ECONOMIC RESEARCH REVIEW
Year:2007 | Volume:7 | Issue:1 (24 SPECIAL ISSUE TAX)|Papers Count:7

Taxes as the most reliable source of income for government are the focus of attention for policy makers. But as these important sources of income and economic policy instrument have negative effect in resource allocation, economists are analyzing bases of tax system that hasn't these inefficient effects on economic resource allocation. Introducing new bases for taxation, by using the theory of externalities ended up to the environmental taxes or Green Tax. These tax bases not even doesn't have negative effect on resource allocation, but on the contrary, makes allocation of resources more efficient.As green taxes are levy on expenditures or market place, it can be expanded through all the markets by external diseconomy effects. This advantage of amount able income for government makes it possible to reduce other disturbing taxes. So there is a double effect on efficiency.This study uses a Rotterdam system of demand equation to analyze this issue.

The main goal of this paper is to examine appropriate tax regime in Iran. Most of the studies in Iran's economy have suggested a consumption tax regime with coordination between Fiscal and Tax policies.In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the consumption tax regime is the most appropriate regime for Iran by using the Mundell-Fleming model and 2SLS Method for 1974-2004.The estimated macro-econometrics model has been used to simulate the reaction of three tax regimes to Government debt shocks. The results reveal that the consumption tax is expected to yield a more stable price, welfare, wage and imports.

The management of the country's tax system can't achieve to its goals, without knowing and considering dominant tax culture and its administration. This paper determining factors of tax culture of taxpayers in Tehran and prioritizing among them. This paper reviews characteristics of tax culture of several countries. Methods used in this research are field, applied, exploratory, and descriptive. Gathered data are the result of distributed questionnaires among taxpayers in Tehran. For determining tax culture factors, analysis method of data is Factor Analysis. With use of Principle Component Analysis method and Varimax Rotation, dependency of every variable on every factor was determined. As result, 3 factors, that had most variance, were determined. First: tax equity and tax organization performance factor that includes equity, non-confidence to tax principals, tax organization transparency, tax spending, responsibility, corruption, and tax type variables. Second: truthfulness and responsibility of taxpayers factor that includes not presenting data, lying, and being pride of not paying tax, and social responsibility variables. Three: bias to pay tax factor that includes tax evasion, negotiation, and resistance on not paying tax variables.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the tax behavior of foreign legal entities in Iran according to the information of their tax files from 2000 - 2002, the comments of foreign legal entities tax experts and by using the statistical instruments such as t-student distribution, binominal distribution and Freedman test.Findings show that because there is no access to the abroad information of the foreign legal entities' headquarters, the assessment of the foreign legal entities' taxable income by using their financial statements and calculating their net profit/loss is useless. It is therefore suggested to use an approach based on the domestic information of these entities and conducting tax calculations using constant coefficients and rates. 

In this paper by assumption the probability of tax collusion and Violation, we study the policy of tax payers, inspectors and government in a triple game. On the base of Nash bargaining solution and determination of appropriate domain of bribery, we analyze separately the policy of government in using honest inspectors, dishonest inspectors and both of them in verification the reports of taxpayers. Then we calculate the optimum revenues of each side in an equilibrium state of each game.

The filing of tax-return which comprising the total taxable revenue, has been canceled since 2001.In this survey the reasons of canceling and the feasibility study of its re-establishment is studied.Among the main reasons are, lack of an efficient system, necessary procedures, poor exchange of communication of taxable revenue responsible with individual tax payers.