatises on poetry and music. Among various styles of poems, Ibn Sī nā ' meticulously discusses emotions in his definition of tragedy and epic e. g. he holds words and the meaning of the styles would be composed in a way that arouses emotions like passion, pity, and sympathy. Thus, we seek to address the raised questions: what kinds of emotions are aroused in facing a work of art? What factors evoke emotions? How do emotions interact with the perception and judgment of the artworks and their beauty? The paper is divided into four parts dealing with the definition of form and beauty as the main elements of a work of art in Ibn Sī nā 's view, different types of emotion that a work of art can elicit the factors that evoke emotion, and the role of emotions in perceiving art. The findings reveal that the collaboration of the three factors of form, imagination, and human nature paves the way to evoke emotions. As the objective component, the artwork consists of Hosn-e-nazm (order), Hosn-e-ta’ lī f (beautiful composition), and e'tedā l (harmony) that elicit passion. Using more complicated designs and stories, unexpected endings, or specific figures of speech in poetry, for instance, are the techniques Ibn Sī nā suggest attracting the audiences profoundly. Imagination and human nature are the subjective elements that reflect more in cultural aspects. Ibn Sina believes that the feeling of happiness would be aroused when people of various regions find the musical rhythm in harmony with their cultural taste. Moreover, emotions in concert with cognitions are ways to understand the meaning and judge the beauty and value of a work of art.

Telekinesis is a topic in parapsychology discussed in the light of empirical and philosophical perspectives. The ability of Telekinesis is demonstrated through experiences and experiments. However, how it is intellectually possible, would be explained by philosophical approaches. To understand Ibn Sina's philosophical explanation of Telekinesis, we need to study the position of the principle of causality in his philosophy, his views on how the mind and the matter interact, and also his perceptions of nature. Approving the principle of causality and expanding its sense from physical causality to non-physical, Ibn Sina holds Telekinesis as a natural phenomenon, which is incompatible with the cosmic order. Moreover, he believes that Telekinesis is possible through the interaction of the mind with the world around.

According to Avicennian philosophy, action is based on faculties of perception and movement. Diversity of perceptual faculties and, more importantly, the threefold function of composition, elaboration, and imitation of imaginative power, and the influence of taste, faculties, and schema on the action offer a different face of the "action" issuance process. The main question of the present study is: Based on the metacognitive analysis of action and the inner capacities of Ibn Sina's philosophy, how many processes of action issuance can be counted? The finding results are as the following: 1. Contrary to the common readings of Ibn Sina's philosophy on the issuance of action, it should be said: We do not face a simple process, rather various processes of issuance of action; At least fourteen processes of issuance of "action" have been deduced from the works of Ibn Sina. 2. Contrary to some readings, Ibn Sina discussed the imitation of the imaginative faculty in various works. 3. Forms and meanings lead to the action sometimes before and sometimes after the composition and elaboration. And sometimes the metaphors of form and meaning are the sources of action; 4. There are four types of control over "action" of the faculties of imagination and thought: basic voluntary control, Non-basic immediate voluntary control, Long-term voluntary control, and Indirect voluntary control. It is worth noting that no research has been carried out on the presentation of the fourteen processes of action issuance and the four forms of action.

Peripatetics believe in the existence of a causal relationship between the human soul and its faculties. They state that faculties and powers have a dependent and inseparable status of the soul. Generally speaking, causality needs the cognation of cause and effects, which is possible in the light of a certain kind of existential cognation. As cognation requires the superiority of creative agents over their effects and indicates the existential gradation between them. Therefore, the causal relationship between the soul and the faculties is not an exception, and the type of ontological relationship between them is based on the main rules of peripatetic philosophy. In this regard, any kinds of pure multiplicity and distinction between the soul and the faculties lead to a definite denial of the causal relationship between them and challenge the ontological and the inseparable connection between the soul and the faculties. So, this is the human soul that refers causality to the soul via the terms of principle, origin, source-in the sense of the existence of the objective aspect of the soul in relation to the faculties and addresses the effect to the faculties through the terms such as effect, sub-functions, and functions. This shows the acquisition of the objective existence of faculties by the human soul. Then, how is it possible that the faculties are known as the branches, sub-branches, and accessories of their actual cause share their existence with the objective reality of the cause?